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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Supreme Court Case No. 43553
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

THOMAS N. TOWNSEND,
Defendant-Appellant.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE GERALD F. SCHROEDER

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

000001

Date: 10/29/2015

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 11 :08 AM

User: TCWEGEKE

ROA Report

Page 1 of 4

Case: CR-MD-2013-000411 O Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder
Defendant: Townsend, Thomas N

State of Idaho vs. Thomas N Townsend
Date

Code

User

3/28/2013

NCRM

PRADAMKD

New Case Filed - Misdemeanor

Magistrate Court Clerk

PROS

PRADAMKD

Prosecutor assigned Ada County Prosecutor

Magistrate Court Clerk

HRSC

TCWADAMC

Hearing Scheduled (CA- Clerk Bond Out
Appearance 04/15/2013 03:00 PM)

Magistrate Court Clerk

BNDS

TCWADAMC

Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 500.00 )

Magistrate Court Clerk

PCFO ·

PRADAMKD

Charge Filed - Cause Found on charges 1 and 2 Magistrate Court Clerk

AFPD

TCTORRGR

Application For Public Defender

CLAP

TCPOSELM

Hearing result for CA- Clerk Bond Out
Magistrate Court Clerk
Appearance scheduled on 04/15/2013 03:00 PM:
Clerk Appearance

CHGA

TCPOSELM

Judge Change: Administrative

John Hawley Jr.

ORPD

TCPOSELM

Order Appointing Public Defender Ada County
Public Defender

John Hawley Jr.

HRSC

TCPOSELM

Hearing Scheduled (AC Pretrial Conference
05/01/201310:15 AM)

John Hawley Jr.

HRSC

TCPOSELM

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/29/2013 08:15 John Hawley Jr.
AM)

PLEA

TCPOSELM

A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (118-8004 {M}
Driving Under the Influence)

John Hawley Jr.

PLEA

TCPOSELM

A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (149-301
Drivers License or Commercial Drivers License
Violation)

John Hawley Jr.

NHPD ·

TCPOSELM

Notice & Order Of Hearing/appointment Of Pd

John Hawley Jr.

4/4/2013

RQDD

TCTONGES

Defendant's Request for Discovery

John Hawley Jr.

4/17/2013

RSDS

TCTONGES

State/City Response to Discovery

John Hawley Jr.

RQDS.

TCTONGES

State/City Request for Discovery

John Hawley Jr.

4/25/2013

MOTS

TCCHRIKE

Motion to Suppress Evidence and Supporting
Memorandum

John Hawley Jr.

4/30/2013

RSDS

TCCHRIKE

State/City Response to Discovery/ Addendum

John Hawley Jr.

5/1/2013

PTMM

TCFINNDE

Pretrial Memorandum & Notice

John Hawley Jr.

HRVC

TCFINNDE

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
05/29/2013 08: 15 AM: Hearing Vacated

John Hawley Jr.

HRHD

TCFINNDE

Hearing result for AC Pretrial Conference
scheduled on 05/01/2013 10:15 AM: Hearing
Held- Set Suppression Hearing

John Hawley Jr.

5/2/2013

HRSC

TCFINNDE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/24/2013 03:30
PM)

John Hawley Jr.

5/7/2013

RSDS

TCTONGES

John Hawley Jr.

6/13/2013

OBJE

TCTONGES

State/City Response to Discovery/ second
addendum
Objection to Motion to Suppress and Brief in
Response

6/24/2013

HRHD

TCFINNDE

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
06/24/2013 03:30 PM: Hearing Held

John Hawley Jr.

4/1/2013

Judge

Magistrate Court Clerk

John Hawley Jr.
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Date: 10/29/2015
Time: 11 :08 AM

User: TCWEGEKE

ROA Report

Page 2 of 4

Case: CR-MD-2013-000411 O Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder
Defendant: Townsend, Thomas N

State of Idaho vs. Thomas N Townsend
Date

Code

User

6/26/2013

MOTS

TCTONGES

Material in Support of State's Responses to
Motion to Suppress

John Hawley Jr.

7/24/2013

MEMO

TCFINNDE

Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to
Suppress Evidence

John Hawley Jr.

CERT

TCFINNDE

Certificate Of Mailing

John Hawley Jr.

MOTN

TCFINNDE

Motion to Suppress Denied

John Hawley Jr.

BAAT

PDPRECJR

ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH

9/23/2013

Judge

PROCESSING (batch process) Nicole Owens,
7679 removed. PD HAWLEY #17 assigned.

BAAT

PDPRECJR

ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH
PROCESSING (batch process) PD HAWLEY #17
removed. Heidi M Tolman, 8478 assigned.

10/21/2013

HRSC,

TCFINNDE

Hearing Scheduled (AC Pretrial Conference

John Hawley Jr.

11/05/2013 09:15 AM)
HRSC

TCFINNDE

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 12/04/2013 08:15 John Hawley Jr.

AM)
11/5/2013

NOTH

TCFINNDE

Notice Of Hearing

John Hawley Jr.

PTMM

TCFINNDE

Pretrial Memorandum & Notice

John Hawley Jr.

HRVC

TCFINNDE

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
12/04/2013 08:15 AM: Hearing Vacated

John Hawley Jr.

HRHD

TCFINNDE

Hearing result for AC Pretrial Conference
scheduled on 11/05/2013 09:15AM: Hearing
Held- Set for SH

Gregory Kalbfleisch

HRSC

TCFINNDE

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 12/10/2013

John Hawley Jr.

09:30 AM)
12/10/2013

HRHD

TCFINNDE

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on
12/10/2013 09:30 AM: Hearing Held

John Hawley Jr.

PLEA

TCFINNDE

A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (118-8004
{M}{2} Driving Under the lnfluence-(Second
Offense))

John Hawley Jr.

FIGT

TCFINNDE

Finding of Guilty (118-8004 {M}{2} Driving Under
the lnfluence-(Second Offense))

John Hawley Jr.

REDU

TCFINNDE

Charge Reduced Or Amended (118-8004 {M}{2}
Driving Under the lnfluence-(Second Offense))

John Hawley Jr.

OSOL

TCFINNDE

Order Suspending Drivers License Driver License John Hawley Jr.
1 Years

JAIL

TCFINNDE

Sentenced to Jail or Detention (118-8004 {M}{2}
Driving Under the lnfluence-(Second Offense))
Confinement terms: Jail: 365 days. Suspended
jail: 345 days. Credited time: 1 day.

PROB

TCFINNDE

Probation Ordered (118-8004 {M}{2} Driving
John Hawley Jr.
Under the lnfluence-(Second Offense)) Probation
term: 2 years O months O days. (Misdemeanor
Supervised)

John Hawley Jr.
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Date: 10/29/2015

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 11 :08 AM

User: TCWEGEKE

ROA Report

Page 3 of 4

Case: CR-MD-2013-000411 O Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder
Defendant: Townsend, Thomas N

State of Idaho vs. Thomas N Townsend
Date

Code ·

User

Judge

12/10/2013

PLEA

TCFINNDE

A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (149-301
Drivers License or Commercial Drivers License
Violation)

John Hawley Jr.

FIGT

TCFINNDE

Finding of Guilty (149-301 Drivers License or
Commercial Drivers License Violation)

John Hawley Jr.

STAT

TCFINNDE

STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action John Hawley Jr.

SNPF

TCFINNDE

Sentenced To Pay Fine 1197.50 charge: 118-8004 John Hawley Jr.
{M}{2} Driving Under the lnfluence-(Second
Offense)

osoo

TCFINNDE

Other Sentencing Option Ordered: Alcohol
Evaluation within 90 days - follow
recommendations

osoo

TCFINNDE

Other Sentencing Option Ordered: Victims Panel John Hawley Jr.

SNPF

TCFINNDE

Sentenced To Pay Fine 302.50 charge: 149-301
Drivers License or Commercial Drivers License
Violation

John Hawley Jr.

John Hawley Jr.

TCFINNDE

Supervised Misdemeanor Probation Order

John Hawley Jr.

STIP

TCFINNDE

Stipulation to Enter Condition Plea of Guilty

John Hawley Jr.

NDRS

TCBROWJM

Notice of Defendant's Responsibilities after
Sentencing

John Hawley Jr.

NOSP

TCMORGAM

Notification Of Subsequent Penalties*DUI*

John Hawley Jr.

APDC

TCLANGAJ

Appeal Filed In District Court

John Hawley Jr.

CAAP

TCLANGAJ

Case Appealed:

John Hawley Jr.

STAT

TCLANGAJ

STATUS CHANGED: Reopened

John Hawley Jr.

MOTN

TCLANGAJ

HRSC ·

TCEDWAAM

Motion for Stay of Execution of Sentence Pending John Hawley Jr.
Appeal
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/07/2014 11 :45
Michael McLaughlin
AM) Motion to Stay Execution of Sentence
Pending Appeal

NOTH

TCEDWAAM

Notice Of Hearing

DCHH

TCEDWAAM

ORDR

TCEDWAAM

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Michael McLaughlin
01/07/2014 11 :45 AM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100
John Hawley Jr.
Order of Release

1/27/2014

VPC

TCLANGAJ

Victim's Impact Panel Completed

2/11/2014

ORDR

TCEDWAAM

6/18/2014

CHRE

CCNELSRF

6/19/2014

NOPA

TCOLSOMC

John Hawley Jr.
Order Staying Execution of Sentence Pending
Appeal
Change Assigned Judge: Reassignment (should Michael McLaughlin
have been done on 12/12/2013 When Notice of
Appeal was filed)
Michael McLaughlin
Notice of Preparation of Appeal Transcript

6/24/2014

NOTR

CCNELSRF

Notice Of Reassignment

12/12/2013

1/6/2014

1/7/2014

Michael McLaughlin

John Hawley Jr.
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Gerald Schroeder

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Date: 10/29/2015
Time: 11 :08 AM

User: TCWEGEKE

ROA Report

Page 4 of 4

Case: CR-MD-2013-0004110 Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder
Defendant: Townsend, Thomas N

State of Idaho vs. Thomas N Townsend
Date

Code

User

7/21/2014

NOTC

TCOLSOMC

Notice of Lodging Appeal Transcript

Gerald Schroeder

7/31/2014

NOTC

CCNELSRF

Notice of Filing Transcripts

Gerald Schroeder

ORDR

CCNELSRF

Order Governing Procedure on Appeal

Gerald Schroeder

8/4/2014

MOTN

TCCHRIKE

Motion to Suspend the Briefing Schedule

Gerald Schroeder

8/20/2014

ORDR

CCNELSRF

Order Suspending Briefing Schedule

Gerald Schroeder

9/22/2014

BAAT

PDPRECJR

/' ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH
PROCESSING (batch process) Heidi M Johnson,
8478 removed. PD HAWLEY #17 assigned.

BAAT

PDPRECJR

AITORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH
PROCESSING (batch process) PD HAWLEY #17
removed. Elizabeth H Estess, 5646 assigned.

ORDR·

CCNELSRF

Order Vacating Stay (Briefing Schedule)

ORDR

CCNELSRF

Amended Order Governing Procedure on Appeal Gerald Schroeder

4/20/2015

BREF

TCCHRIKE

Appellant's Brief

Gerald Schroeder

5/13/2015

BREF

TCWRIGSA

Respondant's Brief

Gerald Schroeder

6/10/2015

HRSC

CCNELSRF

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
07/16/2015 02:30 PM)

Gerald Schroeder

7/16/2015

CONT

CCNELSRF

Continued (Oral Argument on Appeal
07/30/2015 03:00 PM)

Gerald Schroeder

NOTH

CCNELSRF

Notice Of Hearing 07/30/15 @ 3 pm

Gerald Schroeder

7/30/2015

DCHH

CCSCOTDL

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal
scheduled on 07/30/2015 03:00 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tiffany Fisher
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100

Gerald Schroeder

8/27/2015

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Opinion on Appeal

Gerald Schroeder

9/11/2015

NOTA

TCOLSOMC

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Gerald Schroeder

APSC

TCOLSOMC

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Gerald Schroeder

BAAT

PDVANVKE

ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH
PROCESSING (batch process) Heidi M Johnson,
8478 removed. PD SWAIN #4 assigned.

BAAT

PDVANVKE

AITORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH
PROCESSING (batch process) PD SWAIN #4
removed. Mark P Coonts, 7689 assigned.

NOTC

TCWEGEKE

Notice of Transcript of 22 Pages Lodged Supreme Court No. 43553

3/20/2015

9/16/2015

10/28/2015

Judge

Gerald Schroeder

Gerald Schroeder
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ADA COUNTY
SHERIFF'S Ok

.:E

472355

Contract cities of:
C Eagle D Star D Kuna ·

IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
4TH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
ADA
STATE OF IDAHO

Vio.#2

Code Section

iJol~ R. 7T

ADA

5=17,&.

Serial #/Address

tJ
County, Idaho.
ADA COUNTY
SHERIFF

Dept.

/]
Officer

NOTICE: See reverse side of your copy for PENALTY and COMPLIANCE instructions.

COURT COPY VIOLATION #1

~~ ~ \ 1:J "'~ \ \ 0
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.

'

472356

Contract cities of:
.:::::J Eagle D Star

ADA COUNTY
SHERIFF'S OFFICE

D

Kuna

IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
4TH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
ADA
STATE OF IDAHO

) COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS

CD

.,-,-

vs.

/D

J

U1OWA 5.e.l\.q

)00 Misde~~anor Citation

' J

L1)

M
N

Last Name

t--

/V

First Name

Middle Initial

IPUC #

D
D

D Accident
, Involved
Commercial Vehicle Driven by Jhis Driver
(,,,J J\'.,1\.1 way 0"'- .S-t'rt.1 ,€

)D
)

)

, I

- ~ ;1/LC(_)

¢

Infraction Citation

USDOT TK Census#_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Operator

D

Class A

D

GVWR 26001 +

Home Address

D

16 }J Persons

1

('.)

D

Class B

O'\ D.:>

e..

Class C

D

Class D

~ Other

;r7 rJ

~

Business Address
THE UNDERSIGNED OFFICER (PARTY) HEREBY CERTIFIES AND SAYS:
I cer
Height
Veh. Lie.#

i!ff

nd believe the above-named Defendant,

DL or SS#

State

Z:

Wt.

/A U 2 / p/j

Hair
State

.;.::t;a

S '-. U

Model

Color

Cz& Eyes JB
Yr. of Vehicle

j /

l-.

20

/

Did commit the following act(s) on

r {

~ ~ Vio. #1

t

J

,

CJ../ e.

~ 'B'
at

Sex:

MM D F

DOB
Make

A

12!:t o'clock

M.

c1'Jet'-> t- 'lQA e. 4({"-Jo1r,)
Code Section

Vio. #2
Code Section

'""
~I'<)
~

LL

W

°C

.91

~

0

C)

0

Date=

~

W
1-

IQ ~

r-

Mp.

3/;cj {13
Date

~
~

G /e(lw8o& /!:,-fife Ao,~!>
e
ADA

Location

en Hwy.
!f

0

;rz}

' _ _ _County, Idaho.
________

l)Je//e::,
·

Officer/Party

~ Witnessing Officer

:;:

ADA COUNTY
SHERIFF

D7L
Serial #/Adaress

Dept.

Serial #/Address

Dept.

C"JTHE5fATE Of: IDAHOTOTHE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT:
YOQ:f)re ht'sby summoned to appear before the Clerk of the Magistrate's Court of the

Distril:,U'.;our~
locatSiat

'

200

but on or before

ADA
County,
. FRONT STREET
20

BOIS,E
on or after

, Idaho,

l..£ ,~ /

20 J...]_

i 3 ' between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m.

Q)

E

ctl

z

!Jl

cctl

'C
C:

2Q)
0

rse side of your copy for PENALTY and COMPLIANCE instructions.
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•

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION
PROBABLE CAUSE FORM

STATE OF IDAHO

CASE NO. _____{Y/b
______/_3_-_L.l,_I}_O_ __

vs.

CLERK~~-.!3-~------~
DATE

l..A__>~__./,A_j-=-e._-~_C_~_H
..
_____~
COMPLAINING WITNESS _ _
/\_b_b,._______
PROSECUTOR ______

_0_3..,,.v'7;'--::>--=8,,r<--~-/......;;3'
---__ TIME _ __
,

TOXIMETER _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

---

JUDGE

D
D
D
D
D
~
D
D
D
D
D

BIETER
CAWTHON
COMSTOCK
DAY
DENNARD

D
D
D
D
D

MANWEILER
McDANIEL
MINDER
OTHS
REARDON

Pl

SCHMIDT

HANSEN

D
D

SWAIN

MacGREGOR-IRBY

BEG.f33'r5o

- - - - -ENr,[5:ll_!J8J_.

STATUS

GARDUNIA

HARRIGFELD

f1/I tLlS

CASE 10.bb..~1.'1.·

WATKINS

IE "51b,.~ SWORN
- ~ PCFOUND _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

COMPLAINT SIGNED
AMENDED COMPLAINT SIGNED
NO PC FOUND _ _ _ _ _-,--_ __
EXONERATE BOND
SUMMONS TO BE ISSUED
WARRANT ISSUED
BONDSET$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
NO CONTACT
D.R.# _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

0
0

DISMISS CASE
IN CUSTODY

COMMENTS

PROBABLE CAUSE FORM

000008

[REV 8-2006]

IN THE DISTRICT cour-T OF THE FOURTH
JUDI,' \L DISTRICT OF THE
,,
, STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJI\JTY OF ADA.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

NOTICE OF COURT DATE
AND NO.
7(1,,()
BOND RE~IPT<tr'

TOWNSEND THOMAS NELSON
Defendant

FILED

P.M _ _ __

MAR 2 8 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you must appear before the Court

c1J'rk~HE~;~;~DAMS

between 08 April 2013 and 15 April 2013 excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and Holidays,

/

from 09:00AM to 03:00PM at the:

Ada County Courthouse
200 West Front Street

Boise, 83702
If you have been arrested for a Citation, This Notice of Court Date Supersedes any other Court
Date for this case. If you have been given a date by the court you must keep those appearances,
failing to do so will cause a warrant for arrest and forfeiture of bond.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear as specified herein, your bond
will be forfeited and a Warrant of Arrest will be issued against you.

1

BOND RECEIPT No: 897359
Charge:

18-8004 {M} DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE

Bond Amount: $

500.00

Case#
Bond#

DN5-2800004

Bond Type:

Surety

Warrant#:
Agency:

Aladdin/Anytime

lnsu ance:

Danielson National Insurance Company

Bo

MILLER ADAM

sman:

80 N. Cole Rd

Ad

Boise, ID

'

83704

This is to certify that I have received a copy of this NOTICE TO APPEAR.
I understand that I am being released on the conditions of posting bail and
my promise to appear in the court at the time, date, and place described in this notice ..

DATED: 3/23/2013

DEFENDANT

000009
Printed - Saturday, March 23, 2013 by: S04619
\\countyb\DFSSHARE\INSTALLS\lnHouse\Crystal\Analyst4\Sheriff\SHF BondOutReceipt.rpt - Modified: 08/05/2011

FILED

AM.

/~/

P.M. -''--'J"*'~'--""'-'--

rv1or,day, April 01, 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT
BY: LISA POSEY
DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.
vs.

)

~

Case No: CR-MD-2013-0004110

) NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT OF PUBLIC DEFENDER
) i D SETTING CASE FOR HEARING
·

l'

Thomas N Townsend
409 Rose Lake Drive
Middleton, ID 83644

Ada D Boise D Eagle

D Garden City D Meridian

- - - - - -Defendant.
--------------- )
TO: Ada County Public Defender
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you are appointed to represent the defendant in this cause, or in the District Court
until relieved by court order. The case is continued for:

AC Pretrial Conference .... Wednesday, May 01, 2013
Judge:
John Hawley Jr.
Jury Trial. ... Wednesday, May 29, 2013
Judge:
John Hawley Jr.
BONDAMOUNT: _ _ _ __

.... 10:15 AM

.... 08:15 AM

The Defendant is: D In Custody

D Released on Bail

D ROR

TO: The above named defendant
IT HAS BEEN ORDERED BY THIS COURT that the defendant is to contact the Ada County Public Defender's
Office at 200 W. Front Street, Room 1107, Boise, Idaho 83702. Telephone: (208) 287-7400. If the defendant is unable to
post bond and obtain his/her release from jail, that the proper authorities allow the defendant to make a phone call to the
Ada County Public Defender.
IT HAS BEEN FURTHER ORDERED: That the parties, prior to the pre-trial conference, complete and comply
with Rule 16 1.C.R. and THAT THE DEFENDANT BE PERSONALLY PRESENT AT BOTH THE PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE AND/ OR THE JURY TRIAL: FAILURE TO APPEAR AT EITHER THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE OR
THE JURY TRIAL WILL RESULT IN A BENCH WARRANT FOR THE DEFENDANT'S ARREST.
I hereby certify that copies of this Notice w / served as follows
Defendant:

Mailedlic

Hand Delivered --1Signatur~~~~~~~~~~~~-

_______4-_\.1. . .

Phone.t?f2eiz2l.2-...

Z.b./f

C er I date
Prosecutor:

Interdepartmental Mail

~

Public Defender: Interdepartmental Mail

+

Cite Pay Website: https://www.citepayusa.com/payments
Supreme Court Repository: https://www.idcourts.us

NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT OF PUBLIC DEFENDER

000010

.,

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC ..... EFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
'
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

vf

NO.
FILED
A.M. _ _ _ __.--.M---J\r.----

APR O4 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUD1an~fflErlfF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff

Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

vs.
THOMAS N TOWNSEND,
Defendant.

TO:

THE STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff, and to ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned, pursuant to ICR 16, requests discovery

and photocopies of the following information, evidence, and materials:
1) All unredacted material or information within the prosecutor's possession or
control, or which thereafter comes into his possession or control, which tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or tends to reduce the punishment thereof. ICR
16(a).
2) Any ·unredacted, relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant,
or copies thereof, within' the possession, custody or control of the state, the
existence of which is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the
exercise of due diligence; and also the substance of any relevant, oral statement
made by the defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace officer,
prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting attorney's agent; and the recorded
testimony of the defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense
charged.
3) Any unredacted, written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the
substance of any relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant whether before
or. after arrest in response to interrogation by any person known by the codefendant to be a peace office or agent of the prosecuting attorney.
4) Any prior criminal record of the defendant and co-defendant, if any.
5) All unredacted documents and tangible objects as defined by ICR 16(b)(4) in the
possession or control of the prosecutor, which are material to the defense,
intended for use by the prosecutor or obtained from or belonging to the defendant
or co-defendant.

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY, Page 1

000011

\"

. ,.

6) AP reports ot ~physical or mental examinations anu of scientific tests or
experiments within the possession, control, or knowledge of the prosecutor, the
existence of which is known or is available to the prosecutor by the exercise of
due diligence.
. 7) A written list of the names, addresses, records of prior felony convictions, and
written or recorded statements of all persons having knowledge of facts of the
case known to the prosecutor and his agents or any official involved in the
investigatory process of the case.
8) A written summary or report of any testimony that the state intends to introduce
pursuant to rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or
hearing; including the witness' opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, and
the witness' qualifications.
9) All reports or memoranda made by police officers or investigators in connection
with the investigation or prosecution of the case, including what are commonly
referred to as "ticket notes."
I 0) Any writing or object that may be used to refresh the memory of all persons who
may be called as witnesses, pursuant to IRE 612.
11) Any and all audio and/or video recordings made by law enforcement officials
during the course of their investigation.
12) Any evidence, documents, or witnesses that the state discovers or could discover
with due diligence after complying with this request.
The undersigned further requests written compliance within 14 days of service of the

within instrument.
DATED, Thursday, April 04, 2013.

Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on Thursday, April 04, 2013, I mailed a true and correct
copy of the within instrument to:
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
Counsel for the State of Idaho

by placing said same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
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APR 17 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, ~!erk
By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER

Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Robert M. Bleazard

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Magistrate Division
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
, IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Thomas Nelson Townsend,
Defendant.

________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CRMD20130004110
STATE'S DISCOVERY
RESPONSE TO COURT

COMES NOW, Robert M. Bleazard, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County

of Ada, State of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has complied with the Defendant's
Request for Discovery.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

1-=t day of April 2013.
GREG H. BOWER

Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Robert M. Bleazard
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT Thomas Nelson Townsend CRMD20130004110
Page 1
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NO.-----:;:Fl;;"i;Ll:;:;-0

A.M., _ _ _ _ .M-__;;----

APR 17 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATRINA CHRIS'l"ENSEN
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Robert M. Bleazard
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Magistrate Division
200 W. Front Street, Room 366
Boise, Id. 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.
Thomas Nelson Townsend,
Defendant.
________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CRMD20130004110
STATE'S REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY

TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Criminal
Rules, requests Discovery and inspection of the following:
(1) Documents and Tangible Objects:
Request is hereby made by the prosecution to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers,
documents, photographs, tangible objects or copies or portions thereof, which are within the
possession, custody or control of the defendant, and which the defendant intends to introduce in
evidence at trial.

000014

(2) Reports of Examinations and Tests:
The prosecution hereby requests the defendant to pennit the State to inspect and copy or
photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or
experiments made in connection with this case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control
of the defendant, which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or which were
prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or reports
relate to testimony of the witness.
(3) Defense Witnesses:
The prosecution requests the defendant to furnish the State with a list of names and
addresses of witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial.
(4) Expert Witnesses:
The prosecution requests the defendant to provide a written summary or report of any
testimony that the defense intends to introduce pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(c)(4), including
the facts and data supporting the opinion and the witness's qualifications.
(5) Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-519, the State hereby requests that the defendant
state in writing within ten (10) days any specific place or places at which the defendant claims to
have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon
whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi.
DATED this _ _
19-_day of April 2013.
GREG H. BOWER

Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

'(l

day of April 2013, I caused to be served, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing document to: Nicole Owens, Ada County Public Defender,
200 West Front St., Ste 1107, Boise, ID 83702, by the method indicated below:
NOTIFIED AVAILABLE FOR PICK UP
_ _ U.S. MAIL (Postage Prepaid)
- - FAX TRANSMISSION
- x- - HAND DELIVERY
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NO·---~ii'in---,~1-/-/_

t __---;Vilf..-=-

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

AM., _ _ _ _
Fl...r'Ll~•

APR 2 5_ 2013

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN
DEPUTY

......
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS N TOWNSEND,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Criminal No. CR-MD-2013-4110
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM

Defendant.
_______________

The above-named defendant, Thomas N Townsend, by and through his Attorney of
Record, the Ada County Public Defender's Office, Nicole Owens, handling attorney, hereby
moves this Honorable Court for the suppression and exclusion of all evidence, physical and
testimonial, obtained or derived from, through, or as a result of law enforcement's unlawful
detention, search, seizure, interrogation, and arrest of Mr. Townsend that occurred on or about
March 23, 2013.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, Page 1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
On March 23, 2013, at approximately 0134 hours, Mr. Townsend was making au-tum on
State Street. Accordi11:g to the report of Officer Bill Weires, Mr. Townsend drove on the raised
median that divided the east and westbound traffic. Officer Weires activated his overhead lights
and Mr. Townsend pulled over into the Walmart parking lot. The officer requested that Mr.
Townsend submit to field sobriety tests. According to the officers, Mr. Townsend submitted to
the tests, and failed each of them. Mr. Townsend was then placed under arrest for suspicion of
Driving Under the Influence. Mr. Townsend refused the breath test. When advised that the
officers were going to take a blood draw, Mr. Townsend refused to allow the draw. Officers
used force to allow Ada County paramedic Supervisor C. Wolf to take Mr. Townsend's blood.
This blood draw was conducted without a warrant.
ARGUMENT
A search without a warrant is presumptively invalid, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 437
U.S. 385,390 (1978), and a "warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within
a recognized exception" to the warrant requirement, Missouri v. McNeely, -- S. Ct.--, 2013 WL
1628934, at *5 (Apr. 17, 2013). "That principle applies to the type of search at issue in this case,
which involved a compelled physical intrusion beneath [Mr. Townsend's] skin and into his veins
to obtain a sample of his blood for use as evidence in a criminal investigation." Id. Indeed, such
an "invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual's 'most personal and deep-rooted

1

The "facts" recited herein are derived from the police reports and other discovery that to date
has been disclosed to Mr. Townsend by the State. Mr. Townsend in no way concedes that these
"facts" are accurate or true, and recites them solely for the purpose of providing background for
this motion to suppress. Moreover, additional grounds for suppression may become clear as Mr.
Townsend receives additional discovery from the State.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, Page 2
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expectations of privacy."' Id. (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)).
Exigent circumstances is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and is
presumably the exception on which the State relied in conducting the forced blood draw. 2
Exigent circumstances exist "when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law
enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable," Id. (citation and
quotation marks omitted). To determine whether an exigency exists justifying acting without a
warrant, courts are to look to the totality of the circumstances, evaluating "each case of alleged
exigency.based on its own facts and circumstances." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Although destruction of evidence is a well-recognized exigent circumstance that may
support a warrantless search, as the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in McNeely, "[t]he context
of blood testing is different in critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in which
the police are truly confronted with a 'now or never' situation." Id. at *8 First, "BAC [Blood
Alcohol Content] evidence from a drunk-driving suspect naturally dissipates over time in a
gradual and relatively predictable manner." Id.

Second, because of the nature of DUI

investigations, "some delay between the time of the arrest . . . and the time of the test is
inevitable regardless of whether police officers are required to obtain a warrant." Id.

Third,

advances in technology and the streamlining of warrant procedures have led to more expeditious
To the extent the State relied on Idaho's implied consent law to conduct the warrantless forced
blood draw, such reliance is misplaced and does not justify the warrantless search. As the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized in McNeely, "all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that
require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC
testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense."
McNeely, 2013 WL 1628934, at *12 (citation omitted). Further, in the McNeely case itself, the
defendant was read the standard implied consent form, and was informed that a refusal to submit
voluntarily to the test would result in the "immediate revocation of his driver's license for one
year and could be used against him in a future prosecution." Id. at *3. Despite the implied
consent law, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless blood draw violated the defendant's
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment. See
id. at *14.
2

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, Page 3
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processing of warrant applications. See id. at *8-9.
Thus, although "natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of
exigency in a specific case, ... it does not do so categorically. Whether a warrantless blood test
of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of
the circumstances." Id. at *9.
Here, as the officers' reports make clear, Mr. Townsend objected to and denied
permission for a blood draw. Despite the clear lack of consent for the blood draw, the officers
forcibly drew Mr. Townsend's blood. There is no indication that the officers sought to obtain a
warrant before forcibly drawing Mr. Townsend's blood, or that there was anything that would
have prevented them from doing so within a reasonable amount of time. There was, in sum, no
exigency in this case justifying the warrantless blood draw. Accordingly, the forced physical
intrusion beneath Mr. Townsend's skin and into his veins to obtain a sample of his blood for use
as evidence in a criminal investigation violated Mr. Townsend's rights to be free from an
unreasonable search protected by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I,
§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution.

See McNeely, 2013 WL 1628934, at *14 (Apr. 17, 2013)

(warrantless blood test of drunk-driving suspect unreasonable without showing of exigent
circumstances, and natural dissipation of alcohol, without more, insufficient to justify
warrantless blood test).
CONCLUSION

Mr. Townsend's right to be free from unre8:sonable searches and seizures protected by the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution were
violated by the warrantless and unlawful search of Mr. Townsend. All evidence, physical and
testimonial, obtained or derived from, through, or as a result of law enforcement's unlawful

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, Page 4
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search of Mr. Townsend must therefore be suppressed and excluded.
DATED this

.2:!:L. day of April, 2013.

Nicole Owens
Deputy Ada County Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this~ day of April

2013, I mailed a true and correct

copy of the foregoing to the: ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail and by facsimile.
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.
CHRISTOt'HER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Robert M. Bleazard
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Magistrate Division, 200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

)
)
)

THE STA TE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Thomas Townsend,
Defendant,

________________

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CRMD20130004110
STATE'S ADDENDUM TO
DISCOVERY RESPONSE
TO COURT

Comes now, Robert M. Bleazard, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for Ada County,
State of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has submitted an Addendum to Response to
Discovery.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _3?2_ day of April 2013.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

Wkobert M. Bleazard
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
CRMD20130004110 (Thomas Townsend)
ADDENDUM TO DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT, PAGE I
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FILED
A.M._.._.._ _P.M _ _ __
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CHRISTOPHER D. ~ICH,

Clerk

By ELAINE TONG
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Robert M. Bleazard
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Magistrate Division, 200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Thomas Townsend,
Defendant,

________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CRMD20130004110
STATE'S SECOND
ADDENDUM TO
DISCOVERY RESPONSE
TO COURT

Comes now, Robert M. Bleazard, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for Ada County,
State of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has submitted an Addendum to Response to
Discovery.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

_.1tJ. day of May 2013.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

Robert M. Bleazard
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
CRMD20130004110 (Thomas Townsend)
ADDENDUM TO DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT, PAGE I

000024

1

A~=

NO.Flill:t>
J.M--~~A.M-------

JUN \ 3 20\3
D RICH Clerk
CHRIS~~~;.~!~HRISTENSEN
By

OEPUTV

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Kale Gans
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

THOMAS NELSON TOWNSEND,
Defendant.
__________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

.!~

Case No. CR-MD-2013-004)1'1u

OBJECTION TO MOTION TO
SUPPRESS AND BRIEF IN
RESPONSE

The defense moves to suppress the blood draw in this case citing Missouri v. McNeely,
569 U.S. _ ; 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). The State objects, and offers the following brief in
support of that objection.
Factual and Procedural Background ·.

On March 23, 2013, at approximately 01:34 a.m., Deputy Bill Weires observed the
Defendant, Thomas Townsend, drive a silver Chevrolet Silverado to a stop in the westbound turn
lane on West State Street. Ada Cnty. Sheriff's Office Probable Cause Alf, p. 2 (Exhibit #1). The
truck was stopped on top of the lane's stop lines. See id. When the traffic signal turned green, the
Defendant turned into the oncoming traffic lane on State Street, and proceeded to drive
1

OBJECTION TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS
DEFENDANT (TOWNSEND)
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westbound in the eastbound lane. Id Deputy Weires activated his overhead lights, and the
Defendant turned into a nearby parking lot and came to a stop.
The deputy approached the vehicle which contained the Defendant and two passengers.
Ada Cnty. Sheriff's Office Narrative Report, p.1 (Exhibit #2). The deputy noticed a strong odor

of alcohol coming from the Defendant, observed that the Defendant had red, watery, and glassy
eyes, and. noted that he spoke with slurred speech. Ada Cnty. Sheriff's Office Probable Cause
Aff., p. 2 (Exhibit #1). The Defendant also admitted to drinking prior to driving-first conceding

that he drank four beers that night, and later revising that number to seven. Ada Cnty. Sheriff's
Office Narrative Report, p. 1-2 (Exhibit #2). After speaking with the Defendant, the deputy

requested another officer be sent to his location so he could perform a DUI investigation. Id.
Upon Deputy Lakey's arrival, Deputy Weires performed the standardized field sobriety tests
(SFSTs). Id The Defendant failed all three SFSTs.
Following the failure of the SFSTs, the Defendant was arrested for DUI and placed in the
back of Deputy Weires's patrol car. Id at 2. The deputy then attempted to perform a breath test.
Id After the Defendant blew a quick and insufficient sample, the deputy explained to the

Defendant the proper method of conducting the test. Id The Defendant then pretended to blow
into the breathalyzer, and pretended to do so again. Id at 3. Finally, the Defendant refused to
comply with the breath test and told Deputy Weires that he would "have to take his blood." Id at
3. The deputy transported the Defendant to the Ada County Jail where he observed an Ada
County paramedic supervisor draw the Defendant's blood without incident at approximately
03 :00 a.m. Id The blood sample was then taken to Idaho State Police Forensic Services where
Rachel Cutler, Forensic Scientist II, provided her opinions and interpretations of the analysis of
the Defendant's blood in a report dated April 15, 2013. Idaho State Police Forensic Services,
Laboratory Results (Exhibit #3). The Defendant's blood alcohol content result was 0.154. Id

The Defendant filed a motion to suppress on April 24, 2013. The State now objects.

LEGAL STANDARD
Drawing blood from a driver in a driving under the influence case is a seizure. It is
settled that to do so, the State must either have a warrant, or the facts surrounding a blood draw
must fall within an exception to the warrant requirement. As put by the Idaho Supreme Court:
The administration of a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and a
search for evidence within the purview of the Fourth Amendment to the United
2
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States Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826,
1834, 16 L.Ed.2d 908,917 (1966); State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470,472, 65
P.3d 211, 213 (Ct.App.2002). Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant
are presumptively unreasonable. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835, 16
L.Ed.2d at 919; State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 488, 680 P.2d 1383, 1388
(Ct.App.1984). To overcome the presumption, the state bears the burden of
establishing two prerequisites. First, the state must prove that a warrantless search
fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). Second, the state must show that
even if the search is permissible under an exception to the warrant requirement, it
must still be reasonable in light of all of the other surrounding circumstances. Id.
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711-12, 184 P.3d 215, 217-18 (Ct. App. 2008).

But there are a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement. For example, "[s]uch an
exception exists when the search or seizure is conducted with proper consent. Schneckloth v.
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho

261, 264, 858 P.2d 800, 803 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 558, 560, 716 P.2d
1328, 1330, 1332 (Ct.App.1986)." State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406,410,973 P.2d 758, 762 (Ct.
App. 1999). Furthermore, the presence of exigent circumstances in another well-established
exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 499, 163 P.3d 1208,
1211 (Ct. App. 2007).
The State submits that both of these exceptions apply in these circumstances.
CONSENT

Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Wheeler, 149
Idaho 364, 370, 233 P.3d 1286, 1292 (Ct.App.2010) (citing Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at
742)). Idaho drivers, by driving on the public roadways, consent to evidentiary testing pursuant
to I.C. § 18-8002 as follows:
By terms of this statute, anyone who accepts the privilege of operating a motor
vehicle upon Idaho's highways has thereby consented in advance to submit to a
BAC test. McNeely v. State, 119 Idaho 182, 187, 804 P.2d 911, 916
(Ct.App.1990). By implying consent, the statute removes the right of a driver to
refuse an evidentiary test. Goerig v. State, 121 Idaho 26, 29, 822 P.2d 545, 548
(Ct.App.1992). Hence, although an individual has the physical ability to prevent a
test, there is no legal right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent. Woolery,
116 Idaho at 372, 775 P.2d at 1214; State v. Burris, 125 Idaho 289,291, 869 P.2d
1384, 1386 (Ct.App.1994).
3
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State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406,410,973 P.2d 758, 762 (Ct. App. 1999).

In light of this, in Diaz, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the blood draw at issue in the
case "fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement," because Diaz had
impliedly consented to the testing. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739 (2007).
Having found that an exception to the warrant requirement existed, the Court went on to perform
the second step in the analysis: reviewing whether the search was "reasonable" in light of the
circumstances. Id To do so, the Court considered whether the blood draw was done in a
"medically acceptable manner," and whether it was done without unreasonable force. Id After
noting that the test was administered by a qualified technician, that Diaz failed to perform a
breath test, and that Diaz was not "manhandled" while transported to the test, the Court
concluded that under the totality of the circumstances, the test was reasonable. Id,· see also State
v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 65 P.3d 211 (Ct.App. 2002).

Here, Mr. Townsend impliedly consented to the blood draw by driving on Idaho's public
roadways, and further, the blood draw was reasonable under the circumstances: his blood was
drawn by a trained professional in a medically acceptable manner, was done without
unreasonable force. The Defendant argues that there was a "clear lack of consent" for the blood
draw, but this contention misses the mark; while the Defendant may not have expressly
consented to the blood draw, he impliedly consented by driving-and the Defendant makes no
argument refuting his implied consent. Likewise, the Defendant does not claim, nor does the
evidence indicate, that the Defendant ever revoked this implied consent. To the contrary, Deputy
Weires's report states that the Defendant expressly requested a blood draw-the Deputy quotes
Mr. Townsend as saying that the Deputy "would have to take [Townsend's] blood." Ada Cnty.
Sheriff's Office Narrative Report, p. 1-2 (Exhibit #2). Thus, consent was given, both impliedly

and expressly.
Idaho's case law reaffirms this. As the Idaho Court of Appeals found in State v. Wheeler:
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Diaz, 144
Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. "Any person who drives or is in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle" in Idaho consents to be tested for alcohol at the
request of a peace officer with reasonable grounds to believe the person drove
under the influence. LC. § 18-8002(1); Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741.
In Diaz, the Court found that the defendant gave his consent to a blood draw by
driving in Idaho, despite his repeated protests. Id at 302-03, 160 P.3d at 741-42.
4
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In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Diaz, we conclude that a protest to a
blood draw does not invalidate consent created by a person's actions and statute.

State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 370, 233 P.3d 1286, 1292 (Ct. App. 2010). Thus, any potential
protests to the blood draw in the current case would not invalidate the consent. And as
mentioned, Deputy Weires's Narrative Report suggests that the Defendant did not protest the
blood draw, but expressly encouraged it. But whether the Defendant protested the blood draw or
not, implied consent by its very definition does not require an express showing of consent; it
only requires that a defendant drive on Idaho's public roads. Indeed, any such driver takes
advantage of the privilege of driving on the public roadways prior to being stopped-and having
received the benefit of the bargain of implied consent, the driver may not simply claim that he
revoked that consent absent some factual showing.
The Defendant points to Missouri v. McNeely as the basis for his motion to suppress, but
this would not affect the implied consent issue at hand. There, the Supreme Court identified the
sole issue as, "whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se
exigency that justifies an exception the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for
nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases."
_ , __; 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013).

Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.

Whatever bearing this narrow holding has on an

exigent circumstances discussion, by its terms it does not implicate the issue of consent.
There may be some argument that because the Supreme Court identified certain states as
having implied consent laws with certain restrictions, the Court thereby endorsed those
restrictions. However, the existence of implied consent laws at the state level was simply used
by the Supreme Court to illustrate certain findings:
[W]ide-spread state restrictions on nonconsensual blood testing provide further support
for our recognition that compelled blood draws implicate a significant privacy interest.
They also strongly suggest that our ruling today will not "severely hamper effective law
enforcement." Garner, 471 U.S., at 19, 105 S.Ct. 1694.

McNeely, 569 U.S._,__; 133 S. Ct. at 1567. Noting these statutes, for illustrative purposes,
does not amount to a binding opinion of the Court on the restrictions listed in those various
statutes. And while Missouri does have an implied consent statute, the Supreme Court did not
examine that statute as a possible exception to the warrant requirement in this case. Further,
Missouri's implied consent law has not historically provided for forced tests. Due to a recent
statutory change, the question of whether it does now is a matter yet to be decided in the
5
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Missouri courts. (See Missouri v. McNeely, 2011 WL 2455571 (Missouri Court of Appeals,
2011).) In sum, the McNeely decision did not comment on the validity of implied consent laws
in general. And accordingly, the dicta in McNeely does not change the status of the implied
consent law in Idaho.
The blood draw here was taken from a driver who was driving on Idaho's public
roadways. Further, it was taken in a medically acceptable manner, without unnecessary force,
and was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Consequently, the blood draw was
done with the Defendant's implied consent, and was properly excepted from the warrant
requirement.
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the presence of exigent
circumstances.
"[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person
unless 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." Brigham City, 547 U.S. at--, 126 S.Ct. at 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d at
657 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414, 57
L.Ed.2d 290, 301 (1978)). A warrantless search under this exception must be
strictly circumscribed by the nature of the exigency that justifies the intrusion.
State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 99, 57 P.3d 807, 810 (Ct.App.2002).

State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 499, 163 P.3d 1208, 1211 (Ct. App. 2007). Exigent
circumstances may justify warrantless search of the body through a blood draw. See Schmerber

v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). Recently, the
Supreme Court concluded that the elimination of alcohol does not by itself create a per se rule of
exigency in DUI cases. McNeely, 569 U.S._,_ _ ; 133 S. Ct. 1552. In so deciding, the Court
reaffirmed its prior holdings that a totality of the circumstances analysis must be done in each
case. Id. Consequently, "consistent with general Fourth Amendment principles, [] exigency in
[the DUI] context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances."

Id.
Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless blood draw of the Defendant. It should first be noted that the Supreme Court opinion
in McNeely is premised on the idea that blood alcohol is not a "now or never" proposition,
6
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because the rate of alcohol elimination can be determined within a reasonable range. Id. The
Supreme Court assumes that retrograde extrapolation is available to the State. 1 In other words,
the majority opinion presumes that so long as some alcohol is in the defendant's system when the
test is administered, there is a formulaic method by which the actual blood alcohol concentration
at the time the defendant was driving can be determined. It is largely based on this premise that
the Supreme Court concludes that "special facts" in addition to inevitable elimination of alcohol
must be necessary to create an exigency. See id.
However, in the State ofldaho, retrograde extrapolation is not permitted. In the event that
an evidentiary test for blood alcohol reveals a result that is under .08, even if it is substantially
after the defendant last drove, that person generally cannot be prosecuted.2 Idaho Code § 188004(2) provides that, "[a]ny person having an alcohol concentration of less than 0.08, as
defined in subsection (4) of this section, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, by a
test requested by a police officer shall not be prosecuted for driving under the influence of
alcohol except as provided in subsection (3) [drug DUI], subsection (l)(b) [commercial vehicle
DUI]or subsection (l)(d) [underage DUI] of this section." The net effect is that in Idaho, passage
of time does more than just destroy evidence-the cause of action itself erodes away with each
minute. Thus, the very laws of the State of Idaho necessitate a much quicker process than that
contemplated by the McNeely Court, and constitute just one of the "special facts" supporting a
finding of exigency.
Beyond the peculiarity of Idaho's statutes, particular features of this traffic stop further
contribute to the exigent totality of the circumstances here. Deputy Weires had to contend not
only with the Defendant, but with two passengers as well. He further had to wait for another
officer to arrive on scene before administering the SFSTs. The Defendant's own conduct added
to the delay, and the exigency: he failed to properly take the breath test, falsely acted like he was
blowing into the breathalyzer, falsely so acted again, and finally refused to perform the test
altogether, thus significantly delaying the deputy. Beyond this, the Defendant was driving
1 This

ignores the fact that intoxicants other than alcohol may be at issue as well.
is an exception for cases where the defendant fails to provide a valid sample on a breath test. "A shallow
breath sample testing at below .08 does not inherently show that the individual's true breath alcohol concentration is
less than .08. Consequently, it does not ipso facto bar prosecution by the terms of Section 18-8004(2)."

2 There

State v. Turbyfill, 38579, 2012 WL 4465773 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012), review denied (Nov. 29, 2012).
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erratically, and actually admitted to drinking seven beers before doing so. This is in stark
contrast to the situation in McNeely, which the Court described as "unquestionably a routine
DWI case" with "no factors" suggesting an emergency. McNeely, 569 U.S._, __; 133 S. Ct.
at 1557. Here, the Defendant admitted to drinking, showed signs of intoxication, and was driving
the wrong way on State Street, in a car with passengers, until the Deputy's intervention-hardly
a "routine" traffic stop.
The Deputy's Narrative Report further reflects that it was approximately 86 minutes
from the time of the traffic stop to the time the defendant arrived at the jail, where the blood
sample was eventually taken. During that time, alcohol was being eliminated from his system at
a rate .estimated by the Supreme Court as .015 to .02 percent per hour. McNeely, 569 U.S._,
__; 133 S. Ct. at 1575. Because of the wait for another officer, and then the Defendant's own
failure to properly perform the breath test, the roadside portion of the investigation and transport
took 86 minutes. Even assuming a more conservative reduction rate of .015 per hour, some
hypothetical calculations show the exigency at hand here: Were one to factor in any additional
time for obtaining a warrant, then a defendant who was driving well over the legal limit at .101
would present at jail at much less than .08; in fact, those 86 minutes would bring that defendant
to .795. And this would then bar prosecution in a case where the driver was per se in violation of
the law at the time of the crime. In light of these circumstances, Deputy Weires correctly
perceived that there was insufficient time to obtain a warrant, and that the circumstances
necessarily were exigent.
In addition, we know that law enforcement in Ada County booked 20 people into the Ada
County Jail on the night Mr. Townsend was driving under the influence. Aff. of Cecily Willerton,
p 1. Those arrests resulted in 9 driving under the influence charges; 45% of the total bookings
that night. Id. Further, obtaining a warrant in t}J.ese cases, at that time, would take 1.5 hours to
4.5 hours per case. Aff. of Joe Andreoli, p. 2. Accordingly, law enforcement would likely have
been forced to spend between 13.5 to 40.5 additional man hours processing the same number of
DUI cases that night. Such a number of hours of law enforcement's time is significant and could
impact the availability of law enforcement to protect the community on a whole. Further, there
is only one Judge on-call in Ada County at any given time. Aff. of Detective Joe Andreoli, p. 3.
Thus a single magistrate could have to review, consider, and issue numerous warrants in a single
night. This could considerably slow down the process even further. Consequently, the number of
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driving under the influence arrests on the night of March 22 significantly adds to the exigency in
Townsend's case.
It bears mentioning that the State is also in the untenable position of have an ethical

obligation to preserve evidence that could be exculpatory while that evidence is in the body of an
adversarial party. The State accordingly must avail itself of every opportunity to take a sample of
the evidence for the benefit of accurate testing, regardless of which party the outcome benefits.
Taking the totality of the circumstances here into consideration-the delays caused by the
Defendant, the non-routine characteristics of the stop, and the demands upon law enforcement on
that particular evening-the situation was more than exigent enough that the warrantless search
was proper under the Fourth Amendment.

REMEDY
Even if the Court finds that there is no exception to the warrant requirement here, the
State alternatively submits that the defendant is not deserving of a remedy. The Defendant
registered 0.154 blood alcohol content at the time his blood was drawn, and by driving with such
a significant blood alcohol level, he placed the general public at significant risk. Deputy Weires
acted in good faith and in reliance on LC. § 18-8002, Diaz, and Wheeler, when he made the
decision to have the Defendant's blood drawn. The public interest justifies admission of the
results.
If Deputy Weires had understood there to be a warrant requirement and had availed

himself of that process, the defendant's blood alcohol was sufficient that he would have still been
over the legal limit almost five hours after the traffic stop. Therefore, had the deputy understood
a warrant to be necessary, the defendant's blood alcohol would still have been sufficient to
pursue charges in this particular case. We thus ask the Court to consider whether there is a
parallel between this case and the inevitable discovery doctrine in this regard:
The Supreme Court's decision in Nix did not turn upon the fact that the search
which would have led to discovery of the victim's body was completely
independent of the unconstitutional interrogation. The Court reasoned that
society's interests in deterring illegal police conduct and in having juries receive
all probative evidence of a crime are best balanced by applying the exclusionary
rule to put the government in the same, not a worse, position than it would have
experienced absent the police misconduct. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44, 104 S.Ct. at
2508-09, 81 L.Ed.2d at 386-87. This balancing of interests is at the heart of the
inevitable discovery doctrine. It would not be advanced by a rule disallowing
evidence solely because the alternate investigation was not entirely unrelated to
9
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the illegal one. Therefore, in our view, the inquiry should concentrate upon the
inevitability of the discovery rather than the independence of the investigation.
See Whitehorn, 829 F.2d at 1231 ("So long as it is clear that such evidence would
inevitably have been discovered by lawful means, suppression is inappropriate.")
Independence is strong evidence of inevitability, but is not always necessary in
order to demonstrate the ineluctability of the discovery. We therefore hold that a
wholly independent investigation, while certainly relevant to whether discovery
was inevitable, is not a prerequisite to application of the inevitable discovery
exception
State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 102, 57 P.3d 807, 813 (Ct. App. 2002). Here, there was no

police misconduct at all, and the discovery of the evidence likely would have been inevitable;
thus, the weighing described in Buterbaugh tips in favor of admitting the evidence.
The State submits that the exclusionary rule is not the proper remedy in this case. Rather,
as the Supreme Court has stated:
The exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of deterring illegal
searches and seizures. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613,
620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). As such, the rule does not "proscribe the introduction
of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons," Stone v.
Powell, supra, at 486, 96 S.Ct., at 3049, but applies only in contexts "where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served," United States v.
Calandra, supra, at 348, 94 S.Ct., at 620; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3032, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) ("If ... the exclusionary
rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant
situation is unwarranted"). Moreover, because the rule is prudential rather than
constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its
deterrence benefits outweigh its "substantial social costs." United States v. Leon,
468 U.S., at 907, 104 S.Ct., at 3412.
Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2019, 141 L.

Ed. 2d 344 (1998).
The exclusionary rule's sole purpose is to deter future Fourth Amendment
violations, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172
L.Ed.2d 496, and its operation is limited to situations in which this purpose is
"thought most efficaciously served," United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561. For exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence
benefits of suppression must outweigh the rule's heavy costs. Under a line of
cases beginning with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82
L.Ed.2d 677, the result of this cost-benefit analysis turns on the "flagrancy of the
police misconduct" at issue. Id., at 909, 911, 104 S.Ct. 3405. When the police
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exhibit "deliberate," "reckless," or "grossly negligent" disregard for Fourth
Amendment rights, the benefits of exclusion tend to outweigh the costs. Herring,
supra, at 144, 129 S.Ct. 695. But when the police act with an objectively
reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct
involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrent value of suppression is
diminished, and exclusion cannot "pay its way." See Leon, supra, at 909, 919,
908, n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 3405; Herring, supra, at 137, 129 S.Ct. 695. Pp. 2426-2428.
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2422, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011). The State recognizes

that the Idaho Supreme Court has declined to apply the Leon good faith exception to Idaho. State
v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 272 P.3d 483 (2012). However, Deputy Weires acted within well-

authorized and common practices of the State, which had been explicitly authorized by the Idaho
Supreme Court, Idaho Court of Appeals, and the Idaho State Legislature. Therefore, to now
punish the officer and the public· by suppressing the evidence is not a proper application of the
exclusionary rule. The State therefore submits that the exclusionary rule is not a proper remedy
in this case.
CONCLUSION

The State contends that the Court's inquiry need go no further than the implied consent
statute. Mr. Townsend, by driving on the public roadways, consented to evidentiary testing. That
testing was done in a medically sound manner, without unneeded force, and the results of the
blood draw should therefore be admitted. Further, the blood draw results would also be
admissible due to the exigent circumstances surrounding this investigation-that is, the factual
and legal characteristics of this case created an exigency for the officer. In particular, delays
caused by the Defendant, the dangerousness of his driving, and his admissions of drinking, all
distinguish this incident from the "routine" traffic stop in McNeely. Moreover, because
retrograde extrapolation is not available to the State, evidence showing the Defendant was above
the legal limit of blood alcohol was dissipating as time passed. To get a warrant would require
additional time, in which blood alcohol would be eliminated; the State could consequently be
barred from prosecution if the driver fell below a .08 before the administration of the test. Thus,
given the totality of the circumstances, the situation fell within the exigency exception to the
warrant requirement as well.
In the event that the Court finds that neither of these exceptions to the warrant
requirement are satisfied, the State submits that the blood draw results should still be seen as
11
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admissible. To rule otherwise is to invite a manifest injustice. This event and countless others
like it involve a driver putting the public at great risk and an officer responding with the explicit
authorization of the Courts and the legislature. Not only did the officer have good faith, the
public policy and community protection interests at issue lean heavily in favor of admitting the
evidence. The exclusionary rule does not require exclusion in these circumstances, where the
officer was acting under the well-settled law of the State at the time he had the Defendant's
blood drawn.
DATEDthis

,~-P,

dayofJune2013.
GREG.BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

By: Kale D. Gans
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e n day of June 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to: Nicole Owens, Ada County Public Defender, by the
method indicated below:
NOTIFIED AVAILABLE FOR PICK UP
_ _ U.S. MAIL (Postage Prepaid)
FAX TRANSMISSION
X
HAND DELIVERY

12

OBJECTION TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS
DEFENDANT (TOWNSEND)

000036

-·~~·-..

;~:;;::;.

,

I

DR# 2013-94190
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IN THE COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TOWNSEND, THOMAS N
Defendant.
DOB
SSN
DL#

ID

STATE

PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF ARREST AND/OR
REFUSAL TO TAKE TEST

)
ss.
)

State of Idaho
County of Ada
I,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

WEIRES, BILL

, the undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that:

1. I am a peace officer employed by the Ada County.

2. The defendant was arrested on
I.

3/23/2013

at

1:54 AM

hours for the crimes of:

DUI

3. Location of Occurrence:

W STATE ST/ N GLENWOOD
ST

, Boise, Ada County, Idaho ..

4. Identified the defendant as

D

State ID Card

D

TOWNSEND, THOMAS N
, by:
------------'----------Driver s License 0 Verbal by defendant 0 Other INTERNATIONAL
1

DRIVING
PERMIT
Witness

identified defendant.

5. The crime(s) was committed in my presence.

D Yes 0 No If no, information was supplied to me by:

(witness)
VEIDCLE INFO:

Color

SIL

Year

1998

Make

License No.
SLVPK
--------------(DUI): Actual physical control established by:

Model
6.

0 Observation by affiant

D

CHEV

-State

ID

D Observation by Officer:

Admission of defendant to:

D Statement of Witness

D Other:
-----------Two or more convictions in the last ten years?
D Yes 0 No D

Felony 0 Misdemeanor
7. I believe there is probable cause that the defendant committed such crime(s) because of the
following facts:
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(Note: You must include the source of all information that you provide below. Include both what you observed and what you
!_earned from someone else, identifying that person.)

PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE STOP AND ARREST:
On 03/23/13 at approximately O134 hours, I was driving northbound on N. Glenwood St. in Boise, Idaho.
I steered my Ada County Sheriffs Patrol Vehicle into the westbound turn lanes at the intersection with W.
State St. In the lane directly in front of me I observed a silver Chevrolet Silverado Truck (1AUZ185)
signaling to tum westbound onto State. The truck was stopped on top of the lane's stop lines. The traffic
control light was red. The traffic control left turn signal changed to green and the truck proceeded to turn
westbound. The truck drove on the south side of the raised median that divided the east and westbound
traffic on State St. and continued westbound in the eastbound lane. I activated my patrol vehicle's
emergency overhead lights and initiated my traffic stop. The vehicle turned into the parking lot of
WALMART at 7319 W. State. St. and came to a stop.
The driver of the truck, Thomas N. Townsend, provided me with an international driver's permit as
identification. Thomas has lived in Middleton, Idaho for three years. Thomas immediately began to
apologize for driving down the wrong way on State St. As Thomas spoke I could smell a heavy odor of an
alcoholic beverage emanating from him. Thomas' eyes were extremely red, watery, and glassy. Thomas
spoke with slurred speech.
I conducted the standard battery of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, the Walle and Tum test, and the One
Leg stand test. Thomas failed all three tests with scores of 6, 7, and 4 points respectively. Thomas then
refused to provide a breath sample on scene and I transported him to the Ada County Jail where Ada
County paramedic Supervisor C. Wolf conducted a involuntary blood draw at 0300 hours without incident.
Thomas was then booked into the Ada County Jail for Driving Under The Influence.with Citation
#472355.

DUI NOTES
Odor of alcoholic beverage
Admitted drinking alcoholic beverage
Slurred Speech
Impaired Memory
Glassy/Bloodshot eyes
Other:
Drugs Suspected
Urine Collected

D
D

Yes @ No
Yes @ No

Standardized Field Sobriety Test - Meets Decision Points?
@ Yes
D No
Gaze Nystagmus @ Yes
D
@ Yes
D No
Walle and Tum
@ Yes
D
@ Yes
D No
One Leg Stand
@ Yes
D
@ Yes
D No
Crashlnvolved
D Yes @
@ Yes
D No
Injury
D Yes @

Drug Recognition Evaluation performed
Blood Collected

D

No
No
No
No
No

Yes @ No

~ Yes

D

No

Reason drugs are suspected
Prior to being offered the test, the defendant was substantially informed of the consequences of refusal and
failure of the test as required by Section 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code.
Defendant was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances. The test(s) was/were
peformed in compliance with Sections 18-8003 and 18-8004(4), Idaho Code and the standards and methods
adopted by the Idaho State Police.
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BreathBrAC

by: Intoxilyzer 5000 Other

Name of person administering the breath test

- - - - - - - Date certification expires:

0 Defendant refused the test as follows:

(
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By my signature and in the presen·ce of a person authorized to administer Oaths in the State of Idaho, I hereby
solemnly swear that the information contained in this document and attached reports and documents that may
be included herein is true and correct to the best of my information and belief.
Dated:

J/:tL[/(3
----------- Signed:
Subscribed and sworn before me on

~~

2 {-/ :3

,.,,,,,,,--7

(Date)
~
.
(or)
, ~
_P_E_R_S_O_N_A_UT_H_O_RI_Z_E_D_T_O_AD_MIN
__I_S_T_ER NOTARY PUBLIC F~~:Q {!
OATHS

Title:

Residing at: ~
My Commission Expires:

e~

La C...t vt. 'f::c-cr=
1 ,-z.. -

4-

I~
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Ada County Sheriffs Offi __
Narrative Report
RD: 82

1. Incident Tonic
DUI
Failure to Purchase Drivers License
13, Address
1W STATE ST/ N GLENWOOD ST, BOISE
5. Date Occurred
16. Time Occured
03/23/2013
01:34
I

~2013-94190 ·

2. Subiect/Victim's Name
STATE OF IDAHO,

14. Phone

I
17. Route To

I

(208) 000-0000
Is. Division

COUNTY PROSECUTOR

I

PATROL

Narrative:
On 03/23/13 at approximately 0134 hours, I was driving northbound on N. Glenwood St. in Boise,
Idaho. I steered my Ada County Sheriffs Patrol Vehicle into the westbound turn lanes at the
intersection with W. State St. In the lane directly in front ofme I observed a silver Chevrolet Silverado
True~ (1AUZ185) signaling to turn westbound onto State. The vehicle was stopped on top of the
lane's stop lines. The traffic control light was red. The traffic control left turn signal changed to green
and the truck proceeded to turn westbound. The vehicle drove on the south side of the raised median
that divided the east and westbound traffic on State St. The truck continued driving westbound in the
eastbound lane. I activated my patrol vehicle's emergency overhead lights and initiated my traffic
stop. The vehicle turned into the parking lot of WALMART at 7319 W. State. St. and came to a stop.
The following is a synopsis of my interview and subsequent investigation:
I approached the vehicle and observed a person sitting the driver's seat, a passenger in the front seat,
and another passenger sitting in the rear seat. The window was rolled down and I could smell a
strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from inside the truck. I identified myself to the
occupants. The driver, Thomas N. Townsend, was identified by an intern.ational driver's permit.
Thomas immediately began to apologize for driving down the wrong way on State. As Thomas spoke I
could smell a heavy odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from him. Thomas' eyes were extremely
red, watery, and glassy. Thomas spoke with slurred speech. The two occupants were identified by
their Idaho Driver's license as Thomas N. Townsend Jr.
and Eugene E. Odell
Thomas stated the three of them just left Shorty's Saloon at 5467 N. Glenwood where they were
drinking beer. Based on my observations of Thomas, I requested dispatch send an assist to my
location for a DUI investigation. Deputy T. Lakey informed dispatch he was on his way to assist me.
Once Deputy Lakey arrived, I had Thomas exit the Chevrolet truck. I had Thomas walk to the area
between his truck and my patrol vehicle. Thomas told me he was not epileptic or diabetic. Thomas
informed me he was not taking any type of medication. Thomas stated he did not have any type of
medical issues or problems. Thomas has lived in Middleton, Idaho for three years and prior to that he
lived in Boise. Thomas has never obtained an Idaho State Driver's License. Thomas told me the last
thing he ate was chicken at 1800 hours on 03/22/13. Thomas and his two companions went to
Shorty's at 2300 hours on 03/22/13. Thomas told me he drank four regular Bud Light draft beers,
having the last one at 0115 hours on 03/23/13. I repeated to Thomas what he had told me about his
,'

!Admin
Officer(s) Reporting

BILLWEIRES
Approved Supervisor

Sgt. MATT STEELE
(

...

Ada No.

5176
Ada No

4201

Approved Date

03/24/2013 06:55
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Ada County Sheriff's Offii
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Narrative Report
RD: 82
1. Incident Tonic
DUI
Failure to Purchase Drivers License
3, Address
W STATE ST/ N GLENWOOD ST, BOISE
5. Date Occurred .
16. Time Occured

I

03/23/2013

01:34

~2013-94190

2. Sub;ect/Victim's Name
STATE OF IDAHO,
·•

.

14. Phone

I
I

(208) 000-0000

Is. Division

17. Route To
COUNTY PROSECUTOR

I

PATROL

evening stopping with the number of beers he drank. I asked Thomas how many beers he drank at
Shorty's. Thomas' story changed and he told me he drank seven beers between 2100 hours and 0115
hours.
I had Thomas perform the SFST's (standardized field sobriety tests). The first test I had Thomas
perform was the HGN (horizontal gaze nystagmus) test Thomas swayed back and forth as he was
beginning the test. Thomas had lack of smooth pursuit in both of his eyes. Thomas had nystagmus at
maximum deviation in both of his eyes. Thomas had nystagmus prior to 45 degrees in both of his
eyes. I had to remind Thomas several times to ~eep his.head still during the test. Thomas failed the
HGN test with a score of 6.
The second test I had Thomas perform was the walk and turn test. I instructed Thomas on how to
perform the test and I showed him a short sample. Thomas lost his balance on multiple occasions
while standing in the proper position. Thomas started the test prior to me asking him to. Thomas
missed touching heel to toe by more than half an inch on all the steps. Thomas missed touching heel
to toe by more than four inches on some of the steps. Thomas stepped off line several times. Thomas
held his hands from his side by ten to fifteen inches for most of the test. Thomas took the wrong
number of steps and incorrectly conducted the appropriate turn. Thomas failed the walk and turn
test with a score of 7.
The last test I had Thomas perform was the one-leg stand test. I instructed Thomas on how to
-perform the test and I showed him a short sample. Thomas told me he understood the test and was
ready to begin. Thomas immediately started to sway back and forth. Thomas dropped his foot and
raised his hands from his side by more than fifteen inches. Thomas hopped a few times and then
nearly fell over during the test. I stopped the test at that time for Thomas' safety. Thomas failed the
test with a score of 4 prior to me stopping the test.
After Thomas failed all three of the SFST's, I arrested him for DUI. I placed handcuffs on him, checked
for tightness, and l double locked them. I escorted Thomas to the back ofmy patrol car. I assisted
him into the back seat. Once in the back seat, I checked his mouth for foreign objects and saw none. I
played Thomas an audio recording of the ALS (administrative license suspension) form. Thomas told
me he did not have any questions. I told Thomas he could not burp, belch, or vomit, during the 15minute wait. Thomas told me he understood. After the 15-minute wait was over, I had Thomas
perform the breath test. I observed Thomas make a quick blow into the breathalyzer and then stop.
The sample was insufficient. I explained to Thomas the proper way of conducting the test and told
him if the he would not comply with this test a blood sample would be taken from him. Thomas
!Admin
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Ada County Sheriffs Offh.,e
Narrative Report
RD: 82

1. Incident Tonic
DUI
Failure to Purchase Drivers License
3. Address
W STATE ST/ N GLENWOOD ST, BOISE
16. Time Occured
5. Date Occurred
03/23/2013
01:34
I

~2013-94190

2. Sub;ectlVictim's Name
STATE OF IDAHO,

/!

'

14, Phone

I
17. Route To

I

COUNTY PROSECUTOR

'

(208) 000-0000

ls. Division

I

PATROL

falsely acted like he was blowing into the breathalyzer on two more tests. Thomas then stated he
refused to comply with this test and I would have to take his blood.
I transported Thomas to the Ada County Jail where Ada County paramedic Supervisor C. Wolf
conducted a involuntary blood draw at 0300 hours without inci~ent. Thomas was then booked into
the Ada County Jail for DUI (citation# 472355). In booking I served Thomas with a citation# 472356
for Failure to Purchase a Valid Driver's License.

Disposition:
This report will be forwarded to the Ada County Prosecutor's Office for review.
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
KaleD. Gans
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Rm 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS TOWNSEND,
Defendant.

_______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110
AFFIDAVIT OF DETECTIVE
JOE ANDREOLI

The undersigned, Detective Joe Andreoli, of the Boise City Police Department, after
being first sworn, states as follows:
1. That your affiant is a detective with the Boise City Police Department currently
serving in the B.A.N.D.I.T (drug) unit.
2. That your affiant has been in law enforcement for approximately eleven years and
has served as a detective with Boise Police Department for two years of that time.
Additionally, two years a narcotics officer for City of Hamilton in Montana.
3. That your affiant's assignment as a Narcotics Detective involves a great deal of
work in area of searching homes, vehicles, and other property. Your affiant has
sought and received numerous search warrants in Ada County Idaho over the last
three years. Your affiant has been active part of the preparation of those affidavits.

AFFIDAVIT OF DETECTIVE JOE ANDREOLI (TOWNSEND), Page 1
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4. Your affiant knows that it takes your affiant, on average, 2 hours to draft an affidavit
for a search warrant. Your affiant knows that the prosecutor's office then reviews
the affidavit and prepares the warrant, which takes approximately an hour.

The

prosecutor and your affiant then have to contact a Judge, who will review the
affidavit and sign the warrant. This process takes at least one-half hour, but may

'take significantly longer depending on whether the magistrate Judges are on the
bench or otherwise unavailable. Thus a daytime warrant will take approximately 3

Yi, but may take as much as 4 Yi hours.
5. Your affiant knows that in the middle of the night, when both the prosecutor and
Judge are asleep and must be awakened to complete the warrant process, the process
takes additional time.
6. Your affiant knows that as of March of 2013, telephonic warrants were not in use in
Ada County.

7. Your affiant also knows that, although the time to prepare an affidavit in a DUI case
may be shorter than the cases your affiant normally works, the time to get a warrant
would be no less than approximately 1 Yi hours in the system as it existed in March
of 2013.
8. Your affiant knows that in the United State Supreme Court opinion Missouri v.

McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) the Court refers to mechanisms by which the
warrant process has been streamlined to expedite warrants in Drunk Driving
cases. Id. pg. 12.

The Court refers to a search warrant forms used in drunk

driving cases by the prosecutor's office in that jurisdiction. No such expedited
forms were available in Ada County in March of 2013.

AFFIDAVIT OF DETECTIVE JOE ANDREOLI (TOWNSEND), Page 2
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9. Your affiant knows that at any given time there is only one Magistrate serving in
an on-call capacity in Ada County.

Further your affiant sayeth not.
DATED, this J2 71-1 day of June 2013.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /

d'~ day of June 2013.

Notary Public fP[1Id o
Residing at
DM St
Commission Expires: -~lR~·

, Idaho
i~J~·l~K~---

AFFIDAVIT OF DETECTIVE JOE ANDREOLI (TOWNSEND), Page 3
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada Coilllty Prosecuting Attorney
KaleD. Gans
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Rm 3191
Boise, Idaho. 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

THOMAS NELSON TOWNSEND,
Defendant.

________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR MD 2013-0004110
AFFIDAVIT OF CECILY '
WILLERTON

The undersigned, Cecily Willerton, after being first sworn, states as follows:
1. That your affiant is currently employed as a planning analyst in the Planning and Research Department
of the Ada County Sheriff's Office.
2. That your affiant has sufficient access to the Ada CoW1ty Sheriff's Office jail management_ system to
identify and document the number and type of arrests and subsequent bookings into the Ada CoW1ty Jail
made during a given timefrarne. Your affiant is also able to research the number and type of charges
that stem from the identified jail bookings.
3. That your affiant has researched arrests between 6:33 p.m., March 22, and 5:55 a.m., March 23, 2013.
4. That your affiant's research reveals that 20 people were arrested and booked in the identified timefrarne.
Those 20 people resulted in 20 bookings.
5. Your affiant knows that of those 20 bookings, 9 were driving under the influence (DUI) offenses.
6. Your affiant knows that 45% of the bookings for the time identified were for DUL

AFFIDAVIT of Cecily Willerton (MCDONALD), Page 1
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Further your affiant sayeth not.

DATED, this

1L

day of June, 203.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Ada

) ss.
)

On this

JL day o f ~ 20/J, before me, a Notary Public for Idaho, appeared f'.ecily llli i/erh,n

known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she
executed the same.

fldaho
Notary B
Residing at: ~~::...l.:1l.lU..,~'J::-, Idaho
My Commission Expires:
-/L/-/'j'

AFFIDAVIT of Cecily Willerton (MCDONALD), Page 2
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Judge Hawley -- D. Finni::gan- 6/24/13

Time
3:24: 19 PM
3:24:33 PM
3:24:35 PM
3:24:56 PM

Speaker
j Motion to Suppress
i-states Atty
lPublic Defender
!-states Atty
1

3:29:20 PM lwitness
3:36:14 PM iPublic Defender-Nicole
!Owens
3:42:16 PM f-states Atty-Kale Gans
3:44:59 PM j
3:45:13 PM iPublic Defender-Nicole
!Owens

Courtroom206

Note
jThomas Townsend MD 13-4110
[Kale Gans
\Nicole Owens
icalls SW #1- Bill Weires-Sworn-Direct
lExamination of the Witness
fIdentifies Defendant
icross Examination of the Witness

·

I
!Redirct"Examination
jNothing further, witness steps down
!calls DW #1-Thomas Townsend-SwornlDirect Examination of the Witness

3:47:50 PM I-states Atty-Kale Gans
!cross Examination of the Witness
!Nothing further, witness steps down
3:50:03 PM
3:50:20 PM jPublic Defender-Nicole
jArgues motion to suppress
iOwens
I
....3:55·:·07 PM t-states.Atty-Kale.Gans.................!Argumen(................................. · ........ · .................

i

3:59:33 PM jPublic Defender-Nicole
!Owens

1

jRebuttal argument

Hawley
4:02:38 PM iJudge
:

imatter
considered fully submitted
:

. . :; ~~.;.; ~ . :~. .1Judge. Hawley .............................................[~:kf:~~:~:~;d0~ii~;ment ....................................................................

6/24/2013
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FIL~-~----

JUL 2 4 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN
DEPUTY

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.
THOMAS N. TOWNSEND,
Defendant.

CASE NO. CR MD 13-0004110
MEMORANDUM DECISION
REGARDING MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Kale Gans
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
. · Attorney for Defendant - Nicole Owens
Ada County Public Defender's Office

APPEARANCES:

Attorney for Plaintiff -

This matter came before· the court on June 24, 2013 for hearing on the

'
Defenda~t·s Motion to Suppress Evidence.

The court deemed the matter fully

submitted and took this matter under advisement on June 24, 2013.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March 23, 2013 at approximately 1:30 a.m., Detective Bill Weires of the Ada
County Sheriff's Office was on patrol in n0rthwest Boise, Idaho. Weires testified that he
was northbound on Glenwood following a Chevrolet pickup which was also northbound
on Glenwood. The pickup truck which was driven by Defendant Thomas Townsend
(hereafter 1'Townsend") turned left from Glenwood onto State Street. Townsend turned
to the left of the concrete barrier on State Street and proceeded west bound in the east
bound lanes of State Street. Townsend was traveling the wrong way into the oncoming
east bound lanes. Weires turned on the overhead lights of his patrol vehicle. Townsend
proceeded approximately another 40 feet before turning left into a Wal-Mart parking lot.

' ~t,

c..s~ . .

?\) \,~
\-:+1'' \)~
,
1'
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Weires testified that Townsend turned off.State Street at the first pull out after travelling
less than a quarter of a mile in the wrong direction in the east bound lanes.
Weires approached the pickup and identified the driver as the Defendant
Townsend, who was seated in the driver's side position. There were two passengers in
the pickup. Weires immediately detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from the cab
of the truck. He also noted that Townsend had glassy, red eyes, that his speech was
thick-tongued and slurred. Townsend told Weires that he had just left Shorty's Saloon
on North Glenwood. ·
Because there were two passengers in the vehicle Weires called into dispatch for
an officer to assist as backup. Townsend and the passengers remained in the truck
until Deputy'Lakey, ACSO, arrived 10 minutes later. Weires continued his investigation
of Townsend by having him exit his vehicle. During conversation Townsend admitted
~

•

I

'

I

that he had consumed four beers and later admitted that he had consumed seven beers
l

-

~

'

•

while at Shorty's Saloon. Weires testified that Townsend performed poorly on the

.

standard field sobriety tests. Townsend failed all three field sobriety tests and was
arrested for suspicion of Driving Under the Influence.
Weires placed Townsend in the back seat of his patrol vehicle where he played
the Administrative License· Suspension (ALS) audio that notifies suspects of the
,

t

I

,

t

potential penalties for refusing to· submit to evidentiary testing and waited 15 minutes
befcfre requesting Townsend to submit to a breath test on the Lifeloc FC20. Weires
dete~mined that Townsend had not burped, belched or vomited· during the 15 minute
J. j, Ii

waiting period.
i

I

' ~

•

I

·'

l
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I
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I
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I
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•
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After receiving an explanation. of the test Townsend quickly blew into the
instrument and then stopped on his first attempt on the Lifeloc rendering an insufficient
sample.

Weires again explained in detail how the test was conducted and what

Townsend was required to do. Weires explained to Townsend that if he did not comply
with the Lifeloc test that he would need to take a blood sample. Townsend then simply
failed to exhale any air on his second attempt. Townsend stated that he was not going
to comply with the test and that Weires would have to take his blood. Townsend was
transported to the Ada County Jail to submit a blood sample. After arriving at the Ada
County Jail, ·an Ada County paramedic drew blood samples from' Townsend. Weires
testified that Townsend was polite and compliant and that he dicf hot physically resist
,':

the blood draw.

I

Weires testified that he never informed Townsend that he could opt out of the

.

.

blood draw. He simply· told Townsend that if he didn't comply with the breath test that
he would do a blood draw.

Townsend testified that he objected to the blood draw

procedure a·nd protested that the procedure 'violated his constitutional rights. These
objections were not voiced to Weires, but could have been· made to someone else at
the Ada County Jail. Townsend further testified that jail staff told him that if he did not
cooperate they would hold him down and take his blood. Townsend admitted that no
!

. one ever held him down. He stated that he never gave anyone permission to take his
blood and that he did not physically resist the blood drawing.
Ultimately Townsend was cited and· was charged with'· Driving Under the
Influence a violation of Idaho' Code § 18-8004 and Failure to Purchase a Driver's
·I,

.
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License, a violation of Idaho Code § 49-301. On April 25, 2013 Town send filed a motion
to suppress evidence.
Townsend seeks to suppress the blood draw evidence citing the recent case of

Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 2013 WL 1628934 (Apr. 17, 2013). He argues
that McNeely precludes the use of forced blood draw evidence without a warrant and
nullifies the implied consent law in Idaho.
The State filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion on June 13, 2013.
The State also submitted the affidavits of Detective Joe Andreoli and Cecily Willerton
and the narrative report and probable cause affidavit of Detective Weires in opposition
to the motion. Detective Andreoli's affidavit states that telephonic warrants were not in
use in Ada County as of March 2013 and expedited se.arch wa~rants in drunk driving
(DUI) cases were unavailable in March 2013.' Andreoli's affidavit further states that
procuring a warrant during the daytime could take three and one half to four hours while
nighttime warrants would take additional time. Andreoli's affidavit also indicates that
obtaining a search warrant in a DUI would have taken a minimum r of one and one half
I

hours in March 2013.

,

Cecily Willerton's affidavit states that between 6:30 p.m. March 22 and 5:55 a.m.
'

on· March 23, 2013 20 individuals were arrested and booked at the Ada County Jail.
Forty-five· percent of these bookings (or 9 cases) were for DUI.

. ,.
I

\; I. .

· · DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ·and Article I, § 17 of
the Idaho Constitution prohibit "unreasonable searches ·and seizdres" of a person. A
blood draw taken during a driving under the influence investigation' constitutes a seizure
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of the person and a search falling within the scope of both constitutions. Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,

302, 160 P.3d 739, 741. In this case, a warrant was not obtained before the blood draw
took place. Therefore, the State must establish two preconditions to overcome the
presumption that a warrantless search was unreasonable: (1) the search fell within an
exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) it was "reasonable in the light of all the
other surrounding circumstances." Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302; See U.S. v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 471 (1973). This Court finds the State has met its burden.
I.' ·

Implied consent was given as a matter of Idaho law, which qualifies as a
valid exception to the warrant requirement.
.

.

Consent is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. State v.
•

I

:!I.

'

LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907, 243 P.3d 1093, 1095 (Ct.App.2010). The defendant

argues that the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct.
• ,

I

,

1552, 2013 WL 1628934 (Apr. 17, 2013), stands for the proposition that implied
.

. .,

..

)

statutory consent no longer qualifies as a valid exception to the warrant requirement.
~

'

I

•

•

•

•

'

'

~he defendant r~asons that the. Court recognized that all 50 sta~es, including Missouri,
have impli~d consent laws, yet still found ~he defe~dan~'s Fourt~ Amendment right to
have been violated. The ·defendant's interpretation and application of the Supreme
Court's holding,· however, fails to identify several factual and iegal distinctions that
1

distinguish Missouri law and the holding in McNeely from the situatio ~ in Idaho and the
case at hand.
In McNeely,· Justice Sotomayor identified the narrow issue in the case to be
"whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the 'bloodstream· presents a per se
.

,

'

•

I

exigency that justifies an· exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for

•i
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nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases." Id., 133 S.Ct. at 1556

(emphasis added). Missouri's implied consent statute, like most other states', has been
interpreted to allow a driver to withdraw statutorily implied consent by refusing to submit
to evidentiary testing. See Riley v. Director of Revenue, 378 S.W.3d 432, 438
(Mo.App.W.D.2012). The majority pointed out that implied consent laws "impose
significant consequences when a motorist withdraws consent[.)"

(emphasis added).

Consensual blood testing was not addressed. Therefore, given the facts of the case and
the interpretation of the law in Missouri, the holding in McNeely is most directly
applicable to those states and circumstances where a driver has the ·ability to withdraw
statutorily implied consent.

.

'

'~

In Idaho, statutorily implied consent cannot be withdrawn as a matter of law. See
State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 410, 973 P.2d 758, 762 (Ct.App.1999). Even if "an

individual has the physical ability to prevent evidentiary testing, there is no legal right to
withdraw the statutorily implied consent." Id. Idaho's implied consent statute provides
1

th.at any person who drives in the state "shall be deemed to have given his consent to
evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol" so long as the· 'police officer has
"reasonable grounds to believe" the person is under the influence.= I.C. § 18-8002(1).
The evidentiary tests available to officers include blood testing, I.C. § 18-8002(9), and
the specific test to be used is "of the officer's choosing." Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302.
Because·

a driver in

Idaho is unable to withdraw implied consent, the evidentiary test

used was· authorized by statute.

No evidence has been introduced to suggest the

officer did not have ·reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was under the
'I
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influence, thus the blood draw fell within a valid exception to the warrant requirement.
The evidence obtained from the blood draw is, therefore, admissible.

II.

The anticipated time delays in the warrant application process created a
situation whereby given the "totality of the circumstances" a warrantless
blood draw was justified under the exigency exception to the warrant
requirement.
The exigency exception to the warrant requirement applies when the facts of the

specific case "make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Ame~dm~nt." Kentucky v. King, 131
S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 2011 WL 1832821 (2011); See State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509,

'I

!

•

•

•

:

•

•

512, 236 P.3d 1269, 1272 (2010). The Court in McNeely rejected a per se rule that
alcohol metabolization is always an exigency that justifies an exception to the warrant
.
.
'
requirement in all drunk-driving cases. ln ..summarizing their deci:~ion, the Supreme
Court stated:
lrf short, while the natural' dissipation of alcohol' in ttie blood may support a
finding of exigency in a specific case, as it did in Schmerber, it does not do so
categorically. Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is
reasonable
must be determined case
by case based on the totality of the
'
!
circumstances:
I

McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1563.'

· In rejecting a per se rule, the Court in McNeely made two general assumptions.
,

'

,

I

First, the court assumed the states' ability to use retrograde extrapolation. Id. Second,
the court relied on advances in technology that allow police officers to'obtain warrants in
an expedited manner. Id. However, neither of these assumptions can be accurately
applied in_ this case. Based on the heightened importance of timely blood testing in
,'

•

I

J,

I

.

'

•

l

'

!

l

r '
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•
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Idaho, the anticipated delays in obtaining a warrant in March 2013 1 and the compelling
interests of the State, a warrantless blood draw in this case was reasonable and fell
within the exigent circumstances exception.

A.

Idaho law bars the state from extrapolating backwards to determine blood
alcohol content, shortening the available time to gather evidence.

An important assumption relied on by the majority in McNeely was that states
have the ability to extrapolate backwards to determine the blood alcohol content of a
defendant at the time of the stop. Id. With this ability, the. hours that may be needed to
'
:
.
obtain a warrant are insignificant, because the state could mathematically determine
'

..

i

what the blood alcohol content of the defendant was at the time of arrest. However, this
tool is not available in the State in Idaho, and therefore those extra hours are very
significant.
I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) makes it a per se violation ''for any person .... who has an
•

l.

•

alcohol concentration of 0.08 ... or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or
breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state[.]" To
provide incentive to drivers (believing their BACs to be below the limit) to cooperate with
the police and submit to evidentiary testing, the Idaho legislature enacted I.C. § 188004(2) .. As long as drug use' is not suspected, "[a]ny person having an alcohol
concentration of less than 0.08 ... as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, by
a test requested by a police officer shall not be prosecuted for driving under the
influence of alcohol[.]" Thus if a defendant submits to evidentiary testing and the results
't

I

1 Idaho Code Sections 19-4404 and 19-4406 provide a procedure for telephonic search warrants in
Idaho. However, telephonic warrants were not available at1d yvere not in L!~e in Aqa County in March
2013. Expedited search warrants were not available in drunk driving cases in Ada County in March 2013.
(Affidavit Detective Joe Andreoli, filed June 13, 2013 at paragraphs 6, 8).
•

I

•

'

•

I•
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reveal a blood alcohol content of less than .08, the State is prohibited from prosecuting
the individual. See State v. Daniel, 132 Idaho 701, 703, 979 P .2d 103, 105 (1999). This
also means the State, contrary to the assumption made by the Court in McNeely, is
precluded from using retrograde extrapolation, or else the incentive would be destroyed.

Id., 132 Idaho at 703-704, 979 P.2d at 105-106. Without this tool, of which the majority
in McNeely relied in rejecting a per se rule, alcohol dissipation is a greater threat to the
availability of evidence in Idaho, as compared to elsewhere. Therefore, the argument is
stronger in this case that law enforcement requires a shortened time frame for gathering
blood evidence, and that the dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream is more likely an
exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw, objectively reasonable to preserve the
evidence for the State.
B.

At the time of the arrest, the anticipated delay in obtaining a warrant
justified a blood test without judicial authorization.

The inability of law enforcement to obtain judicial authorization .in a timely matter
can create an exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw. The Court in McNeely
expressly acknowledged this by stating, "exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless

·..

'

blood sample may arise in the regular course of law enforcement due to delays from the
~

•

•

..

•

•

•

•

1

1-

'

warrant application process." McNeely, ~ 33 S.Ct. at 1563. The _majority referenced
advances in technology that streamlined the warrant application process:
"Well over a majority of States allow police officers or prosecutors to apply for
search warrants remotely through various means, including telephonic or radio
communication, electronic communication s'uch as e-mail, and video
conferencing. And in addition to technology-based developm~nts, jurisdictions
have found other ways to streamline the warrant process, such as by using
standard-form warrant applications for drunk-drivi~g .investig~tions."

Id. 133 S.Ct. at 1562. However, the detective in this case was not privy to these
technological advances.
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Detective Andreoli's affidavit states that in March 2013, telephonic warrants were
not in use in Ada County, and expedited search warrants were unavailable in drunk
driving cases. The anticipated time to obtain a search warrant for a DUI was, at the very
minimum, one and one half hours. The process at night could have potentially taken a
significantly greater amount of time.
A number of circumstances in this case created a "totality" that justified a
warrantless blood draw. First, the inability of the state to extrapolate blood results
backwards makes the timeliness of when the blood is tested particularly important in
Idaho. Second, perhaps unlike other jurisdicti'ons, the warrant application process in
Ada County at the time was by no means streamlined and the anticipated delays from
that process (likely well over two hours) threatened the availability of evidence. Third,
the defendant was first· offered a less intrusive evidentiary' testing method (a breath
test), but refused to submit

to it. Finally, with the defendant driving the wrong direction

down the street, admitting to having consumed seven beers, and failing all three field
sobriety tests,' an excessive DUI could have reasonably been suspected by the officer,
'

.

!h

carrying with that suspicion a greater interest in the State of prosecuting the violator.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the exigencies of the situation justified the
warrantless blood draw.

..

.
Ill.

In light of all the surrounding circumstances, the search was reasonable.

A "reasonable" search in the context of a forced blood draw means "done in a
medic'ally acceptable manner and without unreasonable force." Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303,
t

160 P.3d. at 742 (citing Schinerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S. Ct. at 1836 (1966)); State v.
Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 371, 233 P.3d 1286, 1293 (Ct.App.2010). Although the

I,
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defendant has not presented evidence, nor argued, that the blood test failed either of
these two criteria, the search still needs to have been reasonable. This Court finds it
was.
First, a blood draw was only performed after the defendant failed to submit to a
less intrusive method of breath testing. Second, the blood draw was performed by a
qualified Ada County paramedic, and no evidence was presented to suggest that the
test fell below the "medically acceptable" standard. Finally, as the defendant testifies, he
did not physically resist the blood draw and no one held him down. Further, Detective
Weires testified that he was polite and compliant during the test. This Court finds, in
light of all the surrounding circumstances, the blood draw was a reasonable search
done in a medically acceptable manner and without unreasonable force.
Conclusion

The Court denies the motion to· suppress and finds the blood draw evidence is
admissible. IT IS SO ORDERED.

.,

'

Dated thisQ(f' day of July 2013.
'1
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M_ .. aay, October 21, 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT
BY: D FINNEGAN
DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
200 W. Front Street, Boise Idaho 83702
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.
)
vs.
)
Case No: CR-MD-2013-0004110
)
Thomas N Town send
409 Rose Lake Drive
Middleton, ID 83644
Defendant.

-------------------

)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:

AC Pretrial Conference .... Tuesday, November 05, 2013 .... 09:15 AM
Judge: John Hawley Jr.
Jury Trial. ... Wednesday, December 04, 2013 .... 08:15 AM
Judge: John Hawley Jr.
THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE PERSONALLY PRESENT AT BOTH THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND/ OR THE
JURY TRIAL. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT EITHER THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE OR THE JURY TRIAL WILL
RESULT IN A BENCH WARRANT FOR THE DEFENDANT'S ARREST.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the court
and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this notice were served as follows:
Defendant:

Mailed --2(____ Hand ';jliv~red
C l e r k ~ Date \~~~(1

Signature
Phone..__........._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Heidi M Tolman
200 W Front St Rm 1107
Boise ID 83702
Private Counsel: Mailed
Clerk
Prosecutor:

Hand Delivered
Date

Signature----------Phone

------------

1nterde pa r!ro ENlta I Mail -1._ ~ Ada D Boise D Eagle D G.C. D Meridian
Clerk
.). _tl_.. Date ...!!lf_Q

'f
Public Defender: lnterdepartm!ntal Mail
Clerk
tf.. Date -.!r-=O....,..,(V3"°"""'""-

:5

Other: - - - - - - - - - - - Mailed
Hand Delivered
Clerk
Date

---

Dated: 10/21/2013

-------

Signature _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Phone..___.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the C L

By:

~

6eputc1er1<

•
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI~/ 0 5 2G13
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY@.fi1&(;)J»HER o. RICH, Clerk
By DEIRDRE FIN~GAN

) ~~~~TE MINUTES/ NOTICE OF HEARINl.i

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff,

~
vs.

-111\
- -----'
' '"'--- ))
--~~_.__v_Yn__...c.....;.Oi,:;........;:~--::n---'
-o=W-=---n:_:.=Y.lryj:'

-

AL MEMORANDUM

Case Number:

___.C.___..R--'---rn_D_-_J3
____-_'-1_1_,_D_ __

h-.-\
0 _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Event Scheduled: _ _ _......
_r__ _

)

~AP~

Clerk:

---=D:;_f_:_____

------------)

Judge:

--------------- )
Defendant.
)

Case Called: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)g71n Chambers

)

_______________) D

~c
I

(

D

D Not Present D

In Custody

D PD Appointed D PD Denied D Waived Attorney

Defendant failed to appear_ Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. Bench Warrant issued_ Bond $ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

~ i s e d of Rights

D

~ Private _ _ _~_ __,_\....b"'"")......Y'.bL...L..J"""<2:-:::'0:=-.:.--'------

/-1- e. ~k ,:_ f

D sc D EA D Gc D MC

Defendant: (g:J>resent

Interpreter: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

D Not Guilty D Guilty Plea/ PV Admit D Written Guilty Plea D No Contact Order
D Pre-Trial Release Order D Provide

Bond$

Se.,,,-

.ft. r-

(?}v;\~

6tt.

:b>

6.

bn±:0:::

(<0 ~ \. \

Evaluation

cDh? ,-fl"o~

{) \Jut

------------------------ D

Release Defendant, This Case Only

D Court Trial Conference on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ at _ _ _ _ am/pm w/ Judge _ _ _ _ _ _ __
D

Pre-Trial/ Jury Trial on

~6,\j
D

onW-< JD

at

am/pm w/ Judge-.,....-------

1 ;ri}3at~mw!Judge

\:taw)~

Contact the Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St., Rm_ 1107, Boise, ID 83702, telephone (208)28~-Jo.

You must appear as scheduled above. Failure to do so will result in a warrant being issued for your arrest,
or default judgment may be entered if you are charged with an infracth;m.
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 200 W. FRONT ST., BOISE, ID 83702
I hereby certify that copies of this notice were served as follows:

D

Defendant:

Hand Delivered

Via CounselZl

Defense Atty:

Hand Deliverea~

L

Prosecutor:

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court

~.b·-~
Deputy Clerk

MAGISTRATE MINUTES
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, ADA COUNTY
~ JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION

D WITHHELD JUDGMENT

~ PROBATION ORDER

Expires---------

~

ST~AHO vs.

}

FILE-1+-:all+>'"+l--"'--...:AT

:::~
trlD:) 3-z+) /

--\-ll l)Yil {l 2) ~[)» Yl s.000:

0

CASE NO.
Prosecuting Agency:~ ]J_BC gEc

DEFENDANT having been charged with the following offenses:
Count1.
Count2.

Du\

rg~~oo<(~\
\yv\}Q li(A ~k
t/:f- 3Pf

DE~NDANT WAS:

X

Jsl Present D I

~

Digitals

=-o-4

.M.

loJ81 J

O GC O MC

Count3. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Count4. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

D Not Present D Interpreter Present

[81 Advised of all rights ~nyenalties per ICR 5, 11, IMCR 5(f)
.,.
•
CO.YRT ENTERS JUDGMENT AFTER: ~ o l Guilty Plea O Trial - Found Guilty
I Defenses~gainst Self-lncriminatiorCEfro Jury Trial .¢'o Confront and Cross Examine Accuser(s) DTo Counsel

epresented by:
Defen ant Waived Righ ·

~ ORDERED:

)'.I.I

State's Attorney:

fo;1D

C

tody

DEFENDANT'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES SUSPENDED

865" .9.§YS beginning

; or

,'.?

CONSECUTIVE TO ANY CURRENT SUSPENSION j8fAbsolute Suspension
(.5 days D Interlock from
to _ __
ORDERED: DEFENDANT TO PAY TO THE CLERK:
D Apply cash bond$_ _ _ _ __
Count1: Fine/Penalty$
W/$
Suspended+CTCosts$
=$._ _ _ _ _ __
Count 2: Fine/Penalty$
/
W/ $
'
Suspended+ CT Costs$
CC
= $._ _ _ _ _ __
Count 3: Fine/Penalty$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ W/ $
Suspended+ CT Costs$
= $_ _ _ _ _ __
Count 4: Fine/Penalty$
W/ $
Suspended + CT Costs $
= $._ _ _ _ _ __
D Reimburse Public Defender$
D Workers' Comp ($.60/hr) $
TOTAL
= $_ _ _ _ _ __
Restitution $_ _ _ _ _ __
Defendant shall make
EQUAL MONTHLY PAYMENTS BEGINNING ONE MONTH FROM TODAY

D
D

0:/JClJ

cc_

/[!)tJtJ

S-0

dQ

) \ORDERE~FENDANT ~ E l~CARCERATED IN:

D County Jail

Count 1: p{g5_daysw/
3~suspended-Credit_/_ _ _ Total =
/~
Count2: _ _ _ daysw/ _ _ _ _ Suspended-Credit _ _ _ _ Total = _ _ __
Count 3:
Count 4:

days w/
days w/

Suspended - Credit
Suspended - Credit

Total = _ _ __
Total = _ _ __

D Juvenile Detention Cent~
TOTAL DAYS TO SERVE= -+,/_,_
________

D Concurrent to Case number(s): - - - - - - D Concurrent

D Consecutive

to all cases

to any other cases

D ___ days must be fully completed, with NO OPTIONS available. D _ _ _ days must be fully completed, with INTERIM JAIL available.

D Pay or Stay$ _ _ __ D In-Custody ___ SAP

D Interlock Funds (after use of any cafeteria funds)

ABC

D If approved by the Ada County Sheriffs Office, defendant is allowed to serve in _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _County at defendant's expense.
~THE FOLLOWING OP.tirs offered by the County Sheriff are available to the defendant only !E defendant meets requirements of the program.

~ All Options
/
days;
D If defendant is in custody, release and re-book for any options.
D Any combo of the following Options: Wk Rls _ _ days; SLD _ _ days; SCS _ _ hours; Hs. Arr. (2/1) _ _ dai1 /1)
dayy

D PROBATION CONDITIONS: Supervised Probation Expires:

/q.., Ja. IC

0

Unsupervised Probation Expires:

1&@4i7i§i?

IN CHAMBERS PER WRITTEN GUilTY PLEA

/;!. ·/0,/.3
DEFENDANT
D Release Defendant this case only

Date of Order
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Oi:C 1 O2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Brian Naugle
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Magistrate Division, 200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
'-.'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS TOWNSEND,
•,,,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2013-0004110
AMENDED
COMPLAINT
Defendant's DOB
Defendant's SSN

PERSONALLY APPEARED before me this

/(J

~\ur

day of~fo.emecr 2013, Brian

Naugle, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of Ada, State ofldaho, who, being first
duly sworn, complains and says: that THOMAS TOWNSEND, on or about the 23rd of March
2013, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did commit the crime of I. OPERATING A MOTOR
VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL (SECOND WITHIN TEN

...

YEARS), MISD., I.C. §18-8004, 8005(4) and II. DRIVING WITHOUT OBTAINING A
DRIVER'S LICENSE, MISD., I.C. §49-301, as follows:

000065
AMENDED COMPLAINT, (TOWNSEND), Page 1

}

I.
That the Defendant, THOMAS TOWNSEND, on or about the 23rd day of March, 2013, in
the County of Ada, State ofldaho, did drive a motor vehicle, to-wit: a silver Chevrolet Pickup, on or
about Glenwood and State Street, while under the influence of alcohol, or, in the alternative, did
drive the above-described motor vehicle at the above-described location, with an alcohol
concentration of .08 or more, to-wit: .154 as shown by an analysis of his blood, and having pled
guilty to or having been found guilty of a violation of a substantially conforming criminal violation

§18-8004, within the previous ten years.

IL
That the Defendant, THOMAS TOWNSEND, on or about the 23rd day of March, 2013, in
the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did operate a motor vehicle, to-wit: a silver Chevrolet Pickup, at
or about Glenwood and State Street, without a valid driver's license.
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case and against
the peace and dignity of the State ofldaho.

SUBSCRIBED AND Sworn to before me this

AMENDED COMPLAINT, (TOWNSEND), Page 2

/

0

~p.l(e;rL
day ofN:cAember2013.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D1STRJ~11t0Ei~tHE1 D. PilCH, Clerk ·
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA syoEiR~~;u~·iNEGAN
.

''

\.

· IN THE MATTER OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE
DRIVER'S LICENSE OF:

409 Rose Lake Drive

)
)
)
)
)

Middleton, ID 83644

)

ORDER SUSP_ENDING DRIVER'S LICENSE

)
)
)

FOR A PLEA OF GUil TY OR FINDING OF
GUILTY Of OF.FENSE

Thomas N Townsend

Defendant.

')

DOB:.
DL or SSN:

_____
TO:

_________

)
)
)

CHatlon No: 472355
Case No: CR-MD-2013-0004110

WJ

Interlock Device

Interlock start: /). · / Z·

_K_

JfEnd: /J-, [J Is_

THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT AND THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT
' .
•

The Defendant having
•the offense of Driving Under the Influence, i
es or equires the suspension of the driving privileges of the
violation of Section 118-8004 M, ich auth
Defendant by the Court, and the Court having considered th~ same.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT 18 HEREBY ORDERED, that the drlylJtg prMleges and.driver's llcense of the above
named Defendant is hereby suspended for a period of
~

1¢ · I Z, !.3

)1(
a

-

~.

r

3&,~

days commencing on

·

'

;or ~

at the end of _any current suspension.

YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED. that the expiration of the period of this suspension does not reinstate your
driver's license and you must make application to the Idaho Transportation Department for reinstatement of
your driver's license after the suspension period expires.
Dated:

/J.. · (O" Ll

I hereby certify that the foregoing Is a true and correct cop

the original O er Suspending Driver's LJcense

For a Plea of GuiHy or Finding of Guilty of Offense entered by the Court and on file in this office. I further

certify that copies of this Order '!ere setved as follows:
Defendant:

Thomas N Townsend Mailed

Department of Transportation. Boise: ·
Dated:
.

1,~ tJ1DJI k3

Hand Delivere~

Malled~

·. Hand Delivered _
C:tsSTOPHER D. RICH
Cle

fth~rt

h~~

By:
Deputy Clerk

·

~~
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DEC 1 0 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN
DEPUTY

SUPERVISED MISDEMEANOR PROBATION ORDER
Defendant: Thomas N Townsend

Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110

Address:

409 Rose Lake Drive

Date Ordered: 12/10/13

Middleton, ID 83644

Judge: John Hawley Jr.

Phone:

Prosecuting Attorney: Michael J. Guy
Defense Attorney: Heidi M Tolman

You have been sentenced to the following term of supervised probation:
on
December 10, 2013
and terminating on
December 10, 2015

Two Years

, commencing

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT you comply with the following terms and conditions of supervision:
Initial Probation Contact: You understand that you MUST contact Ada County Misdemeanor Probation at the
address below within one business day to schedule an appointment. Failure to do so may result in the issuance of
a warrant for your arrest. You will bring all court paperwork with you to this appointment.
Ada County Misdemeanor Probation
8601 W. Emerald Suite 150, Boise, Idaho 83704
Phone: 208-577-3380 I FAX: 208-577-3389
Laws: You shall respect and obey all laws and comply with all terms of probation as ordered by the court or
directed by a probation officer. You shall comply with all lawful requests of a probation officer.
Compliance: You shall comply with all lawful direction given to you by a probation officer.
Notification: You will notify your probation officer within 24 hours (or within one business day) following any
contact with law enforcement, including but not limited to citations, arrests, or investigations. You will fully
cooperate in a respectful manner with any law enforcement requests and advise them that you are on supervised
probation and provide them with the name of your assigned probation officer.
Residence/Contact: You shall notify your probation officer prior to making any changes to your residence, phone
numbers or email addresses. You will submit any changes to your probation officer for approval. You must notify
your probation officer within one business day of making any approved changes. You will maintain a contact
phone with voice messaging. You are responsible for checking this phone number at least daily and complying
with any instructions given by a probation officer.
Reporting: You shall check in at the Ada County Misdemeanor Probation Office on a monthly basis, unless
directed otherwise by a probation officer. You shall truthfully submit any written or oral reports requested by a
probation officer:
Attendance: Y.ou understand that failure to appear for any assigned/scheduled appointments with any service
providers, drug testing service, or your probation officer may result in a probation violation being filed with the court
or the imposition of discretionary jail time.

000068
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Controlled Substances and Alcohol: You will not use, possess, or distribute any alcoholic beverages, controlled
substances or intoxicants while on probation unless lawfully prescribed by a licensed physician. You shall submit
to any testing of breath and bodily fluids for these substances as directed by the court, law enforcement, treatment
providers or the probation officer. You shall be truthful in said testing and shall not ingest substances or take any
actions in an attempt to mask or alter the test results. Any attempts shall be considered the same as a
presumptive positive result. You shall pay all fees and costs of such testing.
Employment/Education: You will obtain and maintain appropriate full-time employment and/or participate in an
educational program as directed by a probation officer.
Electronic Monitoring Device/Alcohol Monitoring Device/Interlock Device: You understand that you may be
placed on electronic monitoring device/alcohol monitoring device/Interlock device as deemed necessary by the
probation officer. You shall pay the daily monitoring costs and any costs associated with any damages or lost
equipment.
Court Fines and Restitution: You shall pay any and all court fines, restitution and other costs as ordered by the
Court and defined in your fine agreement.
Programs & Treatment: You shall cooperate and successfully complete any and all assessments and/or
treatment programs ordered by the Court. You shall pay all costs and fees for the programs in a timely manner.
Classes or Treatment: You shall comply, cooperate and successfully complete any assessments and/or
treatment program required by the probatior:i officer. You shall pay all costs and fees for the programs in a timely
manner.
Review Hearings: You understand that you must appear before the Court as scheduled to review your
compliance with the conditions of your probation.
Costs of Supervision: You shall pay the costs of supervision on a prepaid monthly basis to Ada County
Misdemeanor Probation in the amount of $75.00 per month, unless adjusted by the Court.
Release of Information: You authorize the release and exchange of confidential information to and from your
probation officer, including but not limited to evaluations, medical history, reports, and treatment records related to
your probation.
·
Travel: You will_ not le.ave the state of Idaho withou~ first obtaining a travel permit from your probation officer.
Additional Instructions: You will comply with any and all additional instructions given by a probation officer.
Other:

Defendant's Signature and Date
Supervised Misdemeanor Probatior:i Order
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DEC 1 0 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN
DEPUTY

ADA CQUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Stre~t, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
~

f

'

,

'

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STAT~
OF
IDAHO,
.
'

Case No.CR-MD-2013-4110

PJaintiff,
STIPULATION TO ENTER
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY

vs.
T;HOMAS TOWNSEND,
Defendant.

The parties above-named, by and through undersigned counsel, come now and hereby
stipulate fllld agree, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 1 l(a)(2), to the following:
1)

With approval of the Court, the defendant shall enter a <::onditional plea of
"guilty'' in the above-named case number.

2)

The defendant's conditional plea of "guilty" shall reserve in writing the right, on
appeal from judgment, to review the Court's adverse ruling on the defendant's
Motion to Suppress (July 24, 2013).

3)

If the defendant prevails on appeal, the defendant shall be allowed to withdraw his
conditional plea of "guilty'' pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 1 l(a)(2).

DATED, this

//}i"'day of December 2013.

STIPULATION TO ENTER CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY

0000701

-

Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

THOMA~ TOWNSEND
Pdep.dant

STIPULATION TO ENTER CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY

2
000071

.'

.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this _ _ day of December 2013, I hand delivered

(serv~d) a true and correct copy of the within instrument to:
Ada County Prosecutor
'

Heidi Tolman

STIPULATION TO ENTER CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUil,TY

3
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NOTICE OF DEFEl\ 1"' '\NT'S RESPONSIBILITIES AFT''"'.R SENTENCING
Defendant: Thomas N Townsend

Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110

Address:

409 Rose Lake Drive

Date Ordered: 12/10/2013

Middleton, ID 83644

Judge: JOHN HAWLEY JR.

Phone:
Prosecuting Agency: Ada County Prosecutor
HAVING PLEAD GUILTY TO OR BEEN FOUND GUILTY, I AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING TERMS OF SENTENCING:

FOR ANY JAIL TIME ORDERED BY THE COURT.
Within 48 hours (between 7:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., Monday - Friday except holidays}, the defendant shall make
immediate contact in person, pay any required fee, cooperate with, and follow all instructions of said agencies.
Defendant shall not report to the Day Reporting Center with any trace of alcohol in his or her system. Failure to
do so will result in the issuance of a warrant for your arrest.

Sheriff Court Services
200 W. Front Street is1 Floor
(208) 287-7185

OR

Day Reporting Center
7180 Barrister - Boise, Idaho
(208) 577-3460

For any Juvenile Detention/Community Service report to: 400 N. Benjamin, Suite 201.
Juvenile Defendant to contact the shift Supervisor at 287-5632 or 287-5629, within 5 working days.
Total Days to Serve

D Concurrent D Consecutive to any other cases. D All Options Offered

=

D Juvenile Community Service hrs: _ _ _ _ _ _ _to be completed b y - - - - - - - - - - - FOR ANY TERM OF PROBATION ORDERED BY THE COURT;
I

UNSUPERVISED
~ Notify Court of change of address ~ Commit no crimes ~ Pay all fines, costs, restitution & reimbursements
~ Enroll/complete court approved education or treatment program(s) as ordered ~ Refuse no evidentiary testing
SUPERVISED- Contact Probation Services below within 24 hours. Take any and all court paperwork from your sentencing
on this case. Failura io do so will Yesult in the issuance of a warrant for your arrest.
Ada County Misdemeanor Probation Services - call within 24 hours, (208) 577-3380
8601 W Emerald St. Suite 150
Boise, ID 83704

FOR ANY Al\lD ALL CLASSES ORDERED BY THE COURT;
The defendant shall make immediate contact with the court-approved programs as chosen below, within 24 hours,
pay any required fee, arrive at each class on time, and fully cooperate with program sponsors. Also, take all court
paperwork from your sentencing on this case to each of the programs. Failure to complete these programs as ordered
may result in the issuance of a warrant for your arrest for a violation of probation.

D

Alcohol/Drug Ed. hrs _ _

[g] Victim's Panel

D

D

Anger Management hrs

O Theft Classes hrs

Tobacco Ed hrs

D Domestic Violence Treatment weeks

cgj Other__ Eval within 90 Days__

D Driving School hrs
. D Cog Self Change

_r ___ -- -- As~~-NT -- - - - --- ---,

Provider Chc1sen by defendant: (Place stickers here)

BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES

366 SW 5th Ave. Suite 100
Meridian, ID 83642
Phone 898-9755
Fax 898-2544

Defendant' Signature

Date

'·~----- -- ---

RELEASE OF INFORMATION: I hereby request and authorize the Department of Veterans Affairs to release information regarding my
completion of the programs specified on this Judgment to Ada County Misdemeanor Probation Services (if supervised probation was
ordered) or to the prosucLiling agency as listed above (if defendant is ordered unsupervised probation)

Defendant's Signaturn

Last 4 - SSN

Date
000073
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. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE.FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRicl":dr:iii1t1Ei '
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNl¥IOISMmiER D. RICH, Clerk
By ANNA MORGAN
- DEPUTY

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

)
)

)

vs.
.

)
)

.

-Thomas N Townsend

)

409 Rose Lake Drive
Mfddfeton, ID 83644

)
... )

Defendant.

)

,.

~

DOB:

· DL or SSN: .

)
)
)

Case No: CR-MD-2013-0004110

NOTIFICATION OF PENALTIES FOR .
SUBSEQUENT VIOlATION OF
DRMNG UNDER THE INFLUENCE (DUI)

LC, 18-8004

NOTICE: If ~u plead gulltyto or are found gulllyof driving under the Influence (DUI), Including whhheld Judgments, th
penoHies will, be os follows;
·
·
1. A FIRST DUI is a misdemeanor, and you:
(a) Maybe jailed for up to six months; and fined up to $1000; and
(b) Shall have your driving privileges suspended for up to 180 days. NOTICE: YOUR DRMNG PRIVILEGE
WILL BE SUSPENDED FOR 30 DAYS. THIS ISANABSOLUTE SUSPENSION WTH NO DRIVING
PRMLEGES.
2.. A SECOND DUI wihin 10 ~ars is a misdemeanor, and you:·
·
~ a i l e d for at least 10 days and, up to 1 ~ar,withthe irst,4.8 hours to be seNed consecutively, an
five (5) days of which must be seNed in jail, and maybe fined up to $2000; and
(b) Shall have your driving privileges suspended for 1 ~ar following your release from jaft, with absolutely n,
driving privileges of any kind •
. (c) Shall only drive a motor vehicle equipped with a functioning ignition interlock swem following the the on
(1) war mandatory license suspension period.
3. ADUI IS A FELONY IF IT IS: (1) a third DUlwihin 10 ~ars; or(2) a subsequent DUI with a previous felony DUI,
Aggravated DUI within 15 ~ars; or (3) a second DUI within 10 ~ars where in both cases there was an alcohol
concentration of 0.20 or more; and you:
·
·
(a) Shall be sentenced to the custody of the State Board of Corrections for up to 10 ~ars (but If the court
imposes a jail sentence instead of the state penitentiary, it shall be for a minimum of30 day.;), the first ,t.:
hours to be seNed consecutively. and ten (10) days of which must be served In lal and maybe tned up t
$5000;and
.
·
(b) Shall have your driving privileges suspended for at least 1 ~ar and up to 5 ~ars after release tom ·
custody, wfth absolutely no driving privileges of any kind.
.
(c) Shall onlvdrive a motor vehicle equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system following the one (1
war mandatory license suspension period.
·
I HAVE READ THIS ENTIRE DOCUMENT; I HAVE HAD IT EXPLAINED TO ME; AND I HAVE RECEIVED A COP'

D~!~

r

Defendant

000074
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FILED

P.M----

DEC 12 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cieri<
By AMY LANG
DEPUTY

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

THOMAS TOWNSEND,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
.)

Case No. CR-MD-2013-4110

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Defendant-Appellant.
______________

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, THE STATE OF IDAHO, BY AND
THROUGH THE ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-named Defendant-Appellant,
Jaryn W~tt, appeals against the State of Idaho to the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District, State of Idaho, from the Memorandum Decision Denying the
Defendant's Motion To Suppress, entered on the 24th day of June, 2013, in State
v. Thomas Townsend, Case No. CR-MD-2013-4110.

a.
b.
c.
d.

w

Title of the Action: State v. Thomas Townsend
Title of Court that heard Proceedings Appealed from and Presiding
Magistrate: Magistrate Division of the Fourth Judicial District Court,
State of Idaho, the Honorable Judge John Hawley Jr. presiding.
Case Number: CR-MD-2013-4110
Court to Which Appeal Taken: District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District, State of Idaho.

NOTICE OF APPEALo'Page 1

000075

e.

f.

g.

h.

1.

Date and Hea(Jing of Judgment, Decision, or Order from Which
Appeal is Taken: Memorandum Decision Denying Defendant's Motion
to Suppress, issued July 24, 2013.
Statement as to Whether Appeal is Taken Upon Matters of Law, or
Upon Matters of Fact, or Both:
1. Appeal is taken upon all matters of law and fact.
2. The Defendant-Appellant anticipates raising issues including but not
limited to: Did the magistrate court err in denying the defendant's
motion to suppress?
.
Statement as to Whether the Testimony and Proceedings in the
Original Trial or Hearing Were Recorded or Reported; Identification
of Method of Recording or Reporting; Transcript Request:
1. The proceedings in the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress
were recorded through the magistrate court's courtroom audio
recording mechanism.
2: The audio recording is in the possession of the Transcript Coordinator
of the Fourth Judicial District Court, State of Idaho.
3. The Defendant-Appellant requests the following transcript: Transcript
from the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, held on June 24,
2013.
.
Certification: I certify the following:
1. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the
reporter through the Clerk of the Court through
Interdepartmental Mail.
2. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the
opposing party through Interdepartmental Mail.
3. That the Defendant-Appellant is exempt from paying the
estimated transcript fee because he is an indigent person and is
·
'
unable to pay said fee.
4. That the Defendant-Appellant is exempt from paying the
estimated fee' for preparation of the record because he. is an .
indigent person and is unable to pay said fee.
5. That the Defendant-Appellant is exempt from paying the .
appellant filing fee because he is indigent and is unable to pay
said fee.
Jurisdiction: That the Defendant-Appellant may appeal to the District
Court, and the judgment described above is appealable under and pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.l(a).

DATED this --11::: day of December, 2013.

H " d " T ~ · , . i·
e1 1 o man
Attorney for Defendant-Appellaqt

NOTICE OF APPEAL, Page 2
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•

L

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this ;rday of December, 2013, I ~~iled a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to the:
ADA County Prosecuting Attorney
Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho
by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

NOTICE OF APPEAL, Page 3

.

000077

:~,-.-f,1#10~1-+.'-1~F~l~~.t=======
DEC 12 2013

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone:
(208) 287-7400
Facsimile:
(208) 287-7419

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By AMY LANG
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff,

THOMAS TOWNSEND,
Defendant.

----------------

and

through

Defender's

MD 13 4110

)
).

vs.

COMES NOW,

Criminal No.

MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION
OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)
)

the above-named Defendant,

his

Attorney

Office,

HEIDI

of

Record,

TOLMAN,

the

THOMAS
Ada

TOWNSEND,
County

by

Public

handling attorney,. and. hereby

moves this Honorable Court for its Order staying the execution
of the sentence pending appeal in the instant case pursuant.'· to
I.C.R. 54.5 (a).
DATED, this

\1--

day of December, 2013.

.• ,•• ,•1

HEIDI T 0 ~ - 4 0 : .
Attorney for Defendant

000078
MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL, Page
1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this ~ d a y of December, 2013,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the:.
ADA County

by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

··,

000079
MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL, Page
2

AM.

FILED P.M.

3y D

1...,.-day, January 06, 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT
BY: AMY EDWARDS
DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
_200 W. Front Street, Boise Idaho 83702
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.
vs.
Thomas N Townsend
409 Rose Lake Drive
Middleton, ID 83644
Defendant.

--------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CR-MD-2013-0004110

NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:

Motion Hearing .... Tuesday, January 07, 2014 .... 11 :45 AM
Judge: Michael McLaughlin
Motion for Stay!ng Execution of Sentence Pending Appeal

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the court
and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this notice were served as follows:
Public Defender:
Heidi M Tolman
Emailed
Prosecutor:
Michael Guy

X
EmailedX

Dated: 1/6/2014

.

{,,

NOTICE OF HEARING

-..

~

000080

Judge McLaughlin . 1-7

Time
11 :58:42 AM
11 :58:49 AM

Kim Madsen

Speaker

Courtroom509

Note

I

!CR-MD-13-04110 State vs. Townsend

~

:

Motion Hearing

t
I

\Abraham Wingrove present with the defendant; Michael Guy
!tor
the State
'
.
......................................................................................,> ............................................................................................................................................................................................................
11 :59: 12 AM /Judge
lMotion to stay the execution of sentence pending appeal,
l
l reads sentence. Should the judgment be stayed
12:00:58 PM !Judge

!we have contacted the state's attorney by email and phone.
jThe clerk called today. Their office has received notice. They
!are not here so we will proceed.
12:01 :32 PM 1
!Prosecutor walks in- Michael Guy
12:02:08 PM !Judge
\Are you asking to stay the jail sentence or the entire
l
ljudgment? Has the defendant obtained an evaluation?
!He has not completed the evaluation yet, he is indigent and
12:03:01 PM }Mr.
lWingrove
/currently in custody
..................................................................................., ... >., ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
12:03:23 PM /Judge
/Did they order jail programming in this case? It looks like they
l
jwere waiting for the eval
[1 would ask to waive the jail sentence, but in the alternative the
12:04:03 PM fMr.
[Wingrove [entirety .
12:04:19 PM !Judge
!He had all options. When you do in with a judgment of this
!
!kind you make arrangements. Why is he in custody

l

I

................................................ 4, ...................................... , ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... .

t

:

12:04:47 PM iMr.
iHe went into custody last Saturday, he is telling me he was
jWingrove !made to report on Saturday. All of the options require payment
I
pn advance.
!1 can see he is receiving SSI benefits. So you reported and
12:05:54 PM jJudge
1
jhad no money so you were placed in custody?
12:06:48 PM Defendant !That is correct.

Ii
:

:

i

:

:

................................................ 4, ...................................... , .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... ..

12:06:56 PM !Judge
!The focus seemed to be the warrantees blood draw.
12:08: 17 PM l Mr.
!Whether its likely to succeed on the merits. Missouri vs.
!Wingrove lMcNealy makes it clear, police don;t have the authority to
l
!require a blood draw. Deputies could have obtained a warrant
l
)but they told Mr. Townsend they would hold him down and
!take his blood.
jThe state would submit that the likelihood of succeeds on
12:09:47 PM jMr. Guy
l
[appeal would not be good based on this defendant. We
!
/believe there was a stipulation signed, no agreement on how
!
!the defendant would serve his sentence. He should serve the
!time, it could move forward and go to trial. If the motion to
!
!suppress is. overturned it does not mean the case will
I
(disappear. ·
12:12:00 PM!Mr.
!Response · .. · · .......... ·· ............. ·
.....................................

I

I

!Wingrove

1/7/2014

I

1 of 2
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•

I

I

a1

Judge McLaughlin

1-7

12: 12:06 PM /Judge

I

Courtroom509

Assuming the appeal is successful and the blood sample is
lsuppressed, I have seen cases tried without the blood or
(breath and it is more difficult, but does not fatally cripple the
/state. It might have been the assumption that options would
]be avialable, but he does not have the funding for that. I would
!hope in the future that when such a plea is entered that if

!~Jl~~s ~~a~nderstanding there will be appeal that counsel

·12:·1 s: 16 PM iJudge
!
12: 15:40 PM 1Defendant
/
1

12:16:40 PM iMr. Guy

!

Kim Madsen

·

12: 17:24 PM fJudge

I

12:18:29 PMJMr. Guy
12: 18:36 PM fJudge

l

1
1

I
(

12:20:25 PM fMr. Guy
12:20:32 PM jJudge

!This is an issue of descretion to an appelate court. Let me
!inquire of Mr. Townsend.
[7 years. I have a home in Middleton. I am not going anywhere.
/I am not able to work. Is the State aware of the defendant
)ailing to appear in the past?
iNo FTA's that I can tell. This is a second DUI, original was in
!2005 out of Michigan.
[19-2601 Idaho Code. He has ties to the community that he
/has stated here.
jwe can take the defendant at his word
He has a home here. He has been in good conduct. The court
[will stay the jail portion of the sentence. Just that portion. I
/want you to get an evaluation as stated in your judgment. I will
)stay the fines pending appeal. I want you to attend the victims
panel. If you don't do these things it would be a violation of
[this order.

I
I

fNothing more to add.
jvou need to prepare a new order for the that is more specific .

..1.2:20:54 PM fMr.
[Staying the jail portion and the fines.· Attend the victims· panei"..
)Wingrove jand get an evaluation.
12:21: 1O PM !Judge
[Continue to report to your attorney and you cannot leave the
1
/state of Idaho

. ; ;:;: :;~ -:~·l~:~:uy -i~:ed~~i~;.s license_ ___ ___ ___ _ ___ _ __ _ ____ _
12:21 :37 PM ]Defendant (1 am going to sell my vehicle.
!

12:23:34 PM !Judge
:

12:23:35 PMi

1/7/2014

~

!That is a good idea. We will get an order of release for today.
:

!END OF CASE

2 of 2
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FILED

Tuesday, January 07, 2014 at 12:07 PM
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT

STATE OF IDAHO;.
Plaintiff,

vs.
THOMAS N TOWNSEND,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110
ORDER OF RELEASE
Prosecuting Agency:

D
D

Ada County
Garden City

D
D

Boise City
Meridian

D

Eagle

-------------+->

****
TO THE SHERIFF OF ADA COUN

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO:

IT IS HEREBY OROERED that the bove-named Defendant be released from custody

'

000083
ORDER OF RELEASE

[REV 11-201 O]

:

....

-

7i·tv1/
/)ti .;:

..___ . ,....
NO--'"!!!!l,,~--=F1="=LE:::-D--~;;;-----

\S:)

A.M.

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone:
(2 08) 2 87-7400
Facsimile:
{208) 287-7419

f\ece,'1e.o

.. P.M....;;;;..........--

- FEa
·1 1' 2014
, -~.
·'... '

J~t\ \ 7 2.0\~

CHRISTO.PHER D. RICH, Clerk --- ..
·.... ·sy Arf',Y. ~QWARDS

Ada countY C\etK

; ·

'- ··0EPUTY_1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Criminal No.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.
THOMAS TOWNSEND,
Defendant.

MD 13 4110

ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF
SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL

The above entitled matter,

having come before thi~ Court,

and good cause appearing therefrom;
IT

IS

defendant's

HEREBY

jail

ORDERED,

sentence

appeal of the July 24th,

AND

and

THIS

fines

DOES

are

that

the

pending

the

ORDER,

stayed

2013 Order Denying Defendant's Motion

\•

to

Suppress.

HOWEVER,

the

following

conditions

are

still

in

effect:
1. Probation

is

not

stayed

and

the

Defendant

must

maintain contact with supervised probation.
2. The Defendant must maintain contact with his attorney.
3. The Defendant cannot drive .

....
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF.SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL
t'

000084

4. The Defendant may not leave the State of Idaho.
5. The Defendant must attend Victims Panel .
. 6. The Defendant must obtain an ·Alcohol Evaluation.

DATED, this

day of

ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL

000085

...

.-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 11th day of February, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and
correct copy of the within instrument to:
Ada County Public Defender
Interdepartmental Mail
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Interdepartmenal Mail

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

000086

NO·---~~--,,.;.~~-

_3

A.M_ _ _ _
FILED
1P.M._ .!3fl_ __

JUN 19 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By RAE ANN NIXON
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

)
)
)
)

vs.

) Case No. CRMD-2013-0004110

THOMAS TOWNSEND,

) NOTICE OF PREPARATION
) OFAPPEALTRANSCRIPT

)

Defendant/Appellant,

)

A Notice of Appeal was filed in the above-entitled matter on December 12, 2013 and a copy of said
Notice was received by the Transcription Department on June 19, 2014. I certify the estimated cost
of preparation of the appeal transcript to be:
Type of Hearing: Appeal
Date of Hearing: June 24, 2013 Judge: John Hawley, Jr.
42 Pages x $3.25 = $136.50
Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83(k)(l), the appellant must, unless otherwise
ordered by a District Judge, pay the estimated fee for the preparation of the transcript within
fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, and the appellant shall pay the balance of
the fee, if any, for the transcript upon completion. ·
In this case, the Ada County Public Defender has agreed to pay for the cost of the transcript
fee upon completion of the transcript.

The Tr~scription Department will prepare the transcript and file it with the Clerk of the District
Court within thirty-five (35) days from the date of this notice. The transcriber may make

NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF APPEAL TRANSCRIPT - Page 1
000087

application to the District Judge for an extension of time in which to prepare the transcript.

Dated this 19TH day of June, 2014.
RAE ANN NIXON
Ada County Transcript Coordinator

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on this 19th day of June, 2014, a true and correct copy of the Notice of Preparation of
Appeal Transcript was forwarded to Appellant or Appellant's attorney of record, by first class mail,
at:

Ada County Public Defender
200 West Front Street Ste 1107
Boise, ID 83 702
HEIDI TOLMAN

RAE ANN NIXON
Ada County Transcript Coordinator

NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF APPEAL TRANSCRIPT - Page 2
000088

r~

-----------,

\.
FILED
Tuesday, June 24, 2014 at 10:34AM
CHRISTOPHER D. R

, CLERK OF THE COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110
NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT

THOMAS N TOWNSEND
Defendant.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN That the above-entitled case has been reassigned to the
Honorable JUSTICE GERALD F. SCHROEDER.
DATED Tuesday, June 24, 2014.

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT-Criminal

HEIDI M TOLMAN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
200 W FRONT ST RM 1107
BOISE ID 83702

000089

..

"

•

NO. _______.....,.._,-2~9--

I

FILED

9;!,

A.M _ _ _ _P.M___.,
_ _ __

JUL 18 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By RAE ANN NIXON , , ,
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
· THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
TH<;)MAS TOWNSEND,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CRMD-2013-00041.10
NOTICE OF LODGING
APPEAL TRANSCRIPT

To:

Kale Gans,

Attorney for Respondent.

To:

Heidi Tolman,

Attorney for Appellant.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT a transcript of the proceeding in this action was
lodged with the Court on July 18, 2014.
YOU ARE NOTIFIED that you may pick up a copy of said transcript at the
District Clerk's Office, Ada County Courthouse, 200 West Front Street, Boise, ID 83702.
Unless objections to the content of the transcript are received within twenty-one
(21) days from the date of mailing of this notice, such transcript shall be deemed settled.
Date this 18TH day of July, 2014.

RAEANN NIXON
Deputy Clerk of the District Court

NOTICE OF LODGING

- 1-

000090

, ''.

,.

I hereby certify that on this 18th day of July, 2014, a true and correct copy of the Notice
of Lodging was sent via US Mail to:
ADA CO. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
200 W. FRONT ST. STE. 3191
BOISE, ID 83702
KALE GANS

ADA CO. PUBLIC DEFENDER
200 W. FRONT ST. STE. 1107
BOISE ID 83702
HEIDI TOLMAN

RAE ANN NIXON
Deputy Clerk of the District Court

NOTICE OF LODGING

-2-

000091

.-,

JUL 3 1 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,
By RIC NELSON

Clerk

DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDHAO,
Plaintiff/Respondent
Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110

NOTICE OF FILING
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
THOMAS TOWNSEND ,
Defendant/Appellant

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(p), the transcript of the proceedings dated June 241\ 2013, is now filed.
Dated this 31 51, day of July, 2014.

~

NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL- PAGE I

000092

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 31 51, day of July, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the
within instrument to:

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
ADA COUNTY TRANSCRIPTS DEPARTMENT
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL- PAGE 2

000093

;

\

NO. ~

AM,~~~ij[.,==~Fll.Et>i'i:nP.M::::::
JUL 31 2014
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clark
By RIC NELSON

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFDEPUTY
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110

vs.
THOMAS TOWNSEND,

ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE
ON APPEAL

Defendant/A.

Notice of Appeal having been filed herein, and it appearing that a transcript of all
the testimony of the original trial or hearing has been ordered and the estimated cost of
said transcript having already been paid OR Ada County having agreed to pay the costs
of said transcript upon completion;
It is ORDERED:
1) That Appellant's brief shall be filed and served within 35 days of the filing of the
transcript.
2) That Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within 28 days after service
of appellant's brief.
3) That Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within 21 days after
service of respondent's brief.

/

ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 1

000094

I

\

4) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument in writing after all
briefs are filed, and that if within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is filed, neither
party does so notice for oral argument, the Court may deem oral argument waived and
decide the case on the briefs and the record.
Dated this 31 51, day of July, 2014.

GERALD F. SCHROEDER
Senior District Judge

ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 2

000095

......
{

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 31

5

\

day of July, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and

correct copy of the within instrument to:

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
ADA COUNTY TRANSCRIPTS DEPARTMENT
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 3

000096

...,

.,.-;

NO.-

FILED

~

;;:---

"'--:---~~,P.M.~~--,~r---~~

AUG - 4 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By SHERRI BOUCHER
DEPUTY

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
THOMAS TOWNSEND,

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2013-4110

MOTION TO SUSPEND THE
BRIEFING SCHEDULE

_______________

).

COMES NOW, appellant, by and through the Ada County Public Defender's Office, and
moves this Court pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 32(c), for an order suspending the briefing
schedule in the above-entitled appeal until the remittitur has been issued in State v. Halseth,
docket number 41169 .. The current case js an appeal from: a judgment of conviction resulting
from a conditional guilty. plea challenging Mr. Townsend's warrantless blood draw. This exact
issue is pending in Halseth.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has already begun suspending cases involving this
issue. See June 10, 2014 Order in State v. Burrill, docket number 41151, a copy of which is
attached to this motion. Suspending the briefing schedule now will permit the parties to address
Halseth in their initial briefing rather than through supplemental briefing, which is in the interest
of judicial economy.
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Counsel for the respondent has not been contacted in regard to the instant motion.

DATED this

j

day of August, 2013.

Heidi Toln/an
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this

l{,rL day of August, 2013, I mailed a true and

correct copy of the foregoing to the:
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State ofldaho
by depositing the same in the Interdepartment
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In the Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,)
v.
JONATHON PATRICK BURRILL,
Defendant-Respondent-Cross
Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER
No. 41151

Upon review of the briefs and the issues raised on appeal, this Court has decided to
suspend proceedings in this appeal pending issuance of a Remittitur in State v. Halseth, Supreme
Court Docket No. 41169; therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this appeal shall be SUSPENDED PENDING THE
ISSUANCE OF A REMITIITUR in State v. Halseth, Supreme Court Docket No. 41169, at
which time proceedings in this appeal shall proceed accordingly.
DATED this /lf<.day of June 2014.

ATTEST:

cc: Counsel of Record

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
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NO·---,![aj--,.,.~,,__

A.M. _ _ _ _FllED_,P.M

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

AUG 20 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By RIC NELSON
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS N. TOWNSEND,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Criminal No. CR-MD-2013-0004110

ORDER SUSPENDING
BRIEFING SCHEDULE

The above entitled matter, having come before this Court, and good cause appearing
therefrom;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that the briefing schedule

on the above-entitled appeal is suspended until the remittitur has been issued in State v. Halseth,
docket number 41169.
DATED, this

2b day of f/eA..JLA..Sf- , 2014.
GERALD SCHROEDER
District Judge

ORDER SUSPENDING BRIEFING SCHEDULE
CR-MD-2013-0004110
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MAR 20 2015
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,
By RIC NELSON
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Petitioner/Appellant,
Case No. CR-MD-13-0004110

vs.
THOMAS N. TOWNSEND,

ORDER VACATING STAY

RespondenU Respondent.

The Order Suspending Briefing Schedule filed on August 20, 2014, has been
lifted. An Amended Order Governing Procedure on Appeal will be issued.
It is here by Ordered.

Dated this ~ a y of March, 2015.
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
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FILED
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MAR 20 2015
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ~jtR~~~~soN
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-MD-13-4110

Plaintiff/Respondent,

vs.

AMENDED ORDER GOVERNING
PROCEDURE ON APPEAL

THOMAS TOWNSEND,

Defendant/Appellant.

Notice of Appeal having been filed herein, and it appearing that a transcript of all
the testimony of the original trial or hearing has been provided by appellant to resolve the
issues on appeal:
It is ORDERED:
1) That Appellant's brief shall be filed and served within 35 days from the date of
the filing of this Order.
2) That Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within 28 days after service
of appellant's brief.
3) That Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within 21 days after
service of respondent's brief.
4) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument in writing after all
briefs are filed, and that if within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is filed, neither
party does so notice for oral argument, the Court may deem oral argument waived and
decide the case on the briefs and the record.
Dated this 20th day of March, 2015.

Gerald F. Schroeder
Senior District Judge
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL- Page 1
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___________
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STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
.~
-

Nature of the Case
Thomas Townsend (hereinafter "Townse:nd")

Vii~.s arrested for Driving Under the

Influence (hereinafter "DUI''), a violation of Idaho Cod·~-§ 18-8004. A blood draw took
'

:

place after Townsend was in custody for DUI.
:

.,.

A M.otion
to Suppress was filed to
•,

exclude evidence derived from the warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw that was
obtained from Townsend. A hearing was held and the court denied the defendant's
motion to suppress.

Townsend appeals from the Court's denial of his motion to

suppress evidence and its finding that the blood draw evidence obtained in the case is
admissible.
Townsend raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the implied consent
that was given as a matter of Idaho law, qualifies as a valid exception to the warrant
requirement; and (2) whether given the "totality of the circumstances" a warrantless
blood draw was justified under the exigency exception to the warrant requirement.
Factual and Procedural Background
.
-·
.
Having come on for hearing on defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and

.

"

Supporting Memorandum on June 24, 2013, the following facts were established: This
case began on March 23, 2013·, at approximate.iy 1:30 a.m., when Townsend was pull~d
over by Detective B(II Weires in the Wal-Mart p~rking

161: on State Street and Glenwood

in Garden City, Idaho, because he was driving down the wrong side of the road on the
opposite side of the· raised median, after making a' u-turn.

There were two other

passengers inside the vehicle. (6/24/2013 Tr. p." 5-6, Ls. 1-16). Once Detective Weires
approached the vehicle, he could smell a strong odor··of alcohol and noticed signs of
Brief of Appellant -
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T

',\

' '1

,

•f.··

intoxication. (6/24/2013, Tr. p. 8, Ls. 17-23). Townsend said he had been to Shorty's
Saloon on Glenwood in Garden City and had consumed approximately seven beers
with food in between. (6/24/2013 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 1-25). After Townsend failed all three

..

'

field sobriety tests, Detective Weires arrested him for driving under the influence.
.

'

(6/24/2013, Tr. p. 10, Ls. 7-14). It took less than10 minutes for Deputy Lakey to arrive
to assist with the arrest. (6/24/2013 Tr. p. 10, Ls. 15-21 ). After that, Detective Wei res
had him perform a breath test with the LifeLoc in the back of his patrol car, the results of
which were insufficient because Townsend did not have his mouth sealed around the
machine properly. (6/24/2013 Tr. p. 11, Ls. 1-25).
After the insufficient blow, Detective \/Veires explained to Townsend that he
'

'

would be having his blood drawn at the Ada County JaH. (6/24/2013 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 2-6).
Detective Weires admitted that he never told Townsend that he had the option to ·opt ;ut
of taking the blood draw. Detective Weires then acknowledged that he had· written ·a
.

..

statement of probable cause that the param~dics conducted "an involuntary blood
draw," and that he characterized the blood dra~~ as i~~ioluntary. (6/24/2013 Tr., p. 18,
Ls.16-23; p. 19-20). ·Townsend testified that when Detective Weires told him he was
''

going to have to take his blood, he responded, "I guess you're gonna have to take it.
I'm not gonna, I wasn't gonna fight him .... This is totally against my constitutional right; I
don't believe in taking my blood.

Besides, I'm 71 years old, I don't want to have a

coronary fight'n ya." Then, when asked if he gave police permission to take his blood,
he responded "No," and that it was involuntary on
.

.

ti i~ part. He further testified th~t
1

.:

officers told him that if he did not submit to a blood draw they would hold him down. To
·",

.

.:I

:,

this, he replied, "I'm not going to resist you, but I'm totally against this." (6/24/2013 Tr. p
25, Ls. 5-25; p. 26, Ls. 1-11).
Brief of Appellant -
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Townsend's Motion to Suppress was denied on July 24, 2013. And he was
sentenced on December 10, 2013. Townse~d timely appeals from the denial of his
.
..
Motion to Suppress Evidence.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Does Idaho's Implied Consent Stat1;.Jte Create a Valid Exception to
the'Warrant Requirement When Consent was Revoked?·

·.:2. Under the "Totality of the Circumstances" standard,
.;

was the Warrantless and Nonconsensual Blood Draw
Justified under the Exigency Exception to the
Warrant Requirement?

ARGUMENT
A. Idaho's Implied Consent Statute Does Not' Create a Valid Exception to the
Warrant Requirement When Consent is Revoked.

ARGUMENT
Idaho's impliea consent statute provides that any person who drives on Idaho
roads "shall be d~emed to·;- have . given h.~~ con:~ent to evidentiary testi~g for
concentration of al~o.hol" so long as the police officer has "reasonable grounds to
• •

I

,

,

believe" the person· : is under .the
infiuence
,
•

••

':.

1.c:
..r-:,

§ 18:8002(1).
•..

The evidentiary tests

available to officers ihclude blood testing. I.C. § 18-8002(9).
Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol test is a search and seizure
'

'

under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 17
of the Idaho Constitution. "Like
the Fourth Ame8dment,
the purpose of Art. I, section 17
.
'
.
is to protect Idaho citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy against arbitrary
governmental intrusion."

State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575 at 577, citing Schmerber v.

Brief of Appellant - 4
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California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); State v. Diaz,.
144 Idaho 300, 302,.160 P.3d 739,741 (2007), and .State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501,
503, 975 P.2d 789, 791 (1999).
The Idaho legislature has acknowledged a driver's physical ability to refuse to
submit to an evidentiary test, but it did not· create a statutory right for a driver :to
withdraw his previously given consent to an evidentiary test for concentration of alcohol,
drugs or other intoxicating substances." State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 372, 775
P.2d 1210, 1214 (1989). Thus, the court has held in Idaho a person cannot revoke his
consent; any evidence an officer obtains from a blood test, even when that person
resists or withdraws consent, will be admitted based on statutory implied consent.

..
Because Idaho does not recognize a driver's right to revoke his implied consent, Idaho
has a per se exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Wulff, 337 P .3d 575 at 582.
However, the court in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed.
2d 696 (2013), placed new limits on the ability of officers to conduct warrantless blood
tests.

The court reasoned that allowing warrantless .-blood draws based on Idaho's

implied consent statute would act as a per se· exception to the warrant requirement,
which contradicted McNeely's language that warrantless blood draws should be
examined case by case. State· V. Wulff, 337 P .3d 575

at 577.

The court in Wulff held that because McNeely p~ohibits per se exceptions to tl~e
warrant requirement and the district court corr~ctly understood Idaho's implied consent
.
.
statute operated as a per se exception, Idaho's implied consent statute does not fall
under the consent: exception to the Fourt'h Ame:ridment of the United States
Constitution. Therefore, the court overruled Diaz and ·woolery to the extent that they
.

.

applied Idaho's implied consent statute as an irrevocable per se rule that constitutionally
Brief of Appellant -
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allowed forced warrantless blood draws. The court held that the district court properly
concluded that Idaho's implied consent statute was not a valid exception to the warrant
requirement, and affirmed the district court's grant of W~lff's motion to suppress.
In State v. Wulff, the issue was whether the ..-United States Supreme Court's
holding in McNeely i~ narrow and limited to the exig~r{cy exception, or is br~ader and
applies to all per se exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id at 579. The Wulff court
.'

held that McNeely's overall discussion suggests a broader reading: that implied consent
is no longer acceptable when it operates as a per se exception to the warrant
requirement because the Court repeatedly expressed disapproval for categorical rules.
Id at 580.
"McNeely proscribed what it labeled categoricai or per se rules for warrantless

blood testing, emphasizing over and over again that' .the reasonableness of a search
must be judged based on the totality of the ~ircumstances presented in each case."
Wulff at 581, citing State v. Weems, 434 S.W. 3d at 665. Irrevocable implied consent

operates as a per s~ ·rule that cannot fit unde(the consent exception because it do(,7s
-

.

'

not always analyze the voluntariness of that consent. Voluntariness has always been
analyzed under the totality of the circumstanc.es app.roach: "Whether a consent to. a
search was in fact 'voluntary' ... is a question of fact to b·e determined from the totality°of
the circumstances." Wulff at 581, citing Schneckloth v. ·Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 227,
93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973).
Idaho's implied· consent statute must jump two hurdles to qualify as voluntary: (1)
drivers give their initial consent voluntarily, and (2) drivers must continue to gi•Je
.
..
voluntary consent. Drivers in Idaho give their initial consent to evidentiary testing by
..

driving on Idaho roads volunta'rily. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739,
'

Brief of Appellant -
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.,·

742 (2007). Because consent is implied based on drjving on Idaho's roads, a further
issues is whether th~ consent exception to the Fourth Amendment can apply after a
driver attempts to revoke his consent to a blood draw. Wulff at 582.
In State v. Halseth, 339 P.3d 368, the c9urt help that an implied consent. statute
such as Washington's and Idaho's does not jµstify a warrantless blood draw from . .a
driver who refuses to consent, as did Aviles, or objects to the blood draw, as did
Defendant in .this case. Consent to a search must be voluntary. ·Halseth at 371, citing
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 232-33, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854

(1973). Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person
to withdraw that consent. Id. at 371, citing McNeely, 569 U.S. at 133 S. Ct. at 1566. By
l

objecting to the blood draw, Defendant withdrew his implied consent. Therefore the
district court did not err in granting the motion to suppress.
'·

In the matter at hand, as the officers' reports make clear, Townsend objected to
and denied permission for a blood draw. Despite the clear lack of consent for the blood
draw, the officers forcibly drew Townsend's blood. Hence, he effectively revoked his
implied consent under the statute and his blood draw was involuntary and therefore
illegal and unconstitutional.
B.
Under · the Totality of the Circumst.ances, the Warrantless an·d
Nonconsensual Blood Draw was Not Justified Under the Exigency Exception to
the Warrant Requirement.
··
·

ARGUMENT
A search with?,_ut a w~rrant is presumpti~ely inv~lid, Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978), and a "warrantless search of.the person is reason~ble only if
·:

'~

'

:

.

'

it falls within a recognized exception" to the warrant
requirement,
Missouri v. McNeely at
l
,
,11,

Brief of Appellant -
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1558. Exigent circumstances is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requireme~t.

and is presumably t_he exception· on which the· State· relied in conducting the force·d
blood dr_aw. Exigent circumstances exist "when the exigencies of the situation make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively
reasonable." Id at 1558.
In Missouri v. McNeely, the court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol in th·e
bloodstream does not establish a per se exigency that suffices on its own to justify an
exception to the warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in drunk-driving
investigations. Id. at 1558. That court held that each case of alleged exigency must be
evaluated based "on its own facts and circumstances." To determine whether a law
enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant require'd
the Court to look to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1559.
In fact, as far back as Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) was decided,
.

...

•'

the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Schmerber directs lower courts to engage in
a totality of the circumstances analysis when determining whether exigency permits a
.
·.
.
..
nonconsensual, warrantless blood draw." McNeely at 1'557, citing Schmerber, 358 S.W.
3d, at 69, 74. The c~urt further concluded the Schmerber "requires more than the mere
dissipation of blood-alcohol evidence to support.a warrantless blood draw in an alcohoirelated case." Id. at .1557. The reason for the "totality ·of the circumstances" test, rather
than a per se exigency exception ··to the w~rrant requirement is that a motorist~·
diminished expectation of privacy does not dim111ish their privacy interest in preventing 'a
government agent from piercing their skin.

Any compelled intrusion into the human

body implicates significant, constitutionally protected ·privacy interests.

McNeely at

1555. The importance of requiring authorization by a 'neutral and detached magistrate'
Brief of Appellant -
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before allowing an officer to "invade another's body i~ search of evidence of guilt is
indisputable and great." Id. at 1558, quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 1314 (1948)).
Blood Alcohol Content ("BAC") evidence naturally dissipates in a gradual and
relatively predictable manner. Moreover, because an officer must typically take a DWI
suspect to a medical facility and obtain a trained medical professional's assistance
before having a blood test conducted, some delay between the time of the arrest or
accident and time of the test is inevitable regardless of whether a warrant is obtained.
Id. at 1555. In evaluating exigency under the "totality of the circumstances" test, the

court looks at factors that may cause an investigatory delay, such as whether an officer
was delayed by the need to investigate an accident and transport an injured suspect to
the hospital as was the case in Schmerber.
In McNeely, the court found that the case was "unquestionably a routine DUI

.

',

case" in which no factors other than the natural dissipation of blood-alcohol suggested
that there was an emergency.

McNeely at 1557.

As in McNeely (and unlike

Schmerber), Townsend was not involved in an accident, was cooperative, and his

passengers were cooperative and did not requfre any additional attention other than a
back-up officer who arrived ·in less than

10

minutes to assist Detective Wei res.

Moreover, as in McNeely, the ·officers.did not attempt

fo secure a warrant.

Id. at 1557.

A delay could not have been determined because an attempt to acquire a warrant was
.
.
never made. There were two officers at the scene in this case. One could have made
~

an attempt to get a warrant for the blood draw while the other was handling this very
routine DUI investigation.

Brief of Appellant -
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,.

There is no indication that the· officers sought to obtain a warrant before forcibly
drawing Townsend's blood, or that there was anything that would have prevented them
from doing so within a reasonable amount of time. There was no exigency in this case
justifying the warrantless blood draw. Accordingly, the forced physical intrusion beneath
Townsend's skin and into his veins to obtain a sample.of his blood for use as evidence
i

in a criminal investigation violated Townsend's rights to be free from an unreasonable
search protected by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 17
of the Idaho Constitution.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Townsend respectfully petitions this Honorable
appellate court in view of his constitutional rights to vacate the judgment of conviction
and reverse the court's denial of Townsend's Motion to Suppress Evidence.
DATED this Jl!!.day of April, 2015.

Deputy Ada County Public Defender
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THE HONORABLE GERALD F. SCHROEDER
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE
.
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATIORNEY'S OFFICE
200 West Front Street, Suite 3"191
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Kale D. Gans
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Statement of the Case

On March 23, 2013, Thomas Townsend was arrested for violating Idaho Code§ 18-8004,
Driving Under the Influence and §49-301, Failure to Purchase a Driver's License. After the
Defendant did not provide a breath sample, a warrantless blood draw was conducted at the Ada
County Jail. The defense filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the
warrantless blood draw and the motion was argued before the Honorable Judge John Hawley Jr.
on June 23, 2013. After taking the matter under advisement, Judge Hawley denied the motion on
July 24, 2013. On December 10, 2013, the parties stipulated to entry of a conditional guilty plea
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule ll(a)(2), and the Defense filed notice of appeal two days later.
On January 17, 2014, an order staying execution of the Defendant's sentence pending appeal was
filed with the court, and on July 31, 2014, both a notice of filing transcript on appeal and order
governing procedure on appeal were filed. On August 20, 2014, pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 32, the Honorable Judge Gerald Schroeder granted a Defense motion to suspend the
briefing schedule until issuance of the remittitur in State v. Halseth, docket number 41169,
finding good cause to do so. The remittitur in State v. Halseth was issued on January 5, 2014, the
Appellant's brief was filed on April 20, 2014 and this appeal follows.

I.

Statement of Facts and Proceedings Relevant to this Appeal 1

The facts relevant to this appeal were established on June 24, 2013 when the motion to
suppress was heard by the court. The facts have been set forth in a transcript of the proceeding
and the Honorable Judge John Hawley Jr. 's memorandum decision regarding the motion to
suppress evidence.
On March 23, 2013, Detective Bill Weires of the Ada County Sheriff's Office observed a
vehicle tum left from Glenwood in Ada County onto State Street, and proceed westbound in the
eastbound lanes of State Street into oncoming traffic. Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion

.

to Suppress Evidence, Magistrate Judge John Hawley Jr. (July 24, 2013). Detective Weires
activated his overhead lights, initiated a traffic stop and was able to identify the driver as the
Defendant, Thomas Townsend, in the driver's seat. Id. Upon contacting the Defendant in the
vehicle, Detective Weires observed indicators of impairment including glassy, red eyes, thick-

1 The Defendant has not challenged the Magistrate's findings of fact
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tongued, slurred speech and the odor of alcohol coming from the cab of the truck. Id. Because
two passengers were in the vehicle, Detective Weires called dispatch for an officer to assist as
back up and Deputy Lakey with the Ada County Sheriffs Office arrived ten minutes later. Id.
The investigation continued once the Defendant stepped out of the vehicle, where he admitted to
consuming four, then seven beers prior to driving. Id. The Defendant failed three field sobriety
tests and was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence. Id. After Detective Weires
placed the Defendant in a patrol vehicle, he played the Administrative License Suspension audio
recording, which notifies suspects of the subsequent penalties for refusing to submit to
evidentiary testing. Id. After waiting fifteen minutes, Detective Weires determined the Defendant
had not burped, belched or vomited and provided an explanation of a breath test to the
Defendant. Id. During the Defendant's first breath sample attempt on the Lifeloc instrument, he
blew quickly and then stopped, rendering an insufficient sample result. Id. Detective Weires
instructed the Defendant again on how the test was conducted, what was required of him, and
also explained that a blood sample would be taken if he did not comply with the Lifeloc test. Id.
On his second sample attempt, the Defendant failed to exhale any air and then stated he was not
going to comply with the test and Detective Weires would have to take his blood. Id. After being
transported to the Ada County Jail, an Ada County paramedic drew samples of the Defendant's
blood. Id. According to Detective Weires, the Defendant was compliant, polite and did not
physically resist the draw but was not informed that he could opt out of the draw. Id. The
Defendant testified during the suppression hearing that he objected to the blood draw procedure
and protested that the procedure violated his constitutional rights, but did not object or protest
specifically to Detective Weires. Id. The Defendant testified that jail staff told him that he would
be held down if he did not cooperate, but admitted that he was not held down and did not
physically resist the blood draw. Id.
The Court also considered affidavits from Joe Andreoli, a Detective with the Boise City
Police Department and Cecily Willerton, a planning analyst in the Planning and Research
Department of the Ada County Sheriffs Office. The affidavit of Detective Andreoli stated that
telephonic warrants were not in use as of March 2013 in Ada County and expedited search
warrants were also unavailable at that time. Andreoli Aff. 6, 8. Detective Andreoli also stated
that at minimum, obtaining a search warrant in a driving under the influence case would take one
and one half hours in March of 2013, with procuring a warrant during the daytime taking up to
Brief of Respondent - 2
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three and one half to four hours and nighttime warrants taking additional time. Id at 4, 7. The
affidavit of Cecily Willerton stated that twenty individuals were arrested and booked at the Ada
County Jail between 6:30 pm on March 22 and 5:55 am on March 23, 2013 with forty-five
percent being for driving under the influenced. Willerton Aff. 4-6.
Defendant-Appellant, Thomas Townsend, appeals the trial court's denial of the motion to
suppress in the Fourth Judicial District ofldaho. The trial court denied the motion to suppress the
warrantless draw of the Defendant's blood, finding that implied consent was given as a matter of
Idaho law and qualified as a valid exception to the warrant requirement to obtain a sample of his
blood. The lower court also found the anticipated time delays in the warrant application process
were sufficient to justify a warrantless blood draw based on exigency, another valid exception to
the warrant requirement. Through this appeal, the Appellant advances two theories: (1) Idaho's
implied consent statute does not create a valid exception to the warrant requirement when
consent is revoked, and (2) when considered under the totality of the circumstances, the blood
draw was not justified under the exigency exception to the warrant requirement. Given the facts
of this case and support for the trial court's finding that a warrant was not required due to the
presence of an exception to the warrant requirement, the denial of the motion to suppress should
be upheld.
Argument

I.

Standard of Review on Appeal

In reviewing a trial court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the
standard of review is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, an
appellate court will accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial
evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State
v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing,
the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and
draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106,
897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App.
1999). The Court must follow controlling precedent "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain,
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 576
Brief of Respondent - 3
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(2014); State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005) (quoting"Reyes v. Kit Mfg.

Co., 131 l~aho 239,240, 953 P.2d 989,990 (1998)).
II.

The trial court correctly held that both the consent and exigency exceptions to the
warrant requirement were present, allowing the warrantless draw of the
Defendant's blood to be lawful and Constitutional under the circumstances

Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol test as part of an investigation for
driving under the influence is a search and seizure of the person under both the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution, Art. I, §17. Schmerber v.

California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302,
160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). Like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of Art. I, §17 is to protect
Idaho citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy against arbitrary governmental intrusion. State
v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 506, 975 P.2d 791, 796 (1999). Warrantless searches and seizures are
presumptively unreasonable. Diaz at 302. To overcome the presumption of unreasonableness, the
search must fall within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement and must be
reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Id.; See also U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 471 (1973). A "reasonable" search in the context of a forced blood draw
means "done in a medically acceptable manner and without unreasonable force." Diaz at 301302 (citing Schmerber at 770); State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 371, 233 P.3d 1286, 1293
(Ct.App. 2010).

Exigency and consent are two well-recognized exceptions to the warrant

requirement. Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L.Ed. 2d 865, 872 (2011); Diaz at 302.
A. Sufficient exigency existed under a totality of the circumstances to require a
blood draw of the Defendant without a warrant

When the facts of a specific case make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the exigency
exception to the warrant requirement applies. King at 1856. In filing the original motion to
suppress, the Defendant relied heavily on the landmark case Missouri v. McNeely. Prior to
McNeely, the U. S. Supreme Court had ruled that natural dissipation of alcohol in the
bloodstream through metabolic processes provided an inherent exigency sufficient to justify a
warrantless blood draw incident to a lawful arrest for driving under the influence. Schmerber at
770-771; State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989). In McNeely, the
Brief of Respondent - 4
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Supreme Court took a different approach from prior holdings, providing that "the natural
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient
to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant." Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1568,
185 L.Ed.2d 696, 712 (2013). In addition, the court indicated the standard by which
reasonableness of a warrantless search should be measured, "under the exigency exception,
reasonableness must be evaluated case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." State
v. Halseth, 339 P.3d 368, 369 (2014)(citing McNeely at 1560). The Court in McNeely rejected

the State's contention that exigency necessarily exists in every instance when an officer has
probable cause to believe an individual has been driving under the influence, specifically noting
advances in expeditious processing of warrant applications. The majority discussed technological
advances streamlining the warrant process:
"Well over a majority of States allow police officers or prosecutors to
apply for search warrants remotely through various means, including telephonic
or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and video
conferencing. And in addition to technology-based developments, jurisdictions
have found other ways to streamline the warrant process, such as by using
standard-form warrant applications for drunk driving investigations." McNeely at
1562.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court, in Missouri v. McNeely, exiled Idaho's use of a per se
exigency exception to the warrant requirement for driving under the influence blood draws, the
ruling does not purport to foreclose the exception's application altogether. The Court did not
hold that natural dissipation of alcohol by the body can never provide an exigency exception to
the warrant requirement but rather it cannot provide a per se exception, with metabolism of
alcohol being one factor to consider. Wulff at 579; McNeely at 1558, n. 2. Additional factors to
consider include the procedures in place for obtaining a warrant or the availability of magistrate
judge, the presence of either may affect whether the police can obtain a warrant in an expeditious
way and therefore may establish an exigency that permits a warrantless search. Weems v. State,
434 S.W. 3d 655, 662 (2014); McNeely at 1562.
The trial court correctly found that the warrantless blood draw of the Defendant was both
reasonable and within the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement. The
court's findings were twofold; first, the available timeframe for the State to gather evidence was
shortened because Idaho law prevents the State from extrapolating backwards to determine blood
Brief of Respondent - 5
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alcohol content. Second, the court determined that judicial authorization in the form of a warrant
was not required, as the anticipated time delay in securing a warrant justified conducting a blood
test without a warrant at the time of the Defendant's arrest.
The trial court emphasized an important assumption relied upon by the majority in
McNeely, which was the ability of the State to extrapolate backwards to determine blood alcohol
content at the time of the stop. Memorandum Decision. With this ability, the State could
mathematically calculate blood alcohol content of the Defendant at the time of arrest, rendering
the hours required to obtain a warrant insignificant. Id. Idaho Code § 18-8004 makes it a per se
violation.for "any person ... who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 ... or more, as shown by
analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive a motor vehicle within Idaho. Id.; Idaho Code
§18-8004(l)(a). Furthermore, to incentivize compliant with evidentiary testing, the Idaho
legislature enacted Idaho Code §18-8004(2), with precludes prosecution of individuals for
driving under the influence having an alcohol concentration of less than 0.08, provided drug use
is not suspected. Idaho Code §18-8004(2). Dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream significantly
hinders the State's ability to prosecute driving under the influence suspects, particularly when
Idaho is unable to use retrograde extrapolation as an investigative tool. Without this ability, the
timeframe for gathering evidence becomes of the utmost importance to preserving evidence. In
March of 2013, the anticipated time required to obtain a search warrant for driving under the
influence was, at minimum, one and one-half hours with the potential time frame increasing
significantly at night, as was this case. Memorandum Decision; Andreloi Aff. 4, 7. Additionally,
telephonic warrants were not in use in Ada County and expedited search warrants were not
available in driving under the influence cases. Andreloi Aff. 6, 8. The anticipated time delay in
the warrant application process was · a basis for justifying a blood test without judicial
authorization. Memorandum Decision.
The Defense posits that exigency is not present simply because law enforcement officers
made no attempt to secure a warrant for the Defendant's blood, or established that they would
have been prevented from doing so within a reasonable amount of time. Brief of DefendantAppellant at 10. This argument disregards the trial court's reliance on the anticipated delays for
obtaining a search warrant specific to March of 2013, as well as other factors contributing to the
totality of the circumstances. The warrant application process in Ada County at the time of the
Brief of Respondent - 6
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Defendant's arrest was not streamlined and the likely delay of two or more hours threatened the
availability of evidence. There was no standard search warrant form available for use in drunk
driving cases at that time and the arrest took place after midnight. Furthermore, the Defendant
contributed to the delay in that he was first offered a less intrusive evidentiary method in the
form of a breath test but refused to comply. The trial court also emphasized the State's interest in
prosecuting a potentially excessive alcohol content driver. Memorandum Decision. Given the
Defendant's admission to consuming seven beers, driving the wrong direction down a public
street and failing all three field sobriety tests, it was reasonable for an officer to suspect an
excessive blood alcohol content, creating an even greater interest in prosecuting the potential
offender. Id. In sum, the dissipation of alcohol in the blood stream, when combined with other
factors present in Ada County at the time of arrest, created a sufficient exigency to justify a
blood test without judicial authorization.

B. Idaho's implied consent statute created a valid exception to the warrant
requirement for a search and seizure of the Defendant's blood, as the facts do
not establish the Defendant revoked his consent to evidentiary testing
In addition to exigency, consent is a well-established exception to the warrant
requirement. Implied consent was given by the Defendant as a matter of Idaho law, pursuant to
Idaho's implied consent statute, §18-8002. This code section provides that a person gives
implied consent to evidentiary testing, including blood testing, when that person drives on Idaho
roads, so long as a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that person has been driving
or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation ofldaho's driving under the influence
statute. Idaho Code §18-8002(1), (9). Idaho Code §18-8002(4) provides penalties for any driver
who refuses to comply with testing, with implied consent to evidentiary testing including
Breathalyzer tests and blood tests. Idaho Code § 18-8002(9). The specific evidentiary test
employed is of the officer's choosing. Diaz at 302. In Idaho, statutory implied consent cannot be
withdrawn as a matter of law. See State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 410, 973 P.2d 758, 762
(Ct.App. 1999). There is no legal right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent, even if the
individual has the ability to physically prevent evidentiary testing. Id. In Missouri v. McNeely,
Missouri's implied consent statute was at issue, which had been interpreted to allow a driver to
withdraw statutorily implied consent by refusing to submit to evidentiary testing. Memorandum
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Decision. Consensual blood testing was not addressed, with the majority specifically referencing
scenarios when a motorist withdraws their consent. Id; McNeely at 1565-1566.
Since the trial court's decision, case law has developed regarding the withdrawal of
implied consent in Idaho. In State v. Halseth, the Defendant was arrested on suspicion of driving
under the influence. After he refused field sobriety tests, law enforcement transported the
Defendant to a nearby hospital for evidentiary testing of his blood. The Defendant explicitly
protested the blood draw, stating, "You can't take my blood! I refused!" Halseth at 368. Blood
was drawn despite his protests, without a search warrant. The Court affirmed granting of the
motion to suppress, holding that an implied consent statute such as Idaho's does not justify a
warrantless blood draw from a driver who refuses to consent, or objects to the blood draw, as did
the Defendant. Halseth at 371. By objecting to the blood draw, the Defendant effectively
withdrew his implied consent. Id Consent to a search must be voluntary, not the product of
duress or coercion, and is a fact to be determined from the totality of all circumstances.
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,229, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2052 (1973); Halseth at 371.

In State v. Eversole, the defendant refused to participate in a breath test for alcohol
concentration, with a warrantless blood draw subsequently conducted. State v. Eversole, No.
41063, 2015 Ida.App.LEXIS 25 (Ct. App. April 8, 2015) (case used solely for purposes of
discussing the court's reasoning, courtesy copy attached). Although the facts did not include a
reaction to the officer's demand for a blood draw, the court determined the absence of a second
objection by the Defendant to the draw would be immaterial. Id at 9. By refusing to submit to a
breath test, the Defendant had already withdrawn the statutorily implied consent. Id.
It is significant to note that the lower court did not address or make a factual finding as to

whether the Defendant revoked his implied consent. However, the facts of both Halseth and
Eversole are distinguishable from the facts before this court. First, the Defendant was given the
opportunity to submit to a less intrusive evidentiary test and specifically advised of the
consequence if he did not comply. After failing to exhale on the second breath attempt, the
Defendant stated he would not comply with the test and Detective Weires would have to take his
blood. Although the Defendant testified at the suppression motion that he objected to the blood
draw procedure and protested the potential violation of his constitutional rights, it is unclear to
whom he voiced those concerns. Second, when the blood draw was actually conducted, he did
Brief of Respondent - 8
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not physically resist and was not held down by anyone. Lastly, rather than explicitly protesting
the draw, as the defendant in Halseth, the Defendant in this case stated he simply never gave
anyone permission. The Defendant consented to a breath test, was unable to perform the test and
acquiesced to a blood draw. Thus, the facts do not support a finding that the Defendant revoked
his implied consent given as a matter of Idaho law, permitting a valid exception to the warrant
requirement to be present based on consent.
C. The blood draw performed on the Defendant was reasonable, as it was done
without unreasonable force and in a medically acceptable manner by Ada
County paramedics
The trial court determined that the blood draw conducted was both without unreasonable
force, and done in a medically acceptable manner. The Appellant alleges that the forced physical
intrusion beneath the Defendant's skin and into his veins for the blood sample violated his right
to be free from an unreasonable search. Appellant brief at 10. The defendant did not physically
resist the blood draw and was not held down in the process of obtaining the sample.
Memorandum Decision. The blood draw was conducted only after the Defendant did not perform
a less intrusive evidentiary testing method, and he was polite and compliant throughout the test.
Id. Lastly, qualified Ada County paramedics performed the blood draw, with no evidence of

record suggesting the test was not conducted according to medically acceptable standards. Thus,
the trial court did not err in concluding the blood draw was reasonable in light of all surrounding
circumstances.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests this court uphold the denial of
the Defendant's motion to suppress and conviction for Driving Under the Influence and Failure
to Purchase a Driver's License.
DATED this

(3

day of May 2015.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ad
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State v. Eversole
Court of Appeals of Idaho
April 8, 2015, Filed
Docket No. 41063, 2015 Opinion No. 20

Reporter
2015 Ida. App. LEXIS 25

Notice: PURSUANT TO RULE I 18 OF THE fJ)AHO
APPR!.I.ATE RULES, THIS DECISION rs NOT FINAL
UNTIL EXPIRATION OF THE 21 DAY PETITION FOR
REHEARING PERIOD.

Order denying motion to dismiss was affinned, defendant's
conviction was vacated. and the case was remanded.

LexisN exis® Headnotes

Prior History: ['~II Appeal from the District Court of the
Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bingham County.
Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge.
Disposition: Order denying motion to dismiss, affi1111ed;
order denying motion to suppress evidence, vacated, and
case remanded.

Core Terms
blood, implied consent, withdrawal, testing, breath test,
alcohol, evidentiary, blood test, operable, suppression
motion, district court, driver, warrantless, motion to dismiss,
motor vehicle, statutorily, alcohol concentration, withdrew,
revoked, refuse to provide, refuse to submit, stipulated facts,
blood testing, breath sample, truck

Case Summary
Overview
HOLDINGS: [1]-The trial court did not err by denying
defendant's motion to dismiss the charges under Idaho
Code A1111. § 18-800:/(5 I because it correctly detennined that
the fact-finder could sensibly conclude that defendant and
his companions were capable of rendering the vehicle
operational in a short period of time, even though the
vehicle was stuck on the berm; [2]-The trial court erred by
denying defendant's motion to suppress the test results of
defendant's warrantless blood draw because it was
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and Ida/to
Cons,. art. /, § 17, as he withdrew any implied consent
created by Idaho Code Ann. § I8-8002(1) by refusing to
participate in a breath test for alcohol concentration and the
State presented no evidence of defendant's consent to the
subsequent blood draw.

Outcome

Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Standards of Review> Abuse
of Discretion > General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure> Preliminary Proceedings> Pretrial
Motions & Procedures > Dismissal

HNI The Court of Appeals of Idaho reviews a district
court's decision on a motion to dismiss a criminal action for
an abuse of discretion. Idaho Crim. R. 48(a). When a trial
court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court dete1111incs whether the lower court: (I)
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices
before it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of
reason.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Vehicular Crimes > Driving
Under the Influence > Elements

HN2 See Idaho Code ,1nn. § l8-tW04(/J{a ).
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Vehicular Crimes > Driving
Under the Influence > Elements

HN3 "Actual physical control" is defined to mean being in
the driver's position of the motor vehicle with the motor
running or with the motor vehicle moving. Idaho CodcA!.!11.,.
§ 78-8004(51. Interpreting this language, the Court of
Appeals of Idaho has held that the "actual physical control"
portion of the DUI statute presupposes the presence of a
vehicle that can be controlled. The threat that is targeted by
this part of the DUI statute is the danger that a parked
vehicle will be put in motion by an intoxicated occupant and
thereby pose a risk to the safety of the occupant and others.
This targeted risk does not exist when the vehicle is not
operable, nor subject to being readily made operable, nor in
motion (whether by coasting or being pushed), nor at risk of
coasting. If a vehicle cannot be moved it is not a motor
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2015 Ida. App. LEXIS 25, *l
vehicle capable of being "controlled," and the reason for the
statutory prohibition does not exist. Consequently, the
statute is not violated when the vehicle is not in motion or
susceptible of easily being placed in motion.

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Blood Alcohol & Field
Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > Refusals to Submit

Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Vehicular Crimes> Driving
Under the Influence > Elements

HN8 A defendant's refusal, protest, or objection to alcohol

HN4 For purposes of driving under the influence, when

there is evidence from which a fact-finder could sensibly
conclude that the vehicle was reasonably capable of being
rendered operable, the issue is for the jury.
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search &
Seizure > Warrants
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Warrantless Searches >
Consent to Search > Sufficiency & Voluntariness
Evidence > Burdens of Proof > Preponderance of Evidence
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Driving Under the Influence>
Blood Alcohol & Field Sobtiety Testing > Admissibility
HNS Requiring a person to submit to a blood draw for
evidentiary testing is a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Idaho
C011st. art. I. § 17. Therefore, warrantless forced blood

draws are generally violative of the state and federal
constitutions. However, the warrant requirement does not
apply if the person subjected to the search has consented.
Consent must be voluntary and not the result of duress or
coercion, either direct or implied. The voluntariness of an
individual's consent is evaluated in light of all the
circumstances. Mere acquiescence to a claim of authority by
a law enforcement officer does not constitute consent.
Whether consent was granted voluntarily, or was a product
of coercion, is a question of fact to be determined by all the
surrounding circumstances. The State bears the burden to
prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Warrantless Searches >
Consent to Search > Sufficiency & Voluntariness
HN6 Consent, once given, may also be revoked, for

inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the
right of the person to withdraw that consent. Thus, after a
defendant has revoked consent, officers no longer may act
pursuant to that initial voluntary consent. Of course, an
individual may renew his consent after revoking it.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Blood Alcohol & Field
Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > General Overview
HN7 See Idaho Code Ann. §_J~-800@.

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Warrantless Searches >
Cons~nt to Search > Sufficiency & Voluntariness

concentration testing terminates the implied consent. An
implied consent statute such as Idaho's, Idaho CMe A1111. §
U/-8002(1 ), does not justify a warrantless blood draw from
a driver who refuses to consent or objects to the blood draw.
Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the
right of the person to withdraw that consent.

Counsel: Sara B. ThomaR, State Appellate Public Defender;
Justin M. Cu1tis, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise,
for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Russell J.
Spencer, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

Judges: LANSING, Judge. Chief Judge MELANSON
CONCURS. Judge GRATTON, CONCURRING TN PART
AND DISSENTING IN PART.
Opinion by: LANSING

Opinion
LANSING, Judge
Brant Lee Eversole entered a conditional guilty plea to a
charge of operating a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, preserving his right to appeal orders denying a
suppression motion and a motion to dismiss. He argues that
evidence of his blood alcohol content should have been
suppressed. He also contends that the charges should have
been dismissed because his vehicle was not operational.

I.

BACKGROUND
An officer observed Eversole in the driver's seat of a truck
located in front of a bar. The truck was high-centered on a
two-foot tall ''brick berm," such that the rear wheels of the
["'21 vehicle did not touch the ground. Two other men were
providing help, trying to get the vehicle off of the berm by
lifting the vehicle with a jack. In the officer's view, the jack
strategy was unlikely to work and he described it as a
"feeble" effort, but he also opined that their strategy might
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work if the jack was positioned "a little bit differently." 1
The officer approached the individuals, and his observations
led him to believe that Eversole was intoxicated. The officer
began administering field sobriety tests. Eversole attempted
to complete some of the field sobriety tests, but refused to
complete them all. Because the attempted tests indicated
intoxication, Eversole was arrested. Thereafter, Eversole
additionally refused to submit to a breath alcohol
concentration test. Eversole was then taken to a hospital and
his blood was drawn. The blood test showed that 1*31
Eversole had an alcohol concentration of .279 grams of
alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic centimeters of blood,
well over the threshold required to prove "excessiveness" as
defined in Idaho Code. § /8-8004C. Eversole was charged
with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol in violation of /.C. §§ 18-8004(1 Jfu), 18-8005(9).
Eversole filed a motion to suppress the results of his blood
draw. Rather than conducting an evidentiary hearing on the
suppression motion, the parties stipulated to the facts to be
considered by the district court, including the following:
At the time of his arrest, Mr. Eversole refused to
provide a breath sample for the purpose of
determining his blood alcohol content.
Upon the Defendant's refusal to provide a breath
sample, Deputy Morgan transported the Defendant
to Bingham Memorial Hospital where Tiffany
Henderson, a technician in the lab, drew Mr.
Eversole's blood pursuant to Deputy Morgan's
request.
Eversole conceded that under Idaho statutes, as applied in
then-current Idaho case law, persons driving within the state
gave implied consent to wa1Tantless blood draws.
Nevertheless, he argued that the Idaho precedents regarding
warrantless blood draws had been abrogated by a recent
United States 1"'41 Supreme Court decision. The district
court held that the Idaho precedents had not been overruled
and that an objection to alcohol testing does not invalidate
statutorily implied consent. Accordingly, it denied Eversole's
suppression motion.
Eversole also filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the
State could not prove that the vehicle was operable at the

time he was in it. The district court disagreed and held there
was some evidence that Eversole and his companions could
have moved the vehicle within a short time, rendering it
operable. On this basis, it held that the question of operability
should be submitted to the trier of fact.
Following the denial of the suppression motion and the
motion to dismiss, Eversole entered a conditional Alford2
plea preserving his right to appeal the denial of these two
motions.

II.
ANALYSIS
On- appeal, Eversole argues that the district court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss and by denying his
suppression motion.

A. The District Court Properly Denied the Motion to
Dismiss

HNI This Cou1t reviews a district court's decision on a
motion to dismiss a criminal action for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Martine?.-Grmzn/ez. 152 Idaho 775, 778,
275 P.3d I. 4 (Cl. App. :!012); State

1•.

Dixon. /40 Idaho 301.

KM, 92 l~3d 55 {L 554 (Ct. Au/L1_004 /: see Idaho Crimi11al
Rule 48(a). When a trial court's discretionary decision is
["'51 reviewed on appeal, the Court determines whether the
lower court: (I) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion
and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the
specific choices before it; and (3) reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Jdulw 598, 600, 768
P.2d 1331. 1333 (1989); State 1,: Pole. /39 Jdaho 370. 372,
79 P.3d 729. 731 (Ct. App. 2003i.
Below and on appeal, Eversole argues that the charges
should have been dismissed because the truck was stuck on
the berm and was therefore inoperable. 3 Idaho Code section
/8-80(J./.{l)(a) describes the offense of driving under the
influence as follows:

HN2 It is unlawful for any person who is under the
influence of alcohol ... to drive or be in actual

1
The officer believed that the most expedient means of moving the car would have been to pull the vehicle loose using a tow strap.
The vehicle was eventually towed off by a tow truck. However, at the time the officer observed the vehicle, he did not see any other
vehicles that could be used to tow the truck off of the berm.

2

See Norrh Cmvlina v. Alf'onl. 400 U.S. '.!5. 91 S. Ct. 160.,_27 L. Ed. '.!d.162 (1970>.

Because we conclude that the motion was properly denied on the merits. we need not detennine whether the motion amounted to an
impermissible motion for summary judgment in a criminal case. See SJ.file•,~ l\llev. 1.55 Idaho 972. 981. 318 P.3d 962. 971 (2014).

3
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physical control of a motor vehicle within this
state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or
upon public or private property open to the public.
(emphasis added). The statute further defines HN3 "actual
physical control" to mean "being in the driver's position of
the motor vehicle with the motor rnnning or with the motor
vehicle moving." /. C. § 18-800.f.(5). Interpreting this
language, this Court has held:
The "actual physical control" portion of the DUI
statute presupposes the presence of a vehicle that
can be controlled. The threat that is targeted by this
part of the DUI statute 1*6.1 is the danger that a
parked vehicle will be put in motion by an
intoxicated occupant and thereby pose a risk to the
safety of the occupant and others. This targeted
risk does not exist when the vehicle is not operable,
nor subject to being readily made operable, nor in
motion (whether by coasting or being pushed), nor
at risk of coasting. If a vehicle cannot be moved it
is not a motor vehicle capable of being "controlled,"
a~d the reason for the statutory prohibition does
not exist. Consequently, the statute is not violated
when the vehicle is not in motion or susceptible of
easily being placed in motion.

State v. Adams, /42 Idaho 305. 308. 127 P.3d 208, 211 (Ct.
Arm. 2005 ). Applying this rule, we held that HN4 "when
there is evidence from which a fact-finder could sensibly
conclude that the vehicle was reasonably capable of being
rendered operable, the issue is for the jury." Id.
Relying on Adams, Eversole argues that his vehicle was
neither "in motion ln]or susceptible of easily being placed in
motion." We disagree. The district court correctly determined
that the fact-finder r*71 could "sensibly conclude" that
Eversole and his companions were capable of rendering the
vehicle operational in a short period of time. A finder of fact
could have credited the officer's testimony that the jack
strategy could have worked if the jack was positioned "a
little bit differently." Therefore, the issue should be decided
by the trier of fact and the order denying dismissal was
proper.

B. The Warrantless Blood Draw Was Unconstitutional
and Test Results Must Be Suppressed
HNS Requiring a person to submit to a blood draw for
evidentiary testing is a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Artic:/e I.
Section 17 of the Jdaho Constitution. Schmaher I'.

California, 384 U.S. 757. 767. R6 S. Ct. 1826. 16 L. Ed. 2d
908 (1966); State v. \¥111[£ 157 Idaho 416, 4/R, 337 l~3d
575, 577 (20/ . /-). Therefore, warrantless forced blood draws
are generally violative of the state and federal constitutions.
Missouri v. McNeelv, U.S.
, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558,
/85 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013); Wulff. 157 Idaho at .f.ft), 337 P3rl
at 578. However, the warrant requirement does not apply if
the person subjected to the search has consented. Sclmerkloth
v. Busranwnte. 4 I 2 U.S. 218, 222. 93 S. Ct. 2041. 36 L. Ed.
2d 854 (1973); State v. Domi11guez. 137 Idaho 681, 683, 52
P.3d 325. 327 (Ct. Aap. 2002j. Consent must be voluntary
and not the result of duress or coercion, either direct or
implied. Schnecklorh, 412 U.S. at 248; Swte v. Whitelev,
124 Idaho 261. 264, R58 P.2d 800. 803 (Ct. App. 1993). The
voluntariness of an individual's consent is evaluated in light
of all the circumstances. United States v. Mendenhall. 446
U.S. 544. 557, 100 S. Ct. 1870. 6.f. L. Ed. 2d 497 (19801;
Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 226-27; State ,.. Hansel'J.,. 138.J.dJ.dw
791. 796. 69 P.3d /052. 1057 <2003); Whitelev, 124 Idaho
at 264. 858 l~2d at 803. Mere acquiescence to a claim of
authority by a law enforcement officer does not constitute
consent. Bumper v. Nonh Carolil!a, 39 l U.S. 543, 5.f.9. 88 S.
Ct. 1788. 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968); State 1•. Smith, 144 Idaho
4H2, 488, 163 /~3d JJ<J4, 1200 (2007); State 1•. :tietsorr, 145
Idaho 112. 118, 175 P.3d ROI. 807 (Ct. App. 2007). Whether
consent was granted voluntarily, or was a product of
coercion, is a question 1*81 of fact to be determined by all
the surrounding circumstances. Hansen. 13H Idaho at 796,
69 P.3d at 1057. The State bears the burden to prove consent
by a preponderance of the evidence. United Stares 1:
Matl<)('k • .f.15 U.S. 16.f., 177 11. l .f., 9-1 S. Ct. 988, 39 L Ed. 2d
242 (]<J74); Ilansen, 138 Ida/,() at 796, 69 P3d at 1057;

Slate v. Kilhv, 130 Jdalzo 747. 7.f.9. 947 P2d 420, .f.22 (Ct.
App. 19971.

HN6 Consent, once given, may also be revoked, for
"[i]nherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is
the right of the person to withdraw that consent." State i:
Halseth. 157 Idaho 643, 646. 339 P.3d 36.'1,__ 37 LJ20!.f.l.
Thus, after a defendant has revoked consent, officers no
longer may act pursuant to that initial voluntary consent.
State, . TI!ome, /41 Idaho 151, 15.f.. 106 P3d .f.77, 480 (Ct.
Aw. '2004/. Of course, an individual may renew his consent
after revoking it. Id.
Below, both the State and the district court relied upon
Idaho's implied consent statute, Idaho Code secrion
/8-80021 I), which states that HN7 "any person who drives
or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary
testing for concentration of alcohol." At the time of the
proceedings below, Idaho Supreme Court precedent held
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that this statutorily implied consent satisfied the consent
exception to the constitutional warrant requirement. State v.
Diaz, 144 ldahp 300.. 303. 160 P.3d 739, 742 (2007),
overruled by WullE 157 Idaho 41 n, 337 P.3d 575.
Additionally, and in contravention of the general rule that
consent may be withdrawn or revoked, our Supreme Court
had held that actions or statements revoking implied consent
were ineffective. Stare 1•. Woolerv. J16 Idaho 368. 373, 775
P.2d 12 JO, 12 J5 (1989), overruled by \Vu![(, 157 Idaho 416.
337 P.3d 575. These l.''9.1 points of law have recently
changed, however. In a series of recent decisions, the Idaho
Supreme Court reexamined its application ofldaho's implied
consent statute in light of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in McNeely, U.S. . 133 S. Ct. 1552.... 185 L. Ed.
2d 696. In Wulff. our Supreme Court concluded, "A holding
that the consent implied by statute is irrevocable would be
utterly inconsistent with the language in McNeely
denouncing categorical rules that allow warrantless forced
blood draws." Wulff. J57 Idaho at ./22. 337 P.3d at 581.
Accordingly, under current law, HN8 a defendant's refusal,
protest, or objection to alcohol concentration testing
terminates the implied consent:
[A]n implied consent statute such as ... Idaho's
does not justify a warrantless blood draw from a
driver who refuses to consent ... or objects to the
blood draw .... Inherent in the requirement that
consent be voluntary is the right of the person to
withdraw that consent.
Halseth. 157 Idaho at 646, 339 1~3d at 371. See also State
11. t1rrottu. 157 ldaho 773. 774. 339 P.3d 1177. 1178 (2014)
("A suspect can withdraw his or her statutorily implied
consent to a test for the presence of alcohol.").

In this case, Eversole refused to participate in a breath test
for alcohol concentration. He thereby withdrew any implied
consent created by /. C. § 18-8002(1 J. After this refusal of
the breath test, he was taken to a hospital 1'*1111 where a
blood sample was drawn for alcohol testing. Because
Eversole's implied consent already had been revoked, the
consent exception to the warrant requirement was
inapplicable unless the State proved some subsequent action
or statement by Eversole renewing his consent. The State
did not do so. The stipulated facts include no information
regarding Eversole's reaction to the officer's demand for a
blood draw. Even if Eversole did not specifically object to
the blood draw, that absence of a second objection would be
immaterial, for by refusing to submit to a breath test he had

already withdrawn the statutorily implied consent. Under
the rule announced in Halseth, and elaborated in Wulf( and
ArrQL(Q, this withdrawal was effective and terminated the
operation of the "implied consent" imposed by statute. As
the State presented no evidence of consent to the blood
draw, that blood draw was an impermissible warrantless
search, and the test results must be suppressed.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is vacated and this
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Chief Judge MELANSON CONCURS.

Concur by: GRATTON (In Part)
Dissent by: GRATTON (In Part)

Dissent
Judge ORATION, CONCURRING IN PART 1·~111 AND
DISSENTING IN PART.
I concur with the Court's conclusion regarding the motion
to dismiss; however, 1 disagree with the Court's conclusion
regarding the motion to suppress. Specifically, I disagree
with the Court's finding, whether factual or as a matter of
law, that Eversole's refusal to take the breath test was a
withdrawal of his implied consent for all purposes including
other evidentiary testing.
The motion to suppress in this case was submitted on a
stipulation of facts regarding defendant's motion to suppress.
fn that stipulation, it is agreed that:
3. At the time of his arrest, the Defendant refused
to provide a breath sample for the purpose of
determining the Defendant's blood alcohol content.
4. Upon the Defendant's refusal to provide a
breath sample, Deputy Morgan transported the
Defendant to Bingham Memorial Hospital where
Tiffany Henderson, a technician in the lab, drew
his blood pursuant to Deputy Morgan's request.
(Emphasis added.) The district court recited the statements
in the stipulation verbatim as its findings of fact. The district
court made no further findings regarding Eversole's refusal. 1
Most assuredly, Eversole refused or objected and thereby
withdrew his implied consent to evidentiary breath testing.

1
Indeed, there is nothing to the contrnry in the record. In the officer's [•J 121 affidavit of probable cause, the officer reported that
"[Eversole] stated he understood the form and would not consent to the breath test."
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There is absolutely nothing in the stipulated facts, submitted
and relied upon for the motion to suppress, which expressly
relates to any objection, refusal, or withdrawal of implied
consent by Eversole to submit to an evidentiary blood test.
The record is completely devoid of any mention of protest
to the blood test. One simply cannot read the stipulated facts
to expressly include a refusal or withdrawal of implied
consent to the blood test. Therefore, to the extent the Court
is holding that the stipulated evidence of "refusal to provide
a breath sample" is, as a matter of fact, also a refusal to
submit to any further evidentiary testing, including blood
testing, I cannot agree.
Similarly, I cannot agree with the Court to the extent it is
implying a refusal of blood testing from the refusal of breath
testing. Certainly, most people would rather submit to the
less intrusive breath test than a blood test. But, the refusal of
a breath [*13] test does not support an implication that the
person is also refusing a blood test, even though it is a more
intrusive procedure. Any number of valid reasons exists for
refusing a breath test but not a blood test. The blood test is
more accurate (which could be exculpatory). An individual
may know of, or be embarrassed by, a medical condition
that would make the breath test difficult or impossible. See
Hel{rich v. State, 131 Idaho 349. 351, 955 P.2d 1128. 1130
(Ct. AmJ. 1998/ (''Helfrich sufficiently articulated a physical
inability to complete the [breath test] so as to put the officer
on notice that a different test should be utilized."). An
individual may have had a prior experience with difficulties
in performing breath testing. Whatever the potential reason,
refusal of one test does not imply refusal of another. 2 Again,
to the extent the Court is implying a refusal or withdrawal
of implied consent to a blood test from refusal of a breath
test, I cannot agree.
So, without I" 141 an express or implied factual basis for
finding withdrawal of implied consent by Eversole to blood
testing, it seems apparent that the Court is holding that his
refusal of the breath test operates, as a matter of law, as a
refusal and withdrawal of consent to any and all evidentiary
testing. Indeed, the Court states: "In this case, Eversole
refused to participate in a breath test for alcohol
concentration. He thereby withdrew any implied consent
created by /.C. § 18-8002( //." On what basis this
determination is made I cannot discern. The Court provides
no analysis of what is required to withdraw all consent or,
on a textual or policy basis., how refusal of the breath test
operates to withdraw all implied consent.

In State v. Arrotta. I 57 Idaho 773, 774. 339 P.3d II 77. JJ78
(20 I 4 ), the Court held that: "A suspect can withdraw his or
her statutorily implied consent to a test for the presence of
alcohol." (Emphasis added.) That is exactly what happened
here; under the stipulated facts, Eversole withdrew his
implied consent to "a test," namely, a breath test. In Sf.ate .!'c
Halseth. 157 Idaho 643, 339 P.3d 368 (20 I.//, the Idaho
Supreme Court held that the implied consent statute does
not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver who
objects to the blood draw and that "by objecting to the blood
draw, Defendant withdrew [*15] his implied consent." Id. ar
6./6, 339 P.3d at 371. Halseth protested the blood draw,
stating: "You can't take my blood! I refused! How can you
just take it without my permission?" Id. at_§£!:., 339 P.3d at
369. Under present law, a driver may certainly withdraw his
or her consent to an evidentiary test. I find no support for the
conclusion that refusal as to one specific test is a withdrawal
of statutorily implied consent to any evidentiary testing. In
Helfrich. /31 Idaho at 351. 955 P2d at //30, we stated that
"nothing in Helfrich's behavior suggested to the officer that
she would refuse to submit to a different type of alcohol
concentration test." If Helfrich's initial refusal operated to
withdraw all implied consent, she would not need to "refuse
to submit to a different type of alcohol concentration test."
Id.
In Mill$.. v. S\1'a11so11 1 93 Idaho 279. 280• ./60 P.2d 704, 705
(1969), the Supreme Court addressed whether a driver's

silence when requested to submit to chemical testing of the
blood constituted a refusal for purposes of an administrative
license suspension. In that case, the Court detem1ined that
where the driver had been in an accident, was bleeding, had
lost numerous teeth, had sustained head injuries, a fracture
of the periosteum, and was conscious but dazed, silence in
response to a request for testing did not constitute a refusal
["'161 for purposes of license suspension. Id. at 279-81, 460
P.2d at 70./-06. The Court framed the question as whether
the driver's silence in response to the request for a chemical
test of the blood constituted "a withdrawal of the statutorily
granted consent to such test." Id. at 280. 460 P.2d at 705.
The Court analyzed what constitutes a refusal and withdrawal
of consent.
This court in the case of Stme v. Bock. 80 /d'1lu,1.
296. 308. 328 P.2d /065, 1072 (19581, said:
By operating a motor vehicle in this state
the defendant is "deemed to have given
his consent to a chemical test". The only

Consider the opposite situation; the individual was first offered and refused blood testing and then was given a breath test, as to which
there was no apparent protest. Would the Court, by implication, deem the refusal of the blood test to be a refusal of the less intrusive
breath test?

2
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way he can withdraw that consent is to
expressly refuse the test. So under our law
if he neither refuses nor consents,
expressly, the test may be made.

In the case at bar, the respondent did not at any
time expressly refuse to take the test. Expressly
means in direct or unmistakable tenns. Webster's
Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged);
Black's Law Dictionary 692 (Revised 4 ed. 1968).
Expressly means declared and not merely left to
implication. Magone ~: Heller. 150 U..'i.,_]Q._1.1.
S.Ct. 18. 37 L.Ed. JOO! (1883!; Citv & Coumv of
San Francisco v. Wesrem Airlin.§. L Inc.. 204
Cal.Apn.':!d 105. 22 Cal.Rvt1; 216 (1962).

Mills. 93 Idaho ar 280, 460 P.2d at 705. The Mills Court
concluded that where an individual has neither refused nor
consented, it cannot be said that there was an express refusal
to take the test. Id. 3 This holding is consistent with the
recent Supreme Court decision in Halseth. 157 Idaho at
646, 339 P.3d ar 37 l (requiring that the driver either consent
[* 17]
or object). Since a refusal and withdrawal of
implied consent must be express and may not be "merely
left to implication," ,Wills. 93 Idaho at 280. 460 P.2d nt 705,
I cannot agree that, under the stipulated facts in this case,
Eversole expressly refused or withdrew his implied consent
to evidentiary blood testing.

Note that both the Mills and Bock Courts repeatedly reference refusal the take "the test." In my view, these cases support the
proposition that refusal must be test specific (or a clear and express refusal as to all evidentiary testing).

3
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

OPINION ON APPEAL

THOMAS TOWNSEND,

Defendant-Appellant.

ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: ELIZABETH H. ESTESS
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: ABBY KOSTECKA
Thomas Townsend appeals from the decision of the magistrate denying his
motion to suppress.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The appellant was arrested for Driving Under the Influence, a violation of Idaho
Code § 18-8004. A blood draw took place after he was in custody. The appellant moved
to exclude evidence derived from the warrantless blood draw. The magistrate denied
the motion to suppress following hearing. The appellant appeals from the denial of the
motion to suppress evidence and the finding that the blood draw evidence obtained in
the case was admissible. The appellant pied guilty conditioned on his ability to appeal
the magistrate's denial of his suppression motion. See Stipulation to Enter Conditional
Plea of Guilty (December 10, 2013).
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The magistrate found the following facts:
On March 23, 2013 at approximately 1:30 a.m., Detective Bill Weires of
the Ada County Sheriff's Office was on patrol in northwest Boise, Idaho.
Weires testified that he was northbound on Glenwood following a
Chevrolet pickup which was also northbound on Glenwood. The pickup
truck was driven by Defendant Thomas Townsend (hereafter 'Townsend')
turned left from Glenwood onto State Street. Townsend turned to the left
of the concrete barrier on State Street and proceeded west bound in the
east bound lanes of State Street. Townsend was traveling the wrong way
into the oncoming east bound lanes. Weires turned on the overhead lights
of his patrol vehicle. Townsend proceeded approximately another 40 feet
before turning left into a Wal-Mart parking lot. Weires testified that
Townsend turned off State Street at the first pull out after traveling less
than a quarter mile in the wrong direction in the east bound lanes.
Weires approached the pickup and identified the driver as the Defendant
Townsend, who was seated in the driver's side position. There were two
passengers in the pickup. Wei res immediately detected a. strong odor of
alcohol coming from the cab of the truck. He also noted that Townsend
had glassy, red eyes, that his speech was thick-tongued and slurred.
Townsend told Weires that he had just left Shorty's Saloon on North
Glenwood.
Because there were two passengers in the vehicle Weires called into
dispatch for an officer to assist as backup. Townsend and the passengers
remained in the truck until Deputy Lakey, ACSO, arrived 10 minutes later.
Weires continued his investigation of Townsend by having him exit his
vehicle. During conversation Townsend admitted that he had consumed
four beers and later admitted that he had consumed seven beers while at
Shorty's Saloons. Weires testified that Townsend performed poorly on the
standard field sobriety tests. Townsend failed all three field sobriety tests
and was arrested for suspicion of Driving Under the Influence.
Wei res placed Townsend in the back seat of his patrol vehicle where he
played the Administrative License Suspension (ALS) audio that notifies
suspects of the potential penalties for refusing to submit to evidentiary
testing and waited 15 minutes before requesting Townsend to submit to a
breath test on the Lifeloc FC20. Weires determined that Townsend had
not burped, belched or vomited during the 15 minute waiting period.
After receiving an explanation of the test Townsend quickly blew into the
instrument and then stopped on his first attempt on the Lifeloc rendering
an insufficient. Weires again explained in detail how the test was
conducted and what Townsend was required to do. Weires explained to
Townsend that if he did not comply with the Lifeloc test that he would need
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to take a blood sample. Townsend then simply failed to exhale any air on
his second attempt. Townsend stated that he was not going to comply with
the test and that Weires would have to take his blood. Townsend was
transported to the Ada County Jail to submit a blood sample. After arriving
at the Ada County Jail, an Ada County paramedic drew blood samples
from Townsend. Weires testified that Townsend was polite and compliant
and that he did not physically resist the blood draw.
Weires testified that he never informed Townsend that he could opt out of
the blood draw. He simply told Townsend that if didn't comply with the
breath test that he would do a blood draw. Townsend testified that he
objected to the blood draw procedure and protested that the procedure
violated his constitutional rights. These objections were not voiced to
Weires, but could have been made to someone else at the Ada County
Jail. Townsend further testified that jail staff told him that if he did not
cooperate they would hold him down and take his blood. Townsend
admitted that no one ever held him down. He stated that he never gave
anyone permission to take his blood and that he did not physically resist
the blood drawing.
Ultimately Townsend was cited and was charped with Driving Under the
Influence a violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004 and Failure to Purchase a
Driver's License, a violation of Idaho Code § 49-301. On April 25, 2013
Townsend filed a motion to suppress evidence ...
The State ... submitted the affidavits of Detective Joe Andreoli and Cecily
Willerton and the narrative report and probable cause affidavit of Detective
Weires in opposition to the motion [to suppress]. Detective Andreoli's
affidavit states that telephonic warrants were not in use in Ada County as
of March 2013 and expedited search warrants in drunk driving (DUI) cases
were unavailable in March 2013. Andreoli's affidavit further states that
procuring a warrant during the daytime could take three and one half to
four hours while nighttime warrants would take additional time. Andreoli's
affidavit also indicates that obtaining a search warrant in a DUI would
have taken a minimum of one and one half hours in March 2013.
Cecily Willerton's affidavit states that between 6:30 p.m. March 22 and
5:55 a.m. on March 23, 2013 20 individuals were arrested and booked at
the Ada County Jail. Forty-five percent of these bookings (or 9 cases)
were for DUI. Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress
Evidence, at 1-3.

1The amended complaint states Mr. Townsend had a "an alcohol concentration of .08 or more, to wit: .154
as shown by an analysis of his blood .... " Amended Complaint, at 2.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving
a trial de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court.
State v. ~enner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of
law or statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller,
134 Idaho 458,462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000).
"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the
trial court." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2007).
"When reviewing 'seizure' issues, we defer to the trial court's factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. 2 We freely review, de novo, the trial court's legal
determination of whether or not an illegal seizure occurred." State v. Schwarz, 133
Idaho 463, 466, 988 P.2d 689, 692 (1999).

ANALYSIS

The appellant raises the following issues: (1) "[d]oes Idaho's implied consent
statute create a valid exception to the warrant requirement when consent was
revoked?" and (2) "[u]nder the 'totality of the circumstances' was the warrantless and
nonconsensual blood draw justified under the exigency exception to the warrant
requirement?" Brief of Appellant, at 4.

also State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234, 127 P.3d 133, 137 (2005) ("The Court accepts the trial
court's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.").
2See
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1. Consent
The first issue asserted by Mr. Townsend is his contention that the blood draw
was unauthorized because he "objected to and denied permission for a blood draw.
Despite the clear lack of consent for the blood draw, the officers forcibly drew
Townsend's blood." Brief of Appellant, at 7.
At the time of the magistrate's decision, which included his determination that the
appellant impliedly consented to the blood draw, 3 State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303,
160 P.3~ 739, 742 (2007), which held that Idaho drivers have "given ... implied consent
to evidentiary testing by driving on an Idaho road [and they] also gave ... consent to a
blood draw" had not been overruled. It now has.
The Idaho Supreme Court now "hold[s] that an implied consent statute such as ..
. Idaho's does not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver who refuses to consent
... or objects to the blood draw ... Consent to a search must be voluntary. Inherent in
the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that
consent.'.' State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014).
The magistrate did not specifically rule on the issue of whether or not the
appellant consented to the blood draw, having decided that the blood draw was
authorized due to implied consent and exigent circumstances. The court will, therefore,
address the exigent circumstances issue first. See, e.g., MacLeod v. Reed, 126 Idaho
669, 670, 889 P .2d 103, 104 (Ct. App.1995) ("[W]here a judgment of the trial court is
based upon alternative grounds, the fact that one of the grounds may be in error is of no

3Memorandum

Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress Evidence, at 5-7 ("Implied consent was given as a
matter of Idaho law, which qualifies as a valid exception to the warrant requirement.").
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consequence and may be disregarded if the judgment can be sustained upon one of the
other grounds.").
2. Exigent Circumstances

Mr. Townsend's second contention is "under the totality of the circumstances, the
warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw was not justified under the exigency
exception to the warrant requirement." Brief of Appellant, at 7.
In Missouri v. McNeely, _U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L.Ed.2d 696
(2013), the Supreme Court stated "[i]n those drunk-driving investigations where police
officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates
that they do so." In other words, there is no per se exigency exception to the warrant
requirement because of the dissipation of blood alcohol evidence. See McNeely, 133
S.Ct. at' 1563 ("[W]hile the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a
finding of exigency in a specific case ... it does not do so categorically. Whether a
warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined
case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.").
In this case, the magistrate found as fact, "telephonic warrants were not available
and were not in use in Ada County in March 2013. Expedited search warrants were not
available in drunk driving cases in Ada County in March 2013." Memorandum Decision
Regarding Motion to Suppress Evidence, at 8 n. 1.
The magistrate concluded exigent circumstances were present here because
"Idaho law bars the state from extrapolating backwards to determine blood alcohol
content, shortening the available time to gather evidence" (Memorandum Decision
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Regarding Motion to Suppress Evidence, at 8) and because "[a]t the time of the arrest,
the anticipated delay in obtaining a warrant justified a blood test without judicial
authorization." Id., at 9.
As noted by the magistrate, McNeely states "BAC [blood alcohol content] .
evidence from a drunk-driving suspect naturally dissipates over time in a gradual and
relatively predictable manner." 133 S.Ct. at 1561. "But technological developments4 that
enable police officers to secure warrants more quickly, and do so without undermining
the neutral' magistrate judge's essential role as a check on police discretion, are
relevant to an assessment of exigency. That is particularly so in this context, where
BAC evidence is lost gradually and relatively predictably." 133 S.Ct. at 1562-63.
In Idaho dissipation of BAC evidence over time can result in a bar to prosecution,
because a person cannot be prosecuted for having a BAC that is not at or above the
statutory legal limit, when the testing does not demonstrate this. State v. Daniel, 132
Idaho 701, 979 P.2d 103 (1999). As then Justice Silak noted, this means "if a suspected
motorist can delay taking the BAC test long enough, the motorist will benefit from the
statute's bar to prosecution." 132 Idaho at 705,979 P.2d at 107. Consequently, the U.S.
Supreme Court's statement that dissipating BAC levels can be extrapolated backwards
to the time the vehicle was being driven may have scientific validity, it is not applicable
in Idaho to overcome the bar to prosecution when the testing does not demonstrate the
necessary BAC level.

4"Well

over a majority of States allow police officers or prosecutors to apply for search warrants remotely
through various means, including telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as
e-mail, and video conferencing. And in addition to technology-based developments, jurisdictions have
found other ways to streamline the warrant process, such as by using standard-form warrant applications
for drunk-driving investigations." 133 S.Ct. at 1562.
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In Idaho the consequence of the "gradual and relatively predictable" loss of BAC
evidence is heightened because the driver must have a BAC level at or over the legal
limit at the time of the test.
The magistrate found "the detective in this case was not privy to these
technological advances [that were set forth in McNeely]. Detective Andreoli's affidavit
states that in March 2013, telephonic warrants were not in use in Ada County, and
expedited search warrants were unavailable in drunk driving cases. The anticipated
time to obtain a search warrant for a DUI was, at the very minimum, one and one half
hours. The process at night could have potentially taken a significantly greater amount
of time." Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress Evidence, at 9-10. The
traffic stop occurred at approximately 1:34 a.m. The blood draw occurred at 3:00 a.m. In
the intervening time, the traffic stop was conducted, the investigation was undertaken,
field sobriety tests were conducted, and attempts were made to obtain a breath sample
from Mr. Thompson. See Probable Cause Affidavit. The reasonable inference is that
there was not a great deal of time elapsed between the time of the conclusion of the
final attempt to get a breath sample from Mr. Thompson and the blood draw.
The magistrate made the following analysis in determining exigency:
A number of circumstances in this case created a "totality" that justified a
warrantless blood draw. First, the inability of the state to extrapolate blood
results backwards makes the timeliness of when the blood is tested
particularly important in Idaho. Second, perhaps unlike other jurisdictions,·
the warrant application process in Ada County at the time was by no
means streamlined and the anticipated delays from the process (likely well
over two hours) threatened the availability of evidence. Third, the
defendant was first offered a less intrusive evidentiary testing method (a
breath test), but refused to submit it. Finally, with the defendant driving the
wrong direction down the street, admitting to having consumed seven
beers, and failing all three field sobriety tests, an excessive DUI could
have reasonably been suspected by the officer, carrying with that
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suspicion a greater interest in the State of prosecuting the violator. Based
on the totality of the circumstances, the exigencies of the situation justified
the warrantless blood draw.
Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress Evidence, at 10.
Under the state of the law and the absence of immediate access to
warrants. as the evidence indicates, the finding of exigent circumstances is
appropriate. Under the existing law voiding the implied consent provisions and
the current understanding that a warrant is necessary in short order it is likely the
result would differ.
CONCLUSION

The decision denying the motion to suppress is affirmed.
Dated this.& day of August 2015.
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I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the OPINION ON APPEAL as notice
pursuant to the Idaho Rules to each of the parties of record in this cause in envelopes
addressed as follows:

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
HON. JOHN HAWLEY, JR.
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MAURA OLSON
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-MD-2013-4110
Plaintiff-Respondent,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.
THOMAS N TOWNSEND,
Defendant-Appellant.
TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1) The above-named Appellant appeals against the above-named respondent to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final decision and order entered against
him in the above-entitled action on August 27, 2015, the honorable Gerald F.
Schroeder, District Judge, presiding.
2) That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders
under and pursuant to IAR 11 (c)(1-11).
3) A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Appellant then
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any list of issues on appeal shall not
prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal are:
a) Does Idaho's Implied Consent Statute create a valid exception to the
warrant requirement when consent is revoked?
b) Under the "Totality of the circumstances" standard, was the
warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw justified under the
exigency exception to the warrant requirement?
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4) Reporter's Transcript. The appellant requests the preparation of the entire
reporter's standard transcript as defined in IAR 25(d). The Appellant also
requests the preparation of the additional portions of the reporter's transcript:
a) Oral argument on appeal July 30, 2015 (Court Reporter: Tiffany Fisher.
Estimated pages: less than 100).
5) Clerk's Record. The Appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant
to IAR 28(b)(2). The Appellant requests the following documents to be
included in the clerk's record, in addition to those automatically included
under JAR 28(b)(2):
a) Any and all written requested jury instructions, written jury instructions
given by the court, modified or not given jury instructions, depositions,
briefs, memoranda, statements or affidavits considered by the court, or
considered on any motion made therein, and memorandum opinions or
decisions of the court.
b) Any exhibits, including but not limited to letters or victim impact
statements, addenda to the PSI or other items offered at the
sentencing hearing.
c) Transcript Lodged July 21, 2015.
d) Appellant's Brief April 20, 2015.
e) Respondent's Brief May 13, 2015.
6) I certify:
a) That copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court
Reporter(s) listed in paragraph 4 above.
b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (IDAHO
CODE§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, JAR 24(e)).
c) That there is no appellant filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal
case. (IDAHO CODE§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, IAR 23(a)(8)).
d) That the Ada County Public Defender's office will be responsible for
paying for the reporter's transcript, as the client is indigent (lDAHO CODE
§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, JAR 24(e)).
e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to !AR 20.
DATED this
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day of September 2015.

Eliz~
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I H~REBY CERTIFY, that on this __J_.J!:day of September 2015, I mailed (served) a
true and correct copy of the within instrument to:
Abby Kostecka
Ada County Prosecutor
Interdepartmental Mail
Tiffany Fisher
Court Reporter
Interdepartmental Mail
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TO:

Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
451 West State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720
(208) 334-2616

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
- - - - - - - - - - - x Docket No. 43553
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
THOMAS N. TOWNSEND
Defendant-Appellant.
-

-

-

X

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 22 PAGES LODGED
Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada,
Honorable Gerald Schroeder, Senior District Court Judge.

This transcript contains:
07-30-15

DATE:

Oral argument hearing

October 27, 2015

Tiffany
sher, Official Court Reporter
Officia Court Reporter,
Judge M issa Moody
Ada County Courthouse
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 979
Registered Professional Reporter
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Supreme Court Case No. 43553
Plaintiff-Respondent,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
THOMAS N. TOWNSEND,
Defendant-Appellant.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to
the Record:

1. Transcript of proceedings held June 24, 2013, Boise, Idaho, filed July 31, 2014.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 29th day of October, 2015.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Supreme Court Case No. 43553
Plaintiff-Respondent,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.

THOMAS N. TOWNSEND,
Defendant-Appellant.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

LAWRENCE 0. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Supreme Court Case No. 43553
Plaintiff-Respondent,
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.

THOMAS N. TOWNSEND,
Defendant-Appellant.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
11th day of September, 2015.
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